


THE WILL IN ETHICS

THEOPHILUS B. STORK



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The Will in Ethics

BY
THEOPHILUS B. STORK



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THE SHOP WINDOW WORD

All clever merchants put into their shop windows a display of their goods, not merely by way of attracting, but also, and chiefly, by way of informing possible customers what may be expected within.

In like manner the showman puts forth his gaudy pictures that the passerby may get a glimpse of the glories that await the purchaser of a ticket. It were well and convenient if the author might also give some notion of the contents of his book to the possibly critical gentleman who picks it up and exclaims, perhaps with some impatience: "Well, what is it all about anyhow: what is the fellow driving at? Is there any meat in this uncracked walnut of a book?" His thought being: "Must I wade through all these pages before I can tell what the shopper and theatergoer get so easy a glimpse of before making their venture?"

This very natural desire has in view the answering of two perfectly legitimate questions,—first and generally: Is there anything within worth looking at under any circumstances by anybody? And secondly and particularly,—granting the first question answered satisfactorily: Is that worthy anything of any worth to me?

It is for this reason the author essays this shop window word to briefly exhibit his wares and in a few sentences express the thought which he has attempted to elaborate more fully and at length in his book.

The particular will and the Universal will and their mutual relations to each other is the most absorbing and important theme that the intellect of man can dwell upon.

In it are hidden the mysteries of life, good and evil, happiness and misery. Once understand the true relations of the particular will to the Universal, and you hold in your hand the key to all things. This is the theme of the book, in which we seek to discover first what the will is, how we may know the Universal will as distinguished from the particular will, and what the rule or canon of their relation to each other; for the Universal will is and must be right and good altogether, and whether a particular will be good must depend upon its relation to the Universal will, upon whether it observes the rule of their relation. A good will must be a will harmonious, at one, with the Universal will; and this harmony of the particular will with the Universal will has two aspects,—one the internal side of feeling, the condition of the soul; the other the external side of conduct, the expression of that feeling in outward acts. On the internal side of feeling, harmony of will with the Universal will spells happiness for the particular will, the highest and only true happiness it is capable

of: on the external side of conduct, it spells right conduct, virtue and righteousness. The two are inseparable; a happy — that is, harmonious — will on the internal side must be a good will on the external side. Happiness and goodness are identical; they are but different aspects of the particular will harmonious with the Universal will. "Be good and you will be happy," is, therefore, no truer a maxim than the reverse: "Be happy and you will be good"; for true happiness, which is a harmonious internal will, must produce a harmonious external will,— that is, a will good in its conduct.

What, then, is meant by a harmonious will; and in what does the harmony of will with will consist? Plainly it must consist in the agreement of the tastes, ideas, traits, purposes which make up the content of the one will,— which are the will, in fact — with the tastes, ideas, traits, purposes which make up the content of the other will.

Briefly summarizing the conclusions on these various points, we endeavor to show first that the will is not, what for convenience in practical ethics we are so prone to consider it, a faculty hypostatized as a judge which upon every occasion chooses and decides this or that particular course of conduct. This is too narrow a view, and leads to those problems of Determinism and Free Will which are so unprofitable and, as will presently appear, so unnecessary.

The particular will, man's will, is the man, his

whole intellectual and emotional capacity, made up of his tastes, his appetites, passions, knowledge, habits, his relations with all that surrounds him. In other words, the will is the man; and not the man separated, isolated from all about him, but the man as part of the whole, with a place and relation to the Universe. The particular will is part of the Universal will, not to be understood or treated as separate, but only as part of the Universal. The Universal will manifests itself through the many particular wills that go to make it up. How this can be, how the Universal will and the many particular wills interpenetrate each other, and yet each preserves its own identity, neither lost in the other, but each particular will receiving its true significance from the Universal and being itself only as it is part of the Universal, so that the more intensely and truly it becomes part of the Universal, the more intensely and truly it is itself; this is not easy to understand on its intellectual side and viewed by reason, for reason cannot deal with reality in all its truth. Feeling, however, our own feeling,—which is reality,—gives us a glimpse of this profound and wondrous truth that the identity of the particular is bound up with its relations to the Universal will; as it recognizes this relationship, it gains a power and a joy impossible to it separate and isolated, opposed to the Universal. For in feeling, which is my reality, I never realize my entire self, my identity as a particular will on the emotional side, except as I participate in the great

Universal feelings ; so alone do I become truly myself. Hints and glimpses of this we have a-plenty if we will but know them. Who has not felt the intensifying effect on his particular will of sharing with some vast multitude some common feeling that carried all away as by a single impulse, every heart beating as one, every lip voicing one thought ! This is an experience we all have had in greater or less degree, and to it we can confidently appeal in proof of the profound truth that in the Universal will, as part of it, the particular will finds its own identity emphasized and intensified a thousandfold. It may have been only the wild enthusiasm of college boys over a baseball or football game ; it may have been a vast convention fused into a single feeling by a great orator ; whatever the occasion, there is no denying the real and intense joy which the particular will gains by this becoming part of a greater, more Universal will.

In still fainter degree we know the happiness of the communion of friend with friend,—the interchange and sharing of feelings, tastes, ideas, the harmony of particular will with particular will, which we call friendship ; the intense and higher harmony we call love. For this is the beginning of the higher harmony of particular will with the Universal will, since it is only by harmony with each particular will — our friend, our lover, our neighbor — that we can attain the greater harmony. We only know the Universal by and through those particulars that help constitute it.

How essential to all true happiness is this harmony of will with will, and so with the Universal will, may be seen in two remarkable ways. First, it is quite evident that the very moment a particular will harbors feelings, ideas, not in harmony with part of the Universal will, it falls into unhappiness. All dividing feelings — envy, jealousy, hatred — make men miserable because they tend to destroy those relations which bind each particular into the whole. They negate the true relation of the particular and the Universal to each other, — namely, union and harmony, — and substitute division and conflict, and so separate that which is one into many parts. And secondly, on the other hand, feelings of harmony such as love, sympathy with others, make men happy in feeling and good in conduct, for they unite all particular wills to each other and so to the Universal will. Homely examples of this are not wanting: Let me dislike, envy, or hate a man, and every success of that man, every piece of good fortune he receives, stabs me like a dagger; I am miserable because of my in-harmonious will. But suppose I have the reverse of all these feelings toward him; I think his thoughts, feel his emotions, sympathize with him, love him; his success is then mine; I rejoice as much as he does; his joy and pride flow over and fill my soul too, for we are now united in feeling, no longer separate; we are one in our common feelings, and through him one with that Universal will of which he is but part, it is true, but the part which, since

it is next to and in close contact with *mé*, represents the Universal for me there and now. Thus the parent unselfishly shares and really has the success achieved by his child; their harmony of will with will obliterates all distinction of the two; they each enjoy the triumph of the other; there is no thought of jealousy or envy; perfect sympathy and love drive out all dividing feeling. This gives us a foreshadowing *in petto* of that greater, completer harmony of the particular will with the Universal will which will be the heaven of the next world, for it will be the perfect recognition by the particular will of its relations to the Universal will, and a harmony with it of which the examples cited are but faint *adumbra*.

Thus by our feelings are we made to know the great truth that the particular will must find its happiness in the harmony of the particular will with the Universal will of which the instances just cited are imperfect, partial examples. And, further, we learn that the particular will can never be itself, realize its own identity fully, as a separate, independent will, isolated from or opposed to the Universal will, but only as part of it, bound up with it, partaking of its content, contributing to that content, making a part of the Universal will.

And this enables us to understand the freedom of the will; how the particular will may be itself, retain its own identity, while being a part of the Universal will. To deny freedom to the particular will except as it is independent of the Universal

will, separate and apart from it, is to ignore the nature of the relation between the two. The particular will is not part of the Universal will by merely physical juxtaposition with other parts and with the whole; the part is in the whole and the whole in it; they interpenetrate; the whole would not be itself without the part, nor would the part be itself save in the whole, and bound up in the whole. This is hard to understand as an abstraction, but is expressed for our intelligence in the anthropomorphic language of the Scriptures: "He" (that is, the Universal will conceived thus) . . . dwelleth in me." (the particular) "and I in Him." * My acts, therefore, are free, although influenced by motive, by environment, by heredity, for all these are my relations with the Universal will, and so are part of my identity as a particular will. A motive only influences me by becoming part of myself, because it finds in me that which responds to it; and so of other influences of my surroundings,—they only affect me as they become or are part of myself. My ancestors, too, are myself. My choice or decision of to-day may have been made centuries ago, and I may express in some act of to-day what a cave-dwelling ancestor of the stone age, or armor-clad crusader, or a burgher of the Middle Ages, thought, felt, and was. Thus is to be understood the unity of the particular will with the Universal. I myself am part of the Universal, the whole. My relation to the whole con-

* St. John VI: 56; also I John III: 24; IV: 15, 16.

stitutes me, what I am; it is a part of my own identity, of my own particularity, to be part of the whole; and all and every one of these relations go to constitute my identity. I am not the less, but the greater, by reason of these relations.

It remains to discover what the canon or rule of the relations of the particular will to the Universal will must be on the external side of conduct. In other words, what is right conduct of the particular will with regard to the Universal will. And as preliminary to this it becomes necessary to inquire how we may know the Universal will as distinguished from the particular.

Our only knowledge of the Universal will must be through the particular wills which, as we have already had occasion to remark, are part of it and go to make it up. It may well be asked how, among a variety and diversity of particular wills, any notion of the Universal will can be gotten. Two criterions, however, we have which enable us to recognize the Universal will when it appears: First, is its universality, its presence in all particulars; second, its necessity, the compulsory character of all its manifestations. When, for example, we find — as we do — certain traits, desires, characteristic qualities, that are common to all particulars, we may be sure that these are parts of the Universal will expressed in them. What the majority of sane, average, normal men think, feel, and are, we may be sure expresses the Universal will in them. “*Vox populi, vox Dei*” serves as a rough

expression of this principle; that is to say, the average sense of the majority of men is an expression of God's will, that is the Universal will.

And when, likewise, we are aware of a trait or characteristic which exercises compulsion over us, which we cannot escape or change or modify, but must yield obedience to it, we recognize such as part of the Universal will. Independent of our own particular will, we have to regard it as part of the Universal will, and so we come to regard compulsions of our appetites, our hunger and thirst, the compulsions of our thinking, the conceptions, causality, identity, etc., as manifestations in our particular will of the Universal will.

Having thus ascertained what the Universal and particular wills are, we may now proceed to the rule or canon which governs their external relations; or, in other words, to ascertain how the particular will is to act in its conduct with regard to the Universal. On the internal side we have seen that it must be harmonious, and the question now arises: How, in its conduct, is the harmony of the Universal will and the particular will to be preserved?

It has been shown that the Universal will is made up of the particular wills; they are part of it just as it is part of them, and the harmony of the two must be an agreement of all, the content of each particular will with the content of the Universal will, that content being all the traits, desires, feelings, and so on, which make up the will. From the

foregoing, therefore, it is easy to draw the canon of their mutual relations, since the particular will has within it elements of the Universal will. And since its content helps to make up the content of the Universal will, it follows that to the maintaining true harmony of will the content of the particular will is to be retained and to be as rich and varied as possible, for so only will it be possible to have a rich and varied harmony with the Universal will; and not a single item of its content is to be eliminated save where it conflicts with the Universal will, for to strike out any part of that content is to strike out part of the Universal will of which the particular will is a part. The particularity of the particular will is, therefore, to be retained except where it conflicts with the Universal. This rule has important practical consequences which may be alluded to: First, it means that all the content of the particular will, its desires, its feelings, are right and good except where plainly they conflict with the Universal will. Sin only occurs where this occurs, and the good will is the will of the particular so ruled that all its contents are retained as far as possible without coming into conflict with the Universal will. Applying this canon, we are able to observe that the ascetic as well as the voluptuary are wrong: the ascetic in repressing those natural desires which go to constitute the contents of the particular will and so of the Universal, for the ascetic, in thus repressing them, represses the Universal will itself.

Finally it is to be observed that a good will thus defined as a will harmonious with the Universal will is the only good in and of itself without qualification or dependence on any other thing for its goodness. Likewise it is the happy will; put into anthropomorphic terms, it may be said to be the community of man's feelings and will with God's feelings and will, so far as man is capable thereof. Such capacity varies with each man: to each man, according to his capacity, is the gift of communion with God to come.

Of the gradual substitution of the Universal will for the particular, the gradual assimilation of the Universal by the particular will so that the particular will grows nearer and nearer to identity with the Universal will, only faint allusion can here be made. This does not mean an emptying of the particular will of its content, but a filling it full with the content of the Universal will; and so we come to the apotheosis of the particular will, and so are given to understand the splendid declaration of Hebrew inspiration: "He that loseth his life for my sake, shall find it." * He loses his particular will by assimilating the Universal will. His particular desires, feelings, are given up to receive back the Universal desires, feelings — a richer and fuller gift than all he has surrendered.

* St. Matthew X: 39.

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THE GOOD WILL

Kant has declared that the only good in the world that was good without any qualification was a good will.*

What a good will is, and what the will itself, thus becomes an important, perhaps the most important, question in Ethics.

Let us examine, then, first, what the will is, and, second, what a good will is in the light of this declaration.

THE WILL

The difficulty and confusion in our thinking of the will arise chiefly from two entirely independent sources; one practical, the other speculative and philosophical.

The necessities of practical ethics, the science of law and of government, the theory of rewards and punishments by society with respect to its members, require us to regard the will in one very especial and particular way. We have to consider

* "It is not possible to think of anything anywhere in the world or even outside it that can be regarded as good without any limitation, except only a good will." Quoted by Paulsen in his "Immanuel Kant" (1902), p. 338.

it as an especial, highly differentiated function of the mind which chooses, decides, weighs consequences, debates conduct, has to be urged by promises of reward to certain courses of action, to be deterred from others by threats of punishment. Thus we have come to hypostatize it, to appeal to it as if it were a person, with arguments, inducements, to act in one way rather than another.

Pursuing still further this practical path, we feel under the necessity of justifying the penalties and rewards we bestow by positing the will as free to choose any course of conduct it pleases and, therefore, as responsible and deserving the respective rewards bestowed or penalties inflicted. It is true that we then find ourselves confronted with the difficulty of reconciling the freedom of the will which we require, with the government by motive which we also must use in these dealings with the will by law and government. If the will responds to motives which form the springs of all its acts, if they are the cause and the act of will but the result, how can we call a will free that simply responds to motive; or if it be free, nevertheless, then what becomes of our government by law which seeks to coerce the will by presenting motives in the form of penalties that will compel the will to choose one course of conduct rather than another?

The truth is that in reality the will is not affected in this way at all. How many men, when tempted to commit crime, deliberately choose to refrain after weighing in their minds the penalty

prescribed in comparison with the gratification anticipated from the prohibited act? I venture to assert not one: the effect of law upon the will is of an entirely different sort. The law forbidding an act and laying down penalties educates the will, forms a new will in the man to that extent by coupling with the acts forbidden the acting idea or notion that such acts must not be done, this being emphasized by the penalty annexed thereto. Thus when the idea of these acts arises in the consciousness suggesting the putting them into execution, there comes with them that prohibiting idea that they must not be done, and so the will is educated by law; and the average man thus trained by law or even without express law, educated by habit, custom, the general sentiment of his fellow-men, never debates or deliberates at all; his will, without choosing, takes the course of conduct marked out for him by its education, its fixed constitution. Thus a good man does not hesitate or deliberate when the occasion for a dishonest act presents itself: he refuses at once, inevitably, automatically. It is his character, his education of his will, that instantly decides his act. To say, therefore, of such a man of fixed character, that his acts can be positively prognosticated in advance, is no reflection on the freedom or the strength of his will. On the contrary, it is only possible of weak minds, persons of no character either morally or mentally, vacillating imbeciles, that we say in popular language, "Oh, you can never tell what

he will do." By which we signify not freedom of the will, but rather that he is lacking character, without decided will. Enough of this here and now. When we come to the education of the will it will be in place to labor this point more at length.

Notwithstanding, however, the theoretical difficulties just pointed out, this treatment of the will answers very well for all the purposes of daily life; rewards and punishments play their part, if not exactly as we theoretically imagine, yet effectually.

The second or speculative source of our confusion in thinking the will, has to do with our methods of thinking, what might be called the laws of our thinking. It is to M. Bergson that credit is due for pointing out in a most distinguished way the weakness of the intellect for speculative work. It was his thesis that the human mind or intellect was only formed by evolution for the practical dealing with matter, and beyond that had no capacity. A fairer statement of the intellect's capacity or incapacity would have been that the intellect has a double duty to perform: it has the practical dealing with matter, the managing of our daily life in its various details; and it has the very different duty of speculative inquiry into the reality that lies back of these appearances, these phenomena. Its first service compels methods which are only suited for these practical matters. To deal with matter effectively it has to treat everything as lifeless and unchanging — the very contrary of the reality as we well know; it treats

everything as separate, independent of every other; it sets one thing over against another in its endeavor to think them so that it may deal practically with them. Its process is largely one of deliberate abstraction, of omission of much that in reality belongs to them. We see exaggerated examples of this in the treatment of the astronomers who deal with the heavenly bodies, and who, to facilitate their calculations, drop out all idea of any medium in which they move, assuming for their purpose that they swim in a vacuum; or the physicists who, in reasoning of forces, ignore the attraction of gravitation, assuming for the occasion that it does not exist; and so on.

In regard to the will, the error or confusion of thinking is more subtle; it concerns itself with the notion of causality, one of the essential elements of any method that would deal practically with matter. To get results in the world of matter, to think our ships, our houses, our machinery, we must think in this one particular way; namely, that no object acts by its own initiative; every object is dead; life, and the life impulse, as M. Bergson styles it, has no place; and to produce an effect on one object we must always have some other object with which to work that effect. Each object must also be considered as utterly cut off, separate, independent, of every other. Cause and effect themselves, the notion by which we work, are separate, cut off, external, to each other. It is a mechanical truth for mechanics only. It is from

the translation of this method into the philosophical world that our difficulty with the will arises. We apply the carpenter's rule of mechanics to the will; we treat the will as if it too were a bit of mechanical contrivance, moved by cause, made an effect, just as we treat the matter we work on for practical purposes of building ships, constructing houses, running machinery. But reality is not so constituted: in it objects are not all cut off, separate, but are all closely bound together, interpenetrate each other, so that often you cannot say where one thing ends and another begins; cause reaches forward into effect, effect lies latent in the bosom of cause. This world of reality is not mechanical; it is alive, full of self-initiative; even the most apparently fixed objects move — their molecules within, they themselves from without. The universe is a world made up of vitally connected parts; every part is part of the whole, and the whole is in every part; they cannot be separated, for they are inevitably and vitally one. To put one part over against another, to regard them as external to each other, is to misconstrue the whole conception of reality, and to leave it with no more vital connection than the mechanical ones we use or fabricate in the course of our practical dealing with it. If, however, taking this mechanical view of the world, we contemplate ourselves in connection with those other objects, what hinders us from thinking of ourselves in the same way, each of us in a separate, perfectly inanimate condition, like a block or

a stone, incapable of acting save when something impels us from without? We may recognize that we have what the block or stone lacks,—to wit, life; i. e., we can act without being acted upon; yet we only half grasp this conception of life, for the next moment we say we cannot conceive even the living thing acting except under the goad of a motive. Of a will that acts without motive or initiates an act of itself, we really form no sufficient idea. If we force ourselves for a moment to regard the will acting by its own initiative, we apparently abandon our old method but for a moment, to fly back to it again when we have to think it as but the result of previous forces that have caused it, made it what it is; and so take away all that we have given. Thus man and his will are left as simply the resultant of previously existing matter, a mere mechanically produced thing with no more freedom or independent existence than a block of granite.

Let us forget, if you please, for a moment, the conventional view of the will to which we are all accustomed; the view which concentrates itself on the mere act of willing; the manner of choosing and deciding, as if this was the all-important feature; that treats this to all intents and purposes as if it were alone and all the will. While this fits in quite well with the scheme of practical ethics, whose main concern is with outward acts and their effect on society, on the relation of each man with his fellow, it fails very noticeably when we deal with theoretical ethics. While not denying to those acts the

title of manifestations of the will, we must be careful not to allow them to become substituted for the will itself, which is much more than these acts. These acts of willing, critically examined, will show in reality a very different state of affairs from the metaphorical representations by which we are so fond of symbolizing them.

Let any one examine his own psychological experience; recall some act of will that by its importance impressed its processes on his memory. I venture to say that he will find very little of that deciding, that choosing of one thing, one path, rather than another. Whatever seeming deliberation he finds will turn out to be rather an intellectual effort to see, a prolonged process of perception of the situation or the circumstances presented to him; and that hesitation, or appearance of deliberating, weighing consequences, choosing a particular course of conduct, and the like, which gives to the process the appearance of a decision of the will, is nothing more than this. Once the circumstances or situation is clearly apprehended or supposed to be clearly apprehended, the decision of the will to act in a certain way follows, a consequence of the inherent qualities and character of the whole man. Once satisfied on this point of knowledge, the will acts at once; it hesitated as a traveler studying the sign posts at a cross roads, not for want of intention to go to a particular place, but for want of knowledge as to which road will take him there. Informed of this, he goes on without

hesitation ; we may say he chooses this road rather than that, but his choice is really nothing more than a definite continuation of his indefinite intention to go to that certain place previously determined in his mind.

The will, in other words, is the character of the whole man ; and his act of willing, which we usually call his will, is merely the manifestation of that character as it has to do with some particular occasion. His decision — or choice, if you choose to so style it — is not a new, original act requiring fresh initiative, the intervention of some deciding faculty that wills it at that particular instant. It is rather part of a continuous, connected process like the blooming of a flower, the growth of a leaf, a natural inevitable — I do not fear that word — working out of the whole man.

The choice or decision of to-day was made perhaps centuries ago, and I am expressing in some act of mine to-day what a cave-dwelling ancestor of the stone age, a burgher of the Middle Ages, or an armor-clad crusader thought, felt, and was. To suppose, because this is so, that I give up my individuality, cease to be myself, and become a mere automaton of history, is to misconceive the meaning of individuality, to fail to comprehend the places we each occupy and hold as a part of the whole with relation to the whole, and the preservation of my own identity as myself as part of the whole. Human identity cannot possibly consist in an independence of all relation with the rest of

the Universe, with the Universe past, present, and future. Its identity — indeed the identity of all things — consists in part of these very relations. I am not the less myself, but am myself, a richer and fuller self, by reason of my stretching my roots back into the past, and latitudinally into all my environment of persons, things. My being part of the Universal whole does not impeach my identity; it rather helps to define it by stating what and how I stand with regard to the whole.

To say that my will is not independent of my surroundings, my past, is merely another affirmation of my part in the whole; that my will is conditioned by what surrounds and preceded it, takes not one whit away from its individual identity, for what precedes and what follows or is contemporaneous with me is part of me; I am part of it. And so we say my act of will of to-day was preparing centuries ago without impeaching the identity of the will as mine and nobody else's.

The whole difficulty of the freedom of the will — that is, of the possibility of my identity and individuality existing and being part of the whole of the Universe and yet preserving identity and individuality as my own and nobody else's — arises from that mechanical thinking just adverted to, in which every part of the whole, every object, is separated from every other for the convenience of practical, everyday life and labor.

Thus when we think of our will moved by motive, let us say, we conceive the will as one object, and

some motive another object, alien and utterly outside the will, impinging like a cannon ball on the wall of the will, and so construe its effects; whereas in truth a motive that really moves the will becomes part of the will, is the will for the time of its influence. The will and the motive coalesce, melt the one into the other; in no other way could the motive affect the will. A motive which did not thus become part of the will could not affect it. That conception of freedom of the will which requires for itself absolute independence, separation of the will from everything else, is impossible to thought, for it would, if strictly followed out to its logical conclusion, require that a free will should have no objects upon which to exercise itself, for an object, as furnishing an occasion for the will to either accept or refuse it, would take away from its freedom thus conceived and would present a motive, induce it to act or refuse to act, and to that extent would coerce it from without itself. Such an absolute as this would make the will, putting it in a vacuum from which everything is extracted but its own inner essence, is so absurd a conception that it plainly declares the error of a reasoning which leads to it.

We must think our wills, ourselves, therefore, not as standing alone in a vacuum with all relations forward and back abstracted, but as bound together in a vast whole of the Universe of which all are parts, the parts in the whole, the whole in every part. It may not be easy to so think these

relations of the part to the whole and the whole to the part without plunging into apparent contradictions. Thus I think myself as an individual, my own identity, by itself, distinct from all else, and I think thus that nothing influences me or concerns me; I stand alone, free to do anything: so I conceive my identity in this aspect, but when I again think of myself as not so isolated, but a part in a vast whole, bound to it with innumerable ties and relations, I find what appears to be a contradiction in terms. How can I be myself and free to do what I will, and yet be thus linked with other persons and things; how can I consider myself free? Of course I cannot; my freedom, my identity, is impossible of conception in these terms; or, rather, I have the wrong conception of identity and freedom, which consists not in this isolation of my thinking. In other words, I must revise my conception of identity and freedom, and understand that my identity is not a thing apart, a sort of absolute without relations, but that my identity is part of a much larger whole than myself. I am part of the Universe; as such, I am in relation with it, and my relations with it are not a hamper on that identity, but help to make it up.

But again, as part of the Universe, and with an identity which is related, shaped, constituted, by the fact that it is part of the whole, can there be any freedom of will, as the common phrase goes, under such circumstances, with an identity that is not independent, but part of something else? The

answer is that a freedom of will such as is sometimes meant is not possible; that is a freedom of an absolute, an individual free of all relations, with nothing behind or before or around him. But such a conception of freedom of the will is an absurdity on its face; it is, when examined, impossible even to thought, for unless we suppose some matter or thing affecting the posited absolute, we cannot understand how any exertion of will could take place. Without external objects to will about, how can such actions take place? And if not, then the external object, without which the act of will cannot be conceived, must be the cause in some shape of the act of will — either its refusal or its affirmance with respect to such object.

All that a proper conception of freedom of will can mean is that the will, internally existing, has freedom of external expression; that is, whenever that inward state of feeling, habits, etc. (which might be called the passive will), when called upon to act, has freedom of expression for itself, nothing stops it from expressing itself in act. As long as a man has freedom to put his internal will into external expression of act or word, that will is free, and it boots not to inquire how or by what process he acquired or became possessor of that will. That will is himself, and he is free as long as he can express that will externally in action unhampered.

His will is himself, however * gained, and like

* James remarks: "The effort (i.e. the will) seems . . .

himself it must be the result, the effect, of what has preceded it in time. But this does not make it less himself, for he is a part of that which preceded him. It is, in brief, the mystery, if you choose to call it so, of the relation of the part to the whole; the part is itself identical, individual, separate from the whole; yet, again, it is part of the whole; its very identity as an individual, separate part is constituted in some respects by its being part, having certain relations with the whole. And, again, its identity and individuality help to make up the whole; the whole itself would not be a complete whole lacking this part, and the identity and individuality of this part would not be complete lacking its relation to the whole.

We might ring the changes on this conception of part and whole indefinitely; sufficient has been said to indicate that true freedom of will may be consistent with a connection of each individual part with the whole, for this is what freedom of will must mean: namely, that the will of the individual is in a measure constituted by the relation to the whole; that this relation with all its influences does not impair, but rather enriches and helps to constitute the individual will. And this means that his identity as an individual, as a will, can exist, be consistent with his being part of the whole; that his being part of the whole is not a contradiction, as if it were the substantial thing which we are, and these (strength, wealth, intelligence, etc.) are but externals which we carry." "Psychology," page 578, Vol. II.

ercion of him, not an impairment of his identity as an individual, but rather an enrichment of it. A soldier does not lose his identity by being a private in a vast army. He is not, as a soldier, any less himself. On the contrary, his relations to the army, his subordination to its discipline, his place in its ranks, constitute a part his identity as such soldier, and just as his identity as an individual soldier constitutes in the aggregate of many such the power and strength of that army, so in like manner his being a part of that powerful army gives an increased richness to him as an individual: being such a private adds to his identity a new quality; he represents the army, and when he acts he acts with all the power of that army behind him. And so we may say of each man whose identity is sought to be impeached by charging it with being the resultant of past centuries of causes; that man is in his identity all those causes, and his identity is the richer for them. These causes do not coerce or create him or his will; they are his will. Our difficulty in conceiving this arises largely from that mechanical thinking of the world which will not let us conceive how one object or force may be itself in one sense — separate, individual — and yet at the same time be in and part of another object or force. The mechanical idea of the world gives us no hint of this; in truth, forbids it; compels us, if we would work with matter, to treat every force and object as if it were separate and opposed each to the other; the identity of one in

and through and by reason of another, is outside the mechanical idea, if not utterly impossible to it.

Thus, in reality, away from the mechanical world a true cause permeates, transmutes itself into its effect so that we may say the cause is in the effect. So the causes of my will — past ancestors, ancient cults, what you will, that have preceded me — are not external to me, but they are me as their effect. What saith the Scriptures: "The parents have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge. The sins of the parents are visited upon the children."

This does not mean that in some external, arbitrary fashion the consequences to the children follow the causes brought into being by the parents, but rather to affirm this doctrine I am trying to expound of the relation of the part, the individual and his identity, to the whole; and the possibility of the existence of that identity alongside and contemporaneous with a participation of the whole in that identity, a permeating of each part through and in the whole and in every other part making up that whole, for the whole is made up of those parts.

So understood, these expressions of the Scriptures are not arbitrary, unjust decrees by which some external consequence is annexed to an alien cause, an operation which appears unjust to the ordinary mind, but simply an expression of that connection of the individual, of each part to the whole, so that the act of my father is my act, my

act is his, his good qualities are mine: we are not external to each other, but part of each, so that there is no injustice in my suffering from his act, which is thus understood my act.

Thus far the argument advanced would seem to answer that philosophical difficulty of thinking the will or men free and individual although a part and only a part of the great whole, of reconciling identity and individuality with the being in relation as a part with all that precedes and that environs it.

Passing, then, from this consideration of the will in the large, there yet remains to take up that which commonly is looked upon as exclusively entitled to the name of will; to wit, the specific particular willing of some one concrete act. The former might be called the passive or static will — the man as a whole, with all his character, tastes, peculiar traits constituting his identity, ready to respond with an act when appealed to; while the latter might be called the active will.

This specific act of choice or decision on some occasion arising may be said to be latent in the character, ready to become patent when the occasion calls it forth. The static or passive will lies quiescent, ready to break forth into act when the proper moment calls it forth, like the Leyden jar, ready to manifest the invisible electricity with which it is charged, in the shape of a spark when the proper conductor presents itself.

Let us study more minutely how and when this act of will takes place. Perhaps it has been a too

exclusive attention to this that has led us astray in the larger study of the will. For undoubtedly here, in the specific act of willing, we have displayed what at first glance would seem an act full of uncertainty, involving a choice or decision which until made is as unfixed as the wandering of a cloud over the blue sky of summer. Indeed, we predicate the freedom of that choice or decision very largely on the impossibility of predicting it in advance. If we could tell what the decision would be before its making, we should deny its freedom. But is not this an altogether mistaken apprehension of the transaction?

While it may be true that the particular determination of the will in a certain act may be unfixed until made, yet the general determination may be perfectly fixed. On finding another's pocket-book, the general determination of my will is fixed to return it, but the particular determination, by what specific act I shall execute that determination, may be uncertain. I may debate whether to give it to the police, to advertise it, or myself to seek the owner. In this sense my decision or choice is truly uncertain until made. It is the case of the traveler who knows exactly where he means to go, but hesitates, deliberates, and finally decides the particular route he will pursue.

Examining the act of will still more closely, we perceive that before it takes external form and becomes an act in the world of matter, it is necessary that some idea of the external act should pre-

cede it in the consciousness. Consciousness is only maintained by the presence of ideas, and the power of fixing attention on this or that idea in consciousness to the exclusion of others is essential to the process of thinking; without it, thinking would not be possible.

And William James in his "Psychology" tells us in so many words that this is also an essential of the act of willing, this effort or power of attention to one of a number of ideas. When attention is fixed on some one idea as an idea to be executed, the act of will is complete, and the external expression of it in deed follows, as we might say, automatically.

"To attend to it (the idea) is the volitional act and the only inward volitional act which we ever perform." James' "Psychology," Vol. II, page 567.

It is just here in the philosophical discussion of the willing of some specific act that we fall into the greatest confusion, flounder in contradictions that are little short of the ridiculous; for example, the dilemma of the Middle Ages of the donkey starving to death between two equally attractive bundles of straw.* We are, therefore, warned to beware

¹ * The absurdity of this can be readily seen if the reader, accepting James' analysis of the will-action, will follow out for himself the process. For if the final act of will on the internal side be the fixing of the attention on some object or act to be performed—the acting idea of my nomenclature—we must suppose the donkey or the man (the process is for both, we take it, identical) to have fixed his attention on,

our steps, much like the traveler who, repeatedly falling into quagmires, begins to suspect that he has lost his way.

say bundle of straw A, and that this is so fixed that it will not suffer him to go to bundle B; in other words it is a will act complete in every respect except the putting of it into external execution; and to prevent this we are asked to suppose that in precisely the same manner the man or the donkey's attention is fixed on bundle of straw B; or to put it a little differently, we suppose the mind of our actor to be fixed with attention on both A and B at the same time, and to have formed so complete a will action on the internal side with regard to both that he is able to perform neither of the acts, one negating the other. This is, of course, a piece of mental gymnastics that is impossible. A man cannot fix attention on two ideas at once with equal intensity: one idea will always have the greater attention, occupy the mind to the exclusion of the other. Still less can he have two opposing wills at the same time, any more than he can say "Yes" and "No" in the same breath; the one idea can only negative the other by excluding it; it would thus get itself executed as the only will idea present. Our problem, while acknowledging, and, in fact, making its whole significance turn on the point, that a will to go to bundle A is the exact contradictory of the will to go to bundle B, so that one destroys the other and makes an execution of either act impossible, yet neglects this antecedent impossibility that no actor can be possessed of two contradictory wills at the same time. If the problem posits in the first place a complete internal will action to go to bundle A, as it must, then the intrusion of another will action to go to B is an impossibility while the first will action to go to A is in possession of the consciousness; if the tendency to go to B does become a will act, it can only do so by displacing the will action to go to A; it cannot exist at the same time, for if the will to go to B is a complete will act, it must possess consciousness to the exclusion of any other; so only do will actions complete themselves on the internal side.

The whole difficulty arises, as probably M. Bergson would

Freedom of will is thus in reality a necessity for the possibility of thought. Power to think seems to involve as a necessary condition freedom to fix attention at pleasure on one or another of the items of the content of consciousness, and this is almost identical with the internal act of will. Thus we may say if our thinking is free—"free as thought" is a familiar expression of everyday speech—our willing, which is essentially the same process, must also be free. Parodying Des Cartes, we might declare "*Cogito ergo liber sum.*" I think, therefore, I have freedom of choice of ideas, and so of acts.

This freedom of the immediate act of willing does not answer the more sweeping objection to ultimate freedom of will or of thought which grows out of that mechanical conception of the Universe already

tell us, from the defect of thinking living reality in the mechanical terms of the carpenter. If our actor were a block of wood with two cables attached to him, each pulling a different way with equal force and at the same moment, we would have that perfect equilibrium which would forbid any movement in either direction, and he would remain stationary in accordance with the well known law of mechanics.

But the man or the donkey are not lifeless; before any force can act upon them, it must undergo certain transformations; the motive influencing him to go to A must enter his consciousness, be taken up there and become part of the internal modifications of the consciousness, one of which modifications forbids the coming into consciousness and the transformation of a motive to go to B into a will act at the same moment that a will to go to A possesses consciousness.

None but the schoolmen would have thought of such a ridiculous playing with words divorced from all reality.

discussed, in which I am figured as the mere resultant of what has preceded me, which looks upon me as merely the effect produced by multitudinous preceding causes, so that I think and will only as I am constituted by these. My selection of a course of conduct, my attention to some particular idea, is thus construed to be a pre-ordained reaction to outward stimuli. It might be a partial answer to this to ask how any differences of action or of thought could thus ever arise among men similarly placed with regard to all outward circumstances, the product of like causes, and subjected to the same stimuli. Yet we know very considerable differences do arise, and since the beginning of time have arisen. How many thinking creatures do you suppose saw an apple fall before Sir Isaac Newton, or how many philosophers took baths before Archimedes cried "Eureka!" rushing naked through the streets of Syracuse?

But this objection has already been met by the criticism already made of that mechanical notion of the Universe and its parts which conceives the individual, the part, as having merely a lifeless mechanical relation to the whole, so that the part has no share in the whole. I, as a part of the whole, permeate the whole as a part of it, and the whole permeates me, so that I am not mechanically moved by it or by the other parts of it, but my movements, my willing, my thinking, are my own moving, willing, thinking; if they were not my own, they would not be part of that whole, for I am

part of the whole; it is through me that they find connection and share in the whole. It is because I share in the whole that these other parts of the whole affect me, for they do not affect me, influence me, as mechanical objects in a mechanical world affect each other, impinging externally one on the other, but they affect me by becoming part of me, permeating me, being me. An object of desire, a motive to an act, cannot influence me unless it become part of me; I must take it into myself before it has any effect on me, and then it affects me as part of myself.

Returning to the study of the immediate act, we perceive that it primarily consists in fixing the attention on some particular idea in consciousness with the purpose of giving it external expression in act. And we distinguish in the process two elements: There is first the object or thing in connection with which the act is intended. Without object, the will would have nothing upon which to act; some stimuli from without must occur to call forth the exercise of the will. More will be said of this when we come to the education of the will. The idea in consciousness of this object of the intended act might be called the substantive idea, the idea calling for the act; and the following consequent idea of the act to be done in connection with it might be called the acting idea. The connection between these two is often of a very inflexible sort; fixed union of many substantive ideas with acting ideas is the characteristic of all men,

and the more civilized men are, the more numerous are such unions found to be. In fact, the whole process of civilization in the domain of law and morals might be said to consist in the establishment and multiplication of these.

Without objects to call it forth the will would have no occasion to act; these substantive ideas must first arise in the consciousness before any acting idea can be joined to them. How and when and by what process these acting ideas become joined to the substantive, or in plain terms, with what acts the ordinary man responds to the objects of his desire that present themselves to him, is now our care. Experience is very largely the teacher of the various acting ideas to which the substantive ideas are to be joined. Many of the most fixed connections are so established. Thus the object food, presenting itself and appearing as an idea in consciousness, the acting idea of eating very surely couples itself to it; or the object fire, making itself known as a substantive idea, the acting idea of keeping out of it follows as the result of experience, embodied in the popular saying, "The burnt child dreads the fire." So we might traverse the entire field of our ordinary daily life and conduct, tracing for almost every substantive idea a corresponding acting idea furnished originally by experience, but which now from long usage recurs almost automatically with it.

But experience is not the only teacher of the connection between substantive and acting ideas;

there is a more purposeful, what might be called a more artificial, process, as distinguished from the natural process of experience, by which these connections are established. All moral teaching is of this sort, and by this means all moral transformations of character are wrought. For it is evident that these connections of substantive and acting ideas, fixed in the individual consciousness, constitute his character, his will in large part. And when we seek to reform an evil character, it is by way of putting the proper acting ideas in connection with all substantive ideas that may occur. How, in detail, this education of the will is accomplished may be postponed until we reach that subject. What we may now notice is, first, the manner in which the connection is established between the acting idea and the substantive idea. It is not by pleasant or unpleasant sensations, those potent instruments of experience, but by a very different procedure,—by a presenting to the consciousness again and again, until there is duly impressed on it the acting idea which is sought to be connected with the substantive idea. How this connection between the two is strengthened, emphasized, and rendered permanent, so that the two ideas become firmly welded together, belongs to the subsequent subject of the education of the will.

What now concerns us is the very interesting consequences which follow the connection of these elements of the will-action. When a certain act-

ing idea is thus tied to some substantive idea in consciousness, the impulse and desire to put the acting idea into execution becomes so strong and so insistent that, regardless of the pleasurable or painful sensations that may accompany it, the mere putting into execution of the idea becomes an end in and for itself. This realization of the will has been well defined by a recent writer:

“It means the identity of content between the preceding and the resulting experience. . . . In every complete will-action the idea of the end must precede the perception of the end.” *

The same writer well points out the distinction, for our purpose so important to be drawn, between the gratification of the sense obtained by the doing of an act and the satisfaction of the will by its realization in act. I may form the acting idea of taking a necessary but nauseous dose of medicine, and in proceeding to swallow it find that by some mistake I have taken a draught of delicious wine. I have, in spite of myself, the pleasure of the sensation the wine affords, but I have missed the satisfaction of my will. In all probability my disgust at my error, the failure to realize my will, will altogether destroy the physical pleasure of the wine drinking.

This realization of the will and the satisfaction derived from it is a great compelling motive for the translating of the idea into deed, the making the internal will into an actual deed of the external

* “Eternal Values”: Munsterberg, page 72.

world without regard to the getting of any pleasurable sensation of a physical sort thereby. That this is true we find well attested, not only by the great, but by the trivial transactions of our daily life; indeed, in the latter, because they are so apparently unaccountable and almost absurd, we find the most convincing proof. For trifling habits, tricks of speech, of manner, of walk, a thousand unconsidered ways of acting, there is no other possible explanation. I go to a particular shop, make some peculiar gesture when speaking, take a certain path when walking, not that these afford greater pleasurable sensations than any other shop, gesture, or path, but simply because these particular acting ideas habitually arise and follow, are linked with the substantive idea of a shop, a speech, a walk, and so their execution is the realization of the will in each case, and as such produces the satisfaction that realization of the will affords.

In the larger acts of life this realization of the will plays the supreme part; we might say that life for the most of us is made up of our attempts to realize our internal will in the external world. We may recall innumerable instances in the careers of inventors, statesmen, poets, scientific or philosophical investigators, explorers, whose lives are made up of struggles to realize their wills — in other words, to carry out as deeds in the external world their internal thoughts, plans, schemes, ideals; some vague and indefinite, as the search for the philosopher's stone or the Elixir of Life;

others fixed and definite, as the repeal of the Corn laws, the abolition of slavery, the building of the Pacific Railroad, the cutting of the Panama Canal, the finding of the source of the Nile or the North Pole.

When we come to discuss the happiness of the good will, we shall see why and how this realization of the will exerts such compelling force as a motive to action. Before leaving, however, this analysis of the will action, it may be in place to note the part played by this realization of the will, and its compelling force in the formation and constitution of what we, for want of a better term, call character.

Character depends on this for its very existence, for character is nothing more than the habit of acting in a particular way in response to a demand of some particular situation, circumstance, or thing. And it is made up of these couplings of innumerable substantive and acting ideas in such a firm union that one follows the other with scarcely a thought of hesitation, and so governs the conduct of the individual, because the putting the acting idea into execution constitutes the realization of the will which, we shall see hereafter, as part of the harmony of will with will, goes to make the highest happiness of which we are capable.

Habits of honesty, of sobriety, of right conduct, after long years' usurp, seem to substitute themselves for all the teachings of experience or of more deliberate reasoning which may have originally

fixed them in consciousness. So that many a good man may truly say, "I am honest, not from any deep or profound reflection, any moral reasoning on the subject each time the decision is required of me, but simply because no other or different course of conduct occurs to me; no other but one particular acting-idea is called up by the substantive idea when it appears in consciousness and some action is demanded. The perception of another man's pocket-book at my feet calls up the acting-idea of returning it forthwith, and the action of so returning it follows without deliberation or debate, automatically, we might say, from mere habit."

A writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1909, page 333, refers to this psychological phenomenon in very similar terms: "A man refrains from stealing, not from fear of going to hell, nor from abstract considerations of the greatest number, but because he feels within him an emotion of disgust at the idea of stealing which would make the act painful in a high degree to perform." And in like manner he alleviates distress; not with the hope of getting back his outlay in the future life, or to promote the happiness of the greatest number, "but because a direct, positive gratification from the act accrues to him. It is more pleasant to him to perform these good actions than not to perform them." "Morality," the same writer adds, "is an instinct; in so far as it is acquired, it is a habit."

We do not call that man a person of good character who hesitates when the question presents

itself of returning or not returning another's property, but only that man whose acting-idea in this respect follows automatically, as we might say, the substantive idea of pocket-book, money or other property of another, and impels the translation of it into deed without deliberation or hesitation. He has no choice, entertains no thought about it save that single acting-idea which spontaneously, as a habit, springs up in his mind at the very idea of another's property, and impels him to render it back to its owner. That is to say, in other words, with a man of good character the idea of another man's property is so firmly connected with the idea of certain acts tending to preserve and respect it, so separated and divided from the acts tending to take or injure it, that the attempt to alter that connection, to disconnect the one and to connect the other, yields a feeling of discomfort, even in thought, and the further carrying out of this into action creates a feeling so unpleasant as to amount to a positive repugnance.

And yet it is possible to imagine, in the case of an habitual thief, that the very opposite connection of idea and act may exist, so that the very idea of another's property calls up the inevitable connection, not of respecting it as his, but of taking it from him, and that a feeling of positive dissatisfaction may arise from the failure to carry out the connection in conduct by a corresponding act. And so we may say of the man possessed of the first connection of ideas, he is a man of good char-

acter ; his will, which we now see is his character, is a good will. Nor could we justly assert that either act was not a true act of free will because foreordained in each instance by the character of the will.

Even if it be conceded that there is no power of choice in these instances, that because of his character the man must choose one and not the other act, is not the act so chosen even more his act than if it were merely the choice of the moment by a species of chance? Is not the man more identified with an act expressing his whole fixed character than by an act which, until performed, is but the uncertain creature of a sudden resolve?

The justification of the rewards and punishments meted out to acts of this sort is surely clearer than for the other uncertain acts which are the product of a sudden, unpremeditated choice. Freedom of will of this sort is always invoked to justify those rewards and punishments of government and society which are imposed by an alien, external power, outside the man himself. This may be very well for practical ethics, for the requirements of the administration of justice by human tribunals, the essential matter being always the effectiveness of these external agencies on conduct. In theoretical ethics these externals have no place, and its rewards and punishments require no justification, for the good or evil will is its own reward or punishment. An evil will is itself the severest punishment ; it requires no external power to make it effective, no elaborate reasoning

to show its justice. In like manner the good will is its own reward. In this view it is as impossible to separate conduct and its appropriate guerdon as to tear asunder soul and body. Good will is happiness, evil will is misery, and nothing can alter or change them; as well might we declare that fire should not burn, nor steel cut. For this internal will, made up of his traits, tastes, his ideas, natural or artificial, his feelings, and thoughts, are the man, and so have been recognized by all ethical authority. The Scriptures express the same idea when they declare "As a man thinketh so is he"; the Indian Sacred Books, "The Dhamapada," Chapter I, repeat: "All that we are is the result of what we have thought; it is founded on our thought; it is made up of our thoughts."

Man's will, then, in the sense of theoretical ethics, is more than a mere capacity to respond and act freely under the influence of motive. It is the very essence of himself, the sum total of all his qualities, mental and moral, his appetites, desires, both natural and acquired. It is passive as well as active, a state or condition as well as an activity, a doing or intention to do something.

Having thus analyzed what the will is, let us now consider how and when we first learn something of will in experience, how the significance of will first dawns upon us, for like all our knowledge, what we know of our will comes to us gradually and by experience. Thus we learn that there are

two wills,— our own and another or opposing will, as we might at first be tempted to style it, but which we later learn to call, as differing from our own, the Universal will, for so we find ourselves compelled to think, and, for convenience, to unite under a single intelligible name of Universal will all those opposing forces of nature and man which frequently baffle, contradict, resist, and even defeat, our own will expressed in action.

THE PARTICULAR AND UNIVERSAL WILL

It may be said, we suppose, without fear of contradiction, that in all the numerous and varied experiences of our daily life two main, commanding features stand forth, gigantic, all-absorbing, of overmastering import. Coming upon us at first somewhat in the nature of a discovery, they color and give significance to all the transactions in which we find ourselves engaged.

These are the two forces or activities which make themselves known to a man the moment he becomes an active agent, an actor in the world of actors and activities: the first, his own activity as such actor; the second, an alien, foreign activity or striving that confronts his own activity, opposes it, hedges it in, limits it, perhaps finally defeats it.

This opposing activity manifests itself in a thou-

sand ways, making him realize its importance and its effect as opposing his own activity, restraining, sometimes suppressing it altogether. It may take the form of inert resistance, the inertia of dead matter — the stone that blocks his path, forbids his passage; it may be the active assault of the storm that tosses his frail ship on the bosom of great waters; it may be the laws of his own mind that will not permit him to think save in one way; it may be the efforts of a fellowman whose striving opposes itself to his own.

All these activities or compulsions, varying in their manifestations, but having this one characteristic in common that they contradict and limit our own activity, bring us to a sharp realization of the conflict between our will, which we may call the will of the individual, the particular will, and that something set over against our will, manifesting itself in various ways, but which by the laws of our thinking we have to gather together and unite as all the activity of one universal, all-powerful will, the Universal will. It is this that governs and directs these compulsions of matter and mind that are continually confronting us in our daily life, the dealing with which in various ways largely occupies and fills that life.

The matter of names is not important; the names "particular will," as representing best our own activity, and "Universal will," as representing the opposing activity, seems a convenient method of grouping the two activities whose chief

distinguishing characteristic may be thus indicated.

That particular will may be but the cry of the child for a sweet denied it by its nurse or its parent; it may be the laying of an Atlantic cable, defeated by a turbulent ocean; it may be the framing of some philosophic thought, baffled and driven into self-contradiction by some compulsion of thought. Is not, indeed, all of life made up of this ebb and flow, strophe and anti-strophe, effort and repulse, of particular as against Universal will?

We know the particular will directly and immediately as our own; and all that independent of our will, not subject to our control, we recognize as part of the Universal will by these characteristics, — namely, by the compelling power it exercises over us and by its entire independence of our particular will. For by a compulsion of our thinking we are thus led to construe and interpret the varying forms of that opposing activity confronting our own at every turn and in all its manifold manifestations. In no other way can we intelligently think these activities save as governed and directed by some single power. Such power as we have to think it must be self-determining, self-initiating, exercising intelligent choice, acting without external cause. In short, it must be a true first cause. Our difficulty in thinking this Universal will — that is a cause which is not an effect of some other cause further back — does not relieve us from the necessity. We must think a self-determining, in-

itiating power at the beginning of the series of all the activities other than our own, which power must be the source of these activities, must determine the course of action which we find them exhibiting. In other words, the only intelligible explanation of them is that they are manifestations of will and of a will that is in the last analysis a will with all the characteristics of a will as we know it, having self-initiating power, intelligence, but with this additional quality,— it is Universal, and governs all but the internal activity of man himself.

We cannot carry back these activities in an unending chain of cause and effect forever, and so we must attribute them to some cause, not only that has power of itself to initiate action, but also power to intelligently direct such action with a view to results. It is impossible to believe that these activities with all their reciprocal relations to each other are spontaneous, accidental displays of energy, occurring without fixed rule,— we must consider them as governed by law; and the only beginning or source of such law conceivable by us is a will somewhere back in the apparently endless chain of causes which prescribes the method as well as initiates the coming into existence of these activities; in other words, gives law to them.

This, then, is the Universal will as presented to us in experience, set over against our own particular will, opposed to and often defeating it. We cannot declare that we do not know it, for it is one

of the main facts of all our living; yet on the other hand we can scarcely be said to understand it, conveyed to us as it is under the veil of innumerable concrete particular instances. It is our problem to unravel from these particulars, these concrete instances, the Universal will. For this task we may appeal to one or two principles which will approve themselves as infallible guides. First, we may be sure that whatever we find common to all particulars must be part of the Universal will, for so only can we account for such omnipresence; and secondly, whatever we find of irresistible, compelling power in any particular, we must pronounce Universal, for only so can we account for that quality. It may be said that often that which we find irresistible and inevitable in one instance, to the wider experience, a fuller knowledge, sometimes becomes docile to our own particular will, so that we compel it rather than, as formerly, are compelled by it. But this merely concerns the application of the principle or criterion to some particular; it does not impeach the principle itself. Both these principles are plainly laws of our thinking; we have to think our world and all the concrete experiences which make it up as under the government of a single and all-powerful will. We exempt ourselves from subjection to this will only by reason of a consciousness that we are not coerced by it in our acting. While we cannot think how this may be or that it is at all, still we act as if we were free because so we feel ourselves.

The Universal will must be in every particular that goes to make up that world, and it must be a compelling, irresistible will, to which every particular is subject without exception.

These are compulsions of our thinking from which it is impossible for us to escape, and so these compulsions of our thinking are themselves part of the Universal will that we find coercing, restraining, limiting our own particular will at every turn. By this, however, is not meant that all minds, however untutored or uneducated, recognize these principles as thus stated; but each mind, savage or civilized, according to its mental capacity, in its thinking of all the world about it, acts and construes it under the compulsion of these principles, formulates its ideas to correspond, as far as it has capacity, to these principles.

It is to be noted that these principles are compulsions of our thinking only; what further validity they have may, for the sake of clearness of treatment, be postponed to a later discussion.

Resuming now the main thread of the discussion of the will: We have seen that there are two wills, the particular — that of each individual; and the Universal — the will that governs all, that is expressed and known to us only as we can know it by these concrete instances in which we come in contact with it — the phenomena of nature, the immovable stone, the fierce storm, the compulsions of thought, the activity of other men whose particular wills are themselves instances, concrete and

individual expressions, of the Universal will; for all particular wills have this double significance that they are in one aspect individual, concrete, and so a particular will; in the other aspect they are, notwithstanding that particularity, an expression of the Universal will, have in them some elements of the Universal will.

We distinguish, therefore, in all particular wills considered with regard to the Universal will, two elements; first, this compulsory element which we have just seen is the mark and sign of the Universal will, is the expression of the Universal will in the particular. This element consists in those appetites, those laws of thought, which are imposed on the particular will, are independent of its control, and are common to all particular wills.

Perhaps it were well to here mark the distinction so well made by Hegel in his "Philosophy of Religion," that these various particular wills, observed in the activities of the external world — in men, in nature, in the raging storm, the lashing waves, the devouring beasts of prey — are not themselves in their totality the Universal will, they are but its manifestations. It is their essence, their directing, all-compelling power, that drives and guides them, but is never they, never identifies itself with them; such a doctrine would be truly pantheism. The present doctrine is expressed in St. Paul's declaration: "In whom we move and breathe and have our being." The Universal will is the basis and foundation of all these particular

wills, and from them, by a proper generalization, we may sift out the Universal will. In so doing we eliminate the particular, seize and separate the elements of the Universal by application of these two criterions just referred to, compulsion and ubiquitousness; for the Universal will must be in every particular and it must be compelling.

Upon this, two remarks are called for. One is that all acts done under the evident compulsion of this element of the Universal will carry with them a sanction all their own which is expressed in popular language when referring to such act by the statement that such-and-such an act is perfectly "natural"—that is, in accordance with these simple, primitive instincts, appetites, desires, that are common to all men and are their own justification. In other words, these acts, being the direct product of the elements of the will imposed by the Universal will, carry with them their own evidence of rightness.

The second remark is that these elements, being common to all particular wills, can have no power of conferring that individuality on the particular will which we observe and know in actual experience. Knowing how differently men act under the same circumstances, we are compelled to assume that there must be some other element in the will beside these to account for such difference, to constitute the particularity of the particular will as over against the Universal. What that second element is we now have to consider, never forget-

ting, however, that the first elements of the will, the Universal elements, although unable to account for the differences in particular wills, are yet the foundation and basis of them, for without natural appetites there would be no will. They are essential parts of the particular will and cannot be omitted simply because of their being part of all wills. All wills in this respect are but the concrete expression of the Universal will.

It is in this second element of the particular will that all ethical interest centers, for this is the element which is under the control of the man himself. His appetites and passions are largely beyond his control; they cannot be increased or diminished save in so far as he may do this through the second element of the will. This it is that marks the particular will peculiar, individual, and independent of the Universal will. For in all wills, in addition to the appetites, passions, laws of thought, imposed by the Universal will, there are certain arrangements of ideas, combinations or conjunctions of ideas and acts corresponding to them, which give each particular will that color of individuality that distinguishes it from every other particular will. These are those connections of substantive and acting ideas which have already been discussed in our analysis of the will-action. Summarizing what was there said, we may point out that there are three chief methods by which these connections are established for the will. First, experience, by pleasurable and painful sensa-

tions, connects certain substantive with certain acting ideas; fire, with avoiding it or seeking it, as the case may be; food, with eating; and so on. Second, by the simple juxtaposition of sensations from the external world, by the presentation of two ideas in conjunction, the will is often led to execute the acting idea; this is what might be called suggestion, or sometimes the force of example; when somebody else puts an idea into execution, joins an acting idea to a substantive, we are prompted to do the like. Let one man start to run for a train, and all other intending passengers, his companions, are extremely likely to follow his example,—in other words, to put into execution the acting idea of running which his act has suggested in connection with the substantive idea of a train. Third, there is the deliberate and studied suggestion of acting ideas (of which the second class is a mere chance example) by impressing the ideas on the consciousness in connection with the substantive so that it will always be so linked that the simple recurrence of the substantive idea will always call for that particular acting idea. The methods by which this impression is made upon the will are to be considered under the “Education of the Will,” for it is this third process of teaching, educating the will, which makes possible all ethical improvement and is the instrument of that change of individual character which, in the larger, more serious aspect, is called moral reformation, the making of a good man out of a bad man, or its

reverse of degeneration and moral degradation.

We may be said now to have some idea of what the individual particular will really is, the elements which make it up, and what are its relations to the Universal will, a very essential piece of knowledge when we come to discuss the next branch of our inquiry, namely and secondly:

THE GOOD WILL

From the preceding exposition of the relations of the particular will to the Universal will, it is plain what the definition of a good will must be. Philosophically defined, a good will is a will in harmony with the Universal will. And this harmony of the particular will with the Universal will at the same time constitutes the highest happiness of the particular will. It is that *summum bonum* of which so much has been written. Virtue (the harmony of the particular with the Universal will) and the reward of virtue, happiness, are thus revealed as identical. Right conduct and happiness are not placed over against each other as two opposing somethings, different, separate, unconnected save by arbitrary decree or at best related in some mysterious way as cause and effect, but stand forth as they really are, the same thing viewed from opposite points. This happiness of the good will we leave for further exposition at a later, more convenient place in our discussion.

We now take up the good will and its harmony with the Universal will as the test of its goodness.

Let us consider why a good will must always be a harmonious will and why a conflicting will is an evil will. This fundamental notion grows out of a compulsion of our thinking, which may be variously stated according to the particular view taken for the moment. Perhaps the clearest statement is that we must think that the world, the Universe, is a consistent harmonious whole; that one uniform rule or law governs to this end all its activities, including our own activities as a part; that therefore any conflict in these activities is wrong and to be suppressed. And we may, for convenience, as the nearest approach to the reality that we are capable of, style the Power that promulgates and enforces this harmony of all the parts the Universal will, thus meaning to designate that almighty, intelligent Power which we have to regard as the governor of all things. We think of this Power, such is our feeble capacity, under the guise of a human being of extraordinary endowments, and we call him God, not knowing exactly, and not being able to know exactly, what that mighty Power is which we thus name.

If any thinker doubt the truth of this compulsion of thinking, let him make the experiment of trying to think the Universe otherwise than governed by one uniform and Universal law: Can he for one moment delude his mind into thinking that the world and its phenomena act without law,

that they have no relation each part to each? He must then suppose that each part of all the world made known to him is independent of every other part; in effect this is to posit a condition much more impossible to thought than any other, for it makes of each part an absolute,—*i.e.*, something without relation to any other part. The moment he departs from this, he finds himself driven to the logical opposite of supposing that there is a relation between all the parts that make up the Universe; and if any relation, then he must think some basis for that relation; — and so of necessity his thinking compels him to the conclusion stated above, a Universal will.

We do not venture at this stage of the discussion to consider the validity of thus thinking; whether, in other words, thought and reality correspond. All that is now contended is that we must think this, just as we think twice two are four.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSAL WILL

It may well be asked: “How are we, who know only the particular and concrete, who see only by fragments and snatches, to get any knowledge of the Universal will as it is thus made known to us?” It must be learned, of course, only by inference from the particular and the individual instances which are its concrete expression. In other words,

in each and every particular will there is and must be an element of Universality. How we are to know and recognize it is the question for us to answer. We have already taken a step toward that answer in ascertaining, as we have just done, that the expression in the particular will of desires — appetites, such as hunger and thirst, which are beyond the control of the particular will, while at the same time part of it — bears the mark of Universality by reason of this very character. And we may easily take the next step toward our answer by adding that all the primitive desires of the particular will have this character of necessity, of freedom from the arbitrary control of the particular will.

As already pointed out, our difficulty begins when, holding all these manifestations of each particular will as without evil quality, we consider each particular will in its relations with every other particular will no longer ideally independent and isolated, but in relation, and possibly in conflict, with other wills. My hunger right in itself and by itself may come into conflict with your hunger, equally right in and by itself; and it is plain that the Universal will must afford a reconciliation of all these particular wills, not by their destruction — by the negating of these appetites, this hunger, thirst, etc., — but by giving each its true existence in harmony with each other and with itself.

How far this individual will may assert itself

without becoming an evil will was defined by Kant in his famous declaration: "Act so that thy maxim may be capable of becoming the Universal natural law of all rational beings." *

This simply enunciated the obvious truth that if we grant the right of each particular will to be itself, there must go with it the implied limitation that it must not infringe the right of any other particular will to be itself; that is, it must not oppose or conflict with the Universal will, which a transgression of the rights of any other particular will would do, since every particular will is also and in like manner a concrete expression of the Universal will in all these primitive, elemental desires and appetites.

This highly abstract theoretical expression of the rule of conduct is not easy for the common man to master or apply to the ordinary affairs of everyday life. The same rule has been formulated in the famous Christian maxim: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." **

This we are told is the law and the prophets. In the latter rule we have a practical guide, furnished not by acute reasoning, but ready to hand in our own natural feeling, requiring no thought, no intellectual exercise. We have only to consult our feelings to act correctly, and yet in its essence

* Paulsen's "Immanuel Kant": Creighton & Lefre's Translation, 1902; page 306.

** Matthew VII: 12.

the rule is the same. I am to treat the wishes of others as I would my own, to preserve their particularity and respect it as my own. If a question arise as to some act, I have only to ask myself how I would regard that proposed act if some one were to commit it with respect to myself, and if I feel it no trespass on my particularity, there is good reason to suppose that it will be none on his. Both rules mean that all individual wills are to have free expression, to be unrestricted, except when such expression shall interfere with the desires and appetites of some other particular will.

For it must be evident that if the acts of any particular will be such as to come into conflict with those of other particular wills, one or the other, or possibly both wills, must cease to so act. Conflicting particular wills, expressed in opposing appetites and desires, can never be in harmony with a Universal will, for a Universal will must reconcile all conflicting wills in such a way that each particular will shall maintain its own identity — have its own desires, appetites, etc.— and yet not infringe the identity of any other particular will expressed in its desires, appetites, etc.

This assumes that the particular will, with its desires, appetites and needs, is in itself and by itself good, or at least without any evil quality in and of itself. This assumption does not, however, have the effect, as at first it might seem, of erecting each particular will as its own standard of good and evil. This is not to declare in terms that

whatever *I* want is right; that *my* feeling of pleasure or of pain, of desire or of repulsion, makes any particular act good or evil. It is not my individual arbitrary will that is erected as a standard, but only my will as it registers the decrees of the Universal will.

In other words, we see that this particular will is, in another aspect, a part of the Universal will; that without particular wills, which go to make up the Universal will, there would be no Universal; that the particular will must, therefore, contain in concrete, individual expression something of the Universal, and by virtue of so containing, it must have the sanction of the Universal in some qualified sense. In one aspect every individual desire, wish, need, may be regarded as simply and solely individual expressions of the particular will of and by itself; in the other, they are the expression of the Universal will imposed upon the particular will, yet expressed in it. For example, my hunger or thirst are instances of such expressions of the Universal will in and through the particular will. In one sense they are intensely mine,—nothing can be more insistent or particular in expression; yet in the other, Universal sense they are beyond my control,—they but register the decrees of my inwrought nature, which I can change not one jot by any arbitrary act of will. They are concrete instances of the Universal will, very much as my falling out of a window is a concrete instance of the Universal will generalized and labeled the law

of gravitation; both are utterly beyond my control.

It is, therefore, in this sense that the particular will is held not only without evil qualifications in its manifestations, but a positive expression in a concrete form of the Universal will. A further confirmation of this is gathered when we find that these primitive desires of the particular will are held in common by all; that if we examine many particular wills as known to us, we find peculiar, individual, even unique, manifestations, but after eliminating all these, we find invariably and in all wills these certain primitive appetites, tendencies, both physical and mental; and we justly conclude that these, therefore, must have a common source or cause beyond and independent of their particular manifestations in the concrete individual will. And that common cause must be the Universal will, the will of the whole.

Not only do we infer this common source from the fact of the uniformity of their presence in all wills, but we are brought back by this different path to the conclusion previously reached,—namely, that they must be necessary and independent of any one particular will because always part and parcel of each and all particular wills.

And the great rule of all good conduct must be such a rule as, if adopted by all, would suffer all wills to put the rule into practice without harmful consequences to or conflict with any. The rule, that is, must reconcile all wills so that they

can all act by it, which, of course, they could not do if the acting by it of one will should bring it into conflict with another will.

Conflicting wills are always evidence of a bad will somewhere; some, possibly all, of the conflicting wills must be contrary to the Universal will.

It has been said that our knowledge of the Universal will must be derived from the particular, and it may well be asked how we can ascend from particulars to a Universal. How is the Universal to get higher than the particular on which it is founded? How is Universality to be acquired by simply adding one particular to another,—a row of ciphers has no more value than a single nought? Why, for example, is the hunger or thirst, etc.—the manifestation of the particular will—to have a Universal sanction simply because it is independent of the particular will and is an invariable part of all particular wills?

It has already been pointed out that here we are forced back upon principles that are of purely egoistic origin. The fundamental notion at the basis of our thinking the Universal is simply that sense of Unity which is elemental in both thinking and feeling. It is that primary impulse which compels us to consider everything that we have any knowledge of as in relation to every other thing. Every particular will stands in relation to every other particular will; we cannot conceive them as in reality separate and independent each of the other. And if in relation, then there must

be a something which makes the relation possible, a basis or foundation in which that relation subsists; and this is the idea or notion of the whole as in some way not only embracing every part, but as giving reason for and significance to each part. Hence again the necessity for an agreement, a harmony, of each part with the whole and with every other part, for unity of will, so that each particular will shall agree with the Universal will, — that is, the will of the whole; and as a corollary to this, that each particular will agree with every other; for otherwise a disagreement of particular wills would be the destruction of the parts and so an impairing of the whole.

And so it comes about that a rule for the Universal will is deduced from the adding together of the particular wills (the wills of the parts), which, getting its positive contents, its concreteness, from the content of the particular wills, adds a sanction all its own and superior in authority to any particular will, while expressed in terms of that content and founded upon it, this sanction being derived from the egoistic necessity of considering all the parts as bound together in a whole. It might be said that the Universal will is for many purposes the particular will, shorn of its particularity and, as it were, universalized by the elimination of its inharmonious features. Thus a standard of conduct is obtained, tentative in a measure, yet more or less satisfactory nevertheless, a sort of resultant produced by the two forces of

opposite tendencies,— the one force being the self-assertion of the particular will based on those necessary, externally imposed desires such as hunger and thirst and so on; and the other force the none the less externally imposed Egoistic feeling that the various particular wills must not conflict with each other, must make a harmonious whole, which is a vague yet perfectly true notion of the Universal will as constraining the harmony of all.

From the preceding an important principle governing the relation of the Universal and particular would seem to result,— namely, that the rights of the particular are always rights derived through and because of its being part of the Universal. By itself and in itself apart, separate from the Universal, it has no rights. Whenever it has a right to its particularity, to be itself, to do or possess something, it is always because the doing or being or possessing is a doing or being something that has the Universal in it, is for the Universal and for its welfare. The particular, it has been remarked, is part of the Universal, has something of it in it, helps to make it up; and so far it has the sanction of the Universal for its particularity, but only so far. This principle, firmly grasped, holds the key to many of the practical problems of life, gives the “open sesame” to many closed doors.

In one shape or another the principle has been set forth more or less definitely in varying phraseology by the profounder writers on law and gov-

ernment. Jeremy Bentham gave it a popular expression that has since stuck in the mouths of men, when he declared that the happiness of the greatest number must be the test and sanction of all laws as well as their true end and purpose.

But no statement can overcome the difficulty which affects the principle, no matter in what terms we may formulate it. We seem to pursue a vicious circle. The particular has a right to be itself, and the right of the Universal — that is, of the Universal *pro hac vice* society — is made up of all these rights of the particular; without them the quasi Universal, society, would have no content, no meaning. Yet society may call for concessions from the particular of these very rights; may, indeed, take them entirely away in the name and by virtue of those rights which it seems to partially deny by its demands. Thus the life of the particular is demanded by society in the name and for the sake of the lives of all the rest when it sends its soldiers to battle, when it sends its murderers to the scaffold; likewise, the liberty of the particular is taken when it compels him to serve on a jury or sends him to jail; again, his property is taken when it taxes him; and so on through all the catalog of curtailments of what we call natural rights, than which none can be supposed to be more fundamental, more sacred than life and liberty, but both of which are often taken in the name of society, of the Universal.

Apart from the Universal, by itself, away from society, from the whole, such a sacrifice of these rights of the particular would not be thought of.

Considered by itself and in itself, the particular's rights to life, liberty, and the like, are unquestioned, self-evident. At least so they seem until we reflect that all by itself such rights have no significance. In a vacuum, void of all but itself, of all relation to other particulars or to the whole, rights have no place; a right always connotes relations with others, with the Universal; it means that against something that opposes or denies, the particular is entitled to assert, to claim, to possess, to do. What meaning would a right of property have in a region denuded of men as against whom it is to be enjoyed; or what right is there in a liberty which is simply a freedom from all others, but with nothing with regard to which liberty would have value? Liberty to do nothing, to go nowhere, is an empty thing. So now we see the truth of the principle in a new and clearer light; we see how it is that the rights of the particular are only rights through and because of the Universal; that not only are these rights derived from the Universal, but that apart from the Universal they are of no value, have no meaning.

The truth is the two cannot be divided; their significance is only to be understood when taken together. The particular cannot realize its own

particularity truly save as part of the whole, of the Universal; and the Universal is without meaning save as it is expressed in the particular.

The application of all this to practical affairs is not far to seek, and will be found most effective in solving some of the problems they present. At present, for example, there is much discussion over the right of women to vote; now it is very plain in the light of the principle that there is no such right either in men or women except as it affects the interests of the state, the Universal *pro hac vice*. It is a right which the particular derives through and because of the Universal. If it be conducive to good government, to the interests of the state, then the man or woman has a right to vote. It is a right like all other rights of the particular derived from the Universal — the state, in this instance — and must be so judged. It will vary according to the requirements and needs of different states, the *quasi* Universal, of which the particular may chance to form a part.

In some states, some conditions, it may be for the good of the whole that certain individuals should vote, and such individuals then have that right; in others it may be exactly the opposite, and then there is no such right. Without explicitly acknowledging the principle, we find all the arguments to turn very much on this; and long essays are put forth, showing how much better or worse the state is governed where women vote or do not vote, as the case may be, which proves the

appreciation of the principle that the right to vote is a right that is derived from the whole; it is not a natural right, as we say in the familiar language of the street. Indeed we have now seen that there are no natural rights in the sense of rights independent of the Universal. Even that right of property sometimes styled sacred on account of its fundamental character is now by some of the best jurists styled a social right; that is, the individualistic theory of property is abandoned, and it is declared that the owner of property holds it through the state and for the good of the state; when the good of the state requires it, his property ceases. It may be taken from him by the state, expropriated with or without compensation, as again is best for the interests of the state. His ownership is for the good of all, for and because of the Universal, represented by society; he has no natural right. So, as Von Ihering tells us ("Law as a Means to an End," page 392), "is property made a practicable and feasible institution; without it property would become a curse to society."

The right to life itself, which of all rights might be supposed to be the absolute, inalienable right of the particular to its particularity, ceases the very moment that it is not for the good of the whole, the Universal, society; so of personal freedom, and the like natural, inalienable rights of the particular. The life of the criminal is taken for the good of the whole, because his right to it, being derived

from the whole, the Universal, ceases when it is for its benefit that it should cease; so the liberty of the criminal is likewise sacrificed; and the only admissible question in practice is whether it be for the good of the whole, of society, that this life or that liberty should be taken from the particular. It is here that so much of the false sentiment about criminals leads astray good, conscientious people, who, twisting askew the principle of the greatest good to the greatest number, make the question of punishment of the criminal to turn, not on the good of society, the whole, but on the good of the individual criminal; setting up the rights of the particular against the rights of the Universal, making the reformation of the criminal the chief point, and not the protection of society.

So in many other practical questions of government and social well being, such as divorce, for example, where the effects on the rights of the particular are often allowed to distract the discussion from the true point, which is the good of the whole. This wandering from the right path is the easier because we all recognize that the good of the whole is made up of the good of the parts, and so it becomes easy to make the wrong inference that it is the good of *every* part and not the good of *all* the parts that must govern, and to forget that the two are not the same. For some exceptional persons no laws may be necessary; they require no restrictions, are better without them. But it is not a question of these exceptional per-

sons, but of the average person, that is involved when we speak of the good of the whole; they make up the whole. Therefore by restrictive laws we take a certain amount of freedom from each particular for the good of all, the good of the whole.

All social questions must be studied in the light of this principle, that the rights of the particular are all derived through the Universal: Whether a liberal or very stringent divorce law, or no divorce law at all, is best, is to be decided, not by studying individual cases of hardship or the rights of any one particular, but the question is to be tested by its effect on the whole, on society at large, with no regard to individual cases save as they affect the whole. There is scarcely any limit to the application of the principle in practical matters. Thus in the domain of economic theory much is made of the suffering, the poverty, the crime, that the modern industrial system inflicts; the rights, the good of the particular, seem to the unthinking sentimentalist to be utterly and wrongfully disregarded. But these rights are derived from the Universal, and the real test is not "Does this system injure certain particulars and is it therefore wrong?" but "Is this system the best for the whole society, for the Universal?" or, to put it popularly, "Does it secure the happiness of the greatest number better than any other?" If so, the rights of the particular are not infringed, for their rights come through the Universal, through society, of which they are a part.

This does not declare that no regard is to be had to the rights of the particular, to individual hardship inflicted by any economic system, but that they are not to be considered except in the light of the Universal, the whole; and just as the right of the particular to life and liberty is only derived through and because of the Universal, and may therefore be taken away if for the good of the Universal, of society as a whole, so these lesser rights of the particular may be taken if for the good of the whole, the Universal. Thus the real question becomes with any government, with any society, not "Are there any individual instances of suffering in it; are the rights of some particular infringed?" but always "Are the rights of all particulars,—*i.e.*, the rights of the majority, made as secure as possible?"

Sometimes the rights of the particular are asserted in such a way and to an extent that overrides all rights derived by and through the whole, all rights of the Universal concretely expressed in society. We involuntarily think of Rousseau's "Rights of Man"; of the French Revolution, which was a chaotic assertion of the rights of the particular as against the Universal. We may also recall the result of the struggle, and the reaction that brought back the rights of the particular to their true place as derived from and through the Universal. For even a revolution that in the name of the rights of the particular would annihilate the Universal, undo all knots of its tying, and

leave the particular independent, free of all relations or obligations, only does so, in theory at least, by substituting for the assailed Universal [the society condemned at the moment] a new and higher Universal, a regenerated society, so to speak,—a brotherhood, a fraternity of man all over the world; and the watchwords “Liberty,” “Equality,” “Fraternity”—which are, of course, abstractions, and like all abstractions smack of the Universal—while destroying the old Universal, establish a new one embodied in those magic words.

Indeed all these revolutions, as well as the less violent efforts of men to reach standards of conduct, sets of rules for society, are in effect efforts after a formalization of the Universal will for practical, everyday purposes; they are steps in the great process of civilization, as it is called, for civilization is a practical instance of the process of a partial universalizing of the particular will, the making of a quasi, more or less Universal will for practical living purposes. It is largely nothing more or less than the eliminating of the particular and the adopting from the particular those elements of the particular will which, as imposed upon it and common to all, thus vindicate their claim to be erected into law,—that is, to a quasi Universal will for social ends.

The Universal will thus worked out in its most developed form, we call law; in its earliest stages, general habits, manners, customs. And this law,

again, is no more than the expression of or identity of will which has been found to be possible for each particular will without infringement of the identity of any other particular will. This process as exhibited in history is one long struggle of will with will. Through conflicts, wars, bloodshed, battles, taking of cities and destruction of armies, men have slowly come to that harmony of the particular will with the Universal which is called a government of laws. Before such a result a long process of assimilation, slow and labored, of will with will must have taken place, until a Universal or harmonizing law was worked out which was recognized as a true Universal in so far as it reconciled all particular wills, acknowledging at the same time the underlying principle that every particular possesses a right to some degree of recognition because each will has in it an element, and so is part, of the Universal will. For the Universal will gets its content, its concreteness, from the particular will; it is the desires, wants, needs of the particular that give matter to the Universal, just as the Universal gives form, shape, and final purpose to the particular, and so makes a rule or law out of the chaos of the particular in its diverse and innumerable contents.

And now we see emerging the canon of the Universal in its relation to the particular, which is that all the content of the particular will is to be preserved and retained in the Universal in so far as that is compatible with its being Universalized,—

compatible, that is, with its harmonizing with other particulars, and so with the Universal. The ideal system of law must be that which permits the greatest liberty and freedom of expression to the individual, consistent with the harmony of all individuals with each other and so with the whole.

It is interesting and well worth observing what the limitations of this canon of the Universal are as exhibited in some societies. In American social life, for example, we become aware of the most extreme attempt to give the freest, least restricted expression to the particular will. And in so doing we find ourselves coming upon certain barriers that lie inherent in the very nature of the problem. Too free an exercise of the rights of each particular will goes far to infringe and curtail the rights of other particular wills, so that the canon of their relations is transgressed; and it comes about thus that excessive freedom of the particular will results in the very worst tyranny, the tyranny of the unregulated, eccentric trespassing of each particular will upon every other particular will. In no country of the world, probably, is there more of this trespassing on the rights of the individual by the unrestricted, unregulated license given to every man to do and act as he pleases. The newspapers ruthlessly invade private life and attack private character; personal rights and privileges are made little account of and given scanty protection, even by the courts, when transgressed by large and important interests. Public opinion and sentiment

— that vital spring of all true social law — make less of private rights to be let alone, to be unmolested by others (what may be called the passive rights) than of those rights to do and act which may be called the active rights. This is in direct disregard of the truth that the excessive exercise of the latter, which is commonly called “liberty,” must result in restricting the equally important passive rights. My right to travel in an automobile sixty miles an hour trenches very materially on your right to enjoy a safe road, undisturbed by dust, unthreatened by danger. Your right to sell insurance, life, fire or marine, without license or supervision may trench upon my right to have a safe and trustworthy policy for my money. So of the exercise of many other natural rights, such as the right to administer medicine, give legal advice, sail a ship, run a steam engine, perform a thousand and one acts in the performance of which the safety or health of others is involved.

In all law, therefore, it is very plain from the illustrations just cited that there are two elements to be discerned, of which the law may be said to be the reconciliation. The first is the element of Universality; that is, that which insists on the harmonizing of all particular wills with each other and so with the Universal will. It concerns itself chiefly with the preservation of the whole; this may be said to be the form of the law. The second is the element of the particular, that which gives play to the particular wishes, desires, appetites of the

individual; this furnishes the content, the material or matter, to the law. It concerns itself chiefly with the preservation, as far as possible, of the particular will in all its particularity, for it must be always remembered that while conflict of wills is evil and a conflicting will is an evil will, it does not follow that mere individuality or particularity in itself makes a will conflicting.

Here, then, we have in the process of civilization exhibited in the formalization of its laws a practical example of an attempt to infer the Universal will from the particular in so far as such inference became necessary to and involved in the problem of how men might peaceably live together in human society, for all laws are arrived at by an elimination of those elements of the particular will that are peculiar, eccentric, contradictory to the Universal will — indicated as such by their conflicting with other individual wills — and the retaining and taking up of those elements that are common to all and necessary. There is always a suppression of a part of the particular will, although as law grows more refined there is, no doubt, a greater and greater effort to preserve by nice distinctions more and more of all the content of the particular will save that which is plainly conflicting.

It is not, therefore, every peculiar and individual feature of the particular will which must be suppressed, but only such as are conflicting with other particular wills, and so with the Universal will. Indeed it is, as already mentioned, a true canon of

the relations of the two that individuality of particular will is to be preserved as much as possible. Nor does it invariably follow that a difference of one particular will conflicting with that of another necessarily makes it conflicting with the Universal will. There is no obligation laid upon it to avoid conflict with every other particular will except in so far as that other particular will expresses the Universal will; nevertheless there is *prima facie* a presumption that such conflict with a particular will involves conflict with the Universal will, which is known by and through the innumerable particular wills expressing it.

How, then, a really conflicting difference of will is to be known becomes an important question. All particular wills are different, and have a right to be different, from each other; in that difference is contained their individual character, their selfness. And so long as this difference does not trespass upon or resist the endeavors of some other will to be itself, there is no conflict. Or again, if the difference or conflict of will merely conflicts with the difference of some particular will, which difference is itself in conflict with the Universal will, then that difference of the first will does not conflict with the Universal will. It is only as expressing the Universal will in concrete shape that any particular will has the right to demand of another particular will that it shall not conflict.

For while every will ought to be in harmony

with every other, and so with the whole, it is clear that to be in harmony with a will which is itself out of harmony with other wills would necessitate the harmonizing will becoming out of harmony with the whole or Universal will, made up and expressed by the other wills. It may be well asked then, how, amid so many and so different particular wills, is any standard or measure of the Universal will to be gained? How, out of the multitude of individual particular wills, can we distinguish the Universal which they must express,—indeed, of which they are the only expression known to us?

This is not so impossible a task as it may at first seem. The average will of the majority of individual wills may be safely assumed to represent the Universal will at that particular moment. It is a standard or measure of the Universal will ascertained much as the mariner, looking upon the heaving ocean and noting its uneven surface, is yet perfectly assured that there is a true level above or below which it never goes but for the instant, and to which it returns with unfailing regularity. This level, by the use of proper instruments, he can ascertain exactly. So and in like manner it may be said that despite all the eccentricity of particular wills, all the aberrations from the normal, it is perfectly feasible to find an average will of the majority of men which may serve as a true expression, a safe measure, of the Universal will expressed in and by them. Those wills which do not con-

form to this measure may be condemned as conflicting with the Universal will as expressed in this standard, and therefore as wrong.

And so we find this the central, vital idea of all democracies, of all governments which are ruled by majorities. The will of the people — that is, of the majority of adult and sane persons — is taken as the true law-giving power; for it, shorn of individual eccentricities, expressing only the traits, wishes, desires, common to all, represents that Universal will of which it is the concrete expression. And so we say, with Sir Henry Cunningham, President of the Economic Section of the British Association, that the divine right of kings has been replaced by the divine right of majorities; divine, rightly so called, because of its representing in concrete shape the Universal will. In this lay the truth of the popular saying "*Vox populi, vox Dei*": the will of all individual men, united in common traits, eccentric and abnormal traits eliminated, stands for the voice of God, for they are, in this Universalized character, what God made them.

The practical application of this principle, while perhaps difficult, is not impossible. What the average will of the great majority of men is at any given period of history is not only possible of ascertainment; it is, to the eyes of the philosophical historian, written plainly in the records of the nation or tribe or race, for these records are the resultant of those various particular wills re-

duced to some sort of unity by the rough process of war and blood-letting.

For we must assume, granting an all-powerful Universal will, that the great and the main cause of all happenings in the world of men, in the world of matter, in the Universe itself, in some way represents the willing of that will. Its only contradictions must be mere temporary, incidental infringements, of no real consequence or significance. This means that the general progress of the world — considered in the large, over great spaces of time — must be the progress of the Universal will, must therefore be right in its results, and must be the true manifestation of that will; otherwise, we have to think an all-powerful Universal will which does not control all things, is not all-powerful, but is hindered and thwarted, and does not accomplish itself in the course of the ages,— in other words, is not an all-powerful will at all.

By a proper study, therefore, of the course of the world of nature, of morals, of civilization, we must be able to know what that Universal will is. But in this study we have to discriminate carefully between the haphazard, the sporadic, the eccentric, and the average, the normal, the general, the Universal. It is not the expression of individuals, nor even of great crowds, nor even of nations and races of men, that constitutes always a manifestation of the Universal will; yet again, looking back for centuries over many nations and races, we can discern something that is consistent, uniform, that

has an identity throughout. We can see in retrospect the martyrs and the despised and condemned of one century become the heroes, the recognized prophets, of the next, the Universal will thus marking its course through the ages. Thus we must not accept the cry of even the majority of one century as the true expression of the Universal; it is only time and the slow procession of events that shall finally reveal the Universal will through all these mutations; so alone may the Universal will be known. And its results are always right, just, true; to them we must conform in the end, for this will is the good will.

It might then be asked, "Why trouble ourselves about the matter?" Browning has told us:

"God's in his heaven; All's right with the world."

But how about ourselves? The world may be right and yet we may be at variance with that rightness; our variance will not eventually affect the results, but it may very seriously affect us; we may be destroyed, lest by our persistence we destroy the harmony of created things. Whether we survive or perish, crushed out by the Universal will, depends on whether we are or are not harmonious with it.

Again, the point may well be raised that the knowledge of the Universal will can be of little service to us as a guide to external conduct, since it is a knowledge to be arrived at only after the

event. It is a sort of *ex post facto* knowledge: when we see what is done we may know that it is right, yet — the truly important point to ourselves — we may not know the right while it is in the doing.

To this two remarks apply; first, that by a study of past civilization, transpired history, preceding developments in manners, morals, character through past ages, we may trace the trend and direction of the working of that Universal will, and so infer its future aims and purposes, much as the scientist may build up from a single bone the whole structure of a perished antediluvian animal, or a geologist, beholding some strata or vein of rock formation, may trace with almost absolute precision the hidden and still undiscovered course of it through the depths of the earth. Secondly, it is to be further noted that so long as the particular will on its internal side is in harmony with the Universal will, has the disposition to put itself in the posture of seeking the Universal will rather than its own particular will in the objects that present themselves for its action, a mere intellectual mistake, a misreading of the external signs of the Universal will, is not vital. If I seek to do the Universal will and err in some concrete instance, that error is not fatal to the harmony of my will with the Universal will on the internal side; and when my error discovers itself, I easily can rectify my act in that respect. The intellectual mistake

in no wise affects the harmony of will, which depends on feeling, emotion, or the desire to be harmonious with the Universal.

Thus far we have viewed the Universal will in its relation with the particular will as exhibited in the will of man, and we have sought to extract from the various presentations of the Universal will through the particular some idea or notion of that Universal will which we are only permitted to know in this fragmentary way. But there is a still larger sense in which we may contemplate that Universal will. Its rule is not confined to man and his particular will, but extends over all things, the Universe of phenomena, of which man is but a small part. At least so we are, by that same compulsion of thought, compelled to think; for we can no more think a Universal will for man and another different will for all the world besides man than we can think of two laws of gravitation, one for man and one for the rest of the world. This mental necessity need only be mentioned now to keep our vision of the subject clear and definite.

We may not at first unite all these phenomena of man and nature under the dominion of a single, all-powerful Universal will. The earthquake, the lightning, the ebb and flow of the sea, the growth of plants, the planetary motions, the hunger and thirst of our own bodies, the compulsions of our thinking — to the untrained, undeveloped intelligence these may seem too diverse and the task of so uniting them too great. This may remain for a

later development of our thinking, just as algebra, geometry, the calculus, long lay among the dormant compulsions of mathematical thought. Primitive man, we are told, put a separate will in every spring, in the wind, the ocean, the woods; there was not a single natural object exerting power contrary to his own to which he did not attribute a separate will or personality. The ancient name of the Hebrew Jehovah himself (*Elohim*) was plural, although followed by a singular verb, showing the sense of the unity of the Universal in its earliest intellectual development, the struggling passage from a polytheistic to a monotheistic stage of the human understanding of the world. It interpreted these many Gods as merely different names for different aspects of that one Universal will. It was part of the struggle of the intellect from the various parts to the single whole, to unity which regarded all the differences of wills — flowing of tides, shining of sun, raging of wild beasts, strokes of lightning — as but different manifestations of the single Universal will; each may have primitively been looked upon as Eloah (God) — that is, a part of God's power,— but all united (Eloahim — Gods) made up the whole God, the supreme Universal will, of which each separate manifestation was but a part.*

It remained for subsequent higher, although equally compulsory, development of thought to

¹ * See Stanley's "History of the Jewish Church": "The Call of Abraham," page 25. Deuteronomy VI: 4.

enable Moses to unite all these separate manifestations into that great declaration — that achievement, we might say — of Jewish religious thought: “The Lord our God is one Lord.”

And with this recognition of the Universal will governing all natural phenomena, went the further feeling or assurance that all such natural phenomena were right, that in this sense whatever was, was right. The ebb and flow of the tide, the motions of the heavenly bodies — what madman would ever dream of questioning their rightfulness! Or perhaps it would be more accurate to assert that the idea of right and wrong did not emerge at this point, for right and wrong mean always a conflict of particular will with Universal will, and in the world of phenomena, excluding man, we cannot imagine such a thing. A Universal will, all-powerful, must control and over-rule all; no conflict with it is possible; there is no power to conflict in these subjects of its sway. The apparent conflicts of these are but the working out of that will. All these conflicts and destructions, disappearing stars, destructions of the lightning and the earthquake, we regard not as contradictions, but as right and proper expressions of that one almighty Universal will. What the purpose of that will may be, to what end it moves in solemn, silent, inexplicable majesty, we can only guess and wonder.

Starting, then, with this idea that the whole is right and the Universal will governing the whole is

right, or rather with the idea that right and wrong have no application to these (as well might we ask as to the weight of a melody or the extension and size of a thought), we consider right and proper the other equally natural phenomena,—the compulsions of our appetites, passions, the laws of our thinking,—imposed upon us by that Universal will. These, being as independent of our control as the external phenomena, we instinctively recognize as phenomena to which the notions of right and wrong do not apply. It is only when we are confronted with this problem or situation — when an appetite, say your hunger (right and entitled to satisfaction) is opposed, conflicts, with another appetite, say my hunger (equally right and proper), that the idea of conflict arises and the necessity of some reconciliation of the two conflicting rights dawns upon us. Thus conflict of wills and the wrong which it entails first appears, and we begin to wrestle from that moment with the problem of right and wrong, thus for the first time made real to us. It is only when we come to the human particular will that we thus are enabled to gather the essentials of the conception of right and wrong which lie entirely in the possibility of the conflict of wills, a possibility which is entirely out of the question in the external world where that Universal will is all-powerful, where harmony with it is not the result of coercion, but simply the bare fact that all creation is the expression of that will: there is no other will.

Thus the question of right and wrong is seen in the large, not separate, independent of man's particular will, for of course it is only in relation to man's will that right and wrong have the possibility of their existence, but yet in relation to all the rest of the Universe. It is seen how the Universal will must govern and does govern not merely man and his acts — his is a small part physically of the Universe about him — but all things; and the fair inference may be made that this Universal will, one and undivided, identical to our thinking, must pursue in the government of men a course and method uniform with that by which it rules the rest of the Universe; that it is no special will for man alone, that its government of him is but a part of its government of all. A study of its dealing with the rest of creation, therefore, must help us to an understanding of its dealing with him.

But it may well be asked, if the Universal will be all-powerful, if it rules all, how any conflict of man's particular will with it becomes possible. The acts of his will, becoming part of the physical Universe, must be as much subject to that will as any other phenomena of the world of Nature. This, of course, is perfectly true; man's acts, however conflicting with the Universal will, must be ruled into subjection to that will, and while this may not take place at once (a violation of the laws of nature does not always bring an immediate punishment, any more than a violation of the moral law), yet eventually it does take place, and the

delay in the subjugation of the rebellious acts does not impeach the supreme authority of the Universal will any more than the delay in the punishment of criminal acts by the authority of the state impeaches its sovereignty and power over its subjects.

But on the internal side of the will, that state of man's soul which precedes the outward acts of will, there is the possibility of a conflict with the Universal will which raises all the question of right and wrong, of sin and of misery, or virtue and bliss. Man's particular will may thus conflict with the Universal will, and although the external acts conflicting with the Universal will are by it suppressed or punished, still the internal particular will may remain conflicting with the Universal will and other particular wills expressing that Universal will. The Universal will does not suppress that conflicting internal will, but the very fact that it is conflicting makes it a miserable and unhappy will, for the great law of all happiness of man is that his will, internal and external, shall be harmonious with the Universal will. Any other condition of will means misery. Thus is to be understood that identity of virtue and happiness already referred to.

Again it may be asked, if conflicting will — that is, sin — is always misery, why should the conflicting will ever arise; why should any man voluntarily seek misery? This question may best be answered by considering the condition of the inner particular will which is called happiness, and which

involves a discussion of man's struggle for that most desirable state.

HAPPINESS

In the light of the preceding discussion, happiness defines itself as nothing more nor less than the result of harmony of will with will. In actual experience such harmony is always a concrete, particular instance, the harmony of the will with another and thus with the Universal, for harmony of the particular will with the Universal Will is an abstraction, an impossibility; in reality as we know it, its harmony (constituting happiness) must always consist in harmony with this or that particular will or wills in which and through which it is in harmony with the Universal will of which these wills are the concrete expression. It is thus that the question answers itself how a conflicting will, which spells misery, should ever arise; for it would seem that the struggle of all men would be for the happiness of the harmonious rather than the misery of the conflicting will. But there may be a harmony of will which for the moment may produce happiness, although such harmony be really conflicting with the Universal will and therefore ultimately spell misery.

It is from this circumstance of a temporary harmony with some concrete will which is itself in conflict with the Universal will, that an apparent,

deceptive harmony of will with will may occur which is not a true harmony with the Universal and produces only a temporary happiness that is sure to turn to misery in the end, when that will is suppressed, ruled into harmony with the Universal will, for it must ever be borne in mind that the only happiness of man's internal state is harmony of will with the Universal will. All conflict of will is painful and productive of misery.

But it may be asked, and would perforce be admitted, that there is a species or kind of happiness that is the product of sensations; the pleasure of the warm sunshine, of the cooling wind, of the bright color, the melodious sound, the toothsome viand,—these sensations give us a certain pleasure, and are we to ignore the happiness produced by them and say that all happiness is the product of harmony, unity of will with will? Undoubtedly this is the conventional idea, the popular notion that all pleasure or happiness is the product of these sensations. It is accepted without examination that this is true; but let us look at the reality as philosophy must, for, contrary to general opinion, it is philosophy that truly brings us in contact with reality, and hence its difficulty and strangeness.

Putting aside your ideas, look into your own consciousness as you recall it for the last twenty-four hours, let us say, and ask yourself, "How much happiness have I had that can be properly laid to pure sensations as its cause? Do tooth-

some viands, warm sunshine, freedom from physical pain, constitute my happiness for those hours?" I venture to say not. In the first place, none of these sensations continue long enough to cover any considerable period of the time; they come and go continually, except perhaps the negative pleasure of freedom from pain, which consists rather in the absence of disagreeable sensations, a mere negative condition necessary to, but not in itself constituting, positive happiness. But it will be found that the real happiness of the day has been made up of what is in popular language often styled one's state of mind; that is, the mental attitude of myself to my surroundings, the behavior of my friends, the result of my plans and my work as expressed in events of my day. This is only another name for that unity of will which is the source of all true happiness in this world and the next. What this pleasure of unity of will is, as contrasted with the mere pleasures of sensations, may be understood by a closer study of that realization of the will already discussed,—that is, the carrying into execution of the will-ideas, the translating of the acting ideas of consciousness into deeds of the external world. This realization of the will is an admirable illustration, a concrete example, of that wider condition of harmony of the particular will with the Universal will which constitutes in this world true happiness, of that virtue which it is and which gives promise and foretaste of that eternal bliss to which all religion bids

us look forward in the next world. For as the pleasures, the happiness of the senses, fall away through the decay of our bodily faculties, this pleasure of harmony of will with will, particular will with Universal will, grows and waxes greater, so that we often find in old men of exceptional character a high degree of true happiness from that source when all bodily senses have failed them and ceased to yield their wonted tribute of physical joy.

For this realization of the will depends for its motives, for the pleasure it undoubtedly yields, on this principle or truth of our internal states of consciousness; namely, that the echoing back to us of our ideas, our feelings, our thoughts, plans, by the external always affords pleasure, gratification, satisfaction we may call it, in the instances where some acting idea has been in the consciousness and is afterwards translated into an external act, the satisfaction of the will: that is the peculiar, unique joy of having a unity, a correspondence of internal will and external deed. Philosophers have recognized the fact of this joy or satisfaction, and have in various ways sought to explain it, but it would seem wiser philosophy to accept it as it is given, tracing its various phases, its different operations under the various circumstances of life, but realizing it as an ultimate, final, elemental truth that requires no explanation, or rather forbids it. There is no explanation of it any more than of the pleasure of the taste of honey in the mouth.

Examine, if you will, the nerves of the tongue; trace the operation of the honey on them; and yet there is left entirely untouched and unexplained why these particular affections of the nerves of taste by honey should produce that feeling in consciousness which we recognize as pleasure. The satisfaction experienced from the realization of the will is a different satisfaction from any satisfaction experienced by the senses and derived from sensations which by virtue of their agreeableness afford what we popularly term pleasure. It is a satisfaction which depends on the bringing about an identity between the acting idea and the accomplished deed as it is afterwards perceived, rendered back to consciousness as a perception.

Having once the acting idea, simple or complex — the idea of removing from a fire or the idea of some great discovery to be accomplished — there is at once a keen desire annexed to it to behold it executed, carried out into an accomplished act, because of the satisfaction of will that follows, a satisfaction which consists in that unity of individual will with Universal will that occurs when thought and act agree and coincide and so constitute a harmony, a unity (in these particulars at least) of the individual will with all other wills which is the highest happiness possible to man, for it is a step toward that unity of particular will with Universal will which has been described as the *sum-mum bonum*. The reflection back to consciousness of these acting ideas in the accomplished deed of the

external world produces a unity of will of the internal world with the external, of the individual particular will with the will of the Universal expressed in these deeds, that is full of highest joy. Balboa discovering the Pacific Ocean; Pasteur finding the germ of Anthrax; Thackeray exclaiming over his Becky Sharp, "That was a stroke of genius!"—we call these satisfactions of great achievements, the pleasure of success, triumph of accomplishing, and other varied terms that fail to set forth the essence of the matter, which consists in the bringing into consciousness the intense bliss of the soul that feels itself by these brought into unity of will with the Universal will expressed in that answering back to its thought, to its will, of that other Universal will; and whose unity with its will is attested by the deed echoing back its thought.

Psychologists have hinted and skirted about this great truth of the realization of the will and the harmony with the Universal will that thence results, and have pointed out the pleasure that follows a successful achievement of preconceived plans of action, whether these were the placing of a ball in a certain place—say in golf, football, billiards, and the like—the firing a shot into a target, or the bringing to completion some scheme of social, financial or religious import. Thus William James remarks *: "It follows that even when no pleasure is pursued by an act, the act itself may

* "Psychology," Vol. II, page 556 et passim.

be the *pleasantest line* of conduct when once the impulse has begun on account of the incidental pleasure which thus attends its successful achievement and the pain which would come of interruption."

That is, a failure to realize the will — i. e. to carry its idea of an act into successful completion — is painful; and in many cases, where the idea is a grand scheme of some sort which fails, whether it be a Protestant Reformation or a Conquest of England, it may cause such pain as to break the heart of the disappointed actor.

In regard to the accomplishment of lesser plans, James again remarks*: "It is true that on special occasions (so complex is the human mind) the pleasure of achievement may itself become a pursued pleasure. . . . Take a football game or a fox hunt. . . . We reap the reward of our exertions in that pleasure of successful achievement which, far more than the dead fox or the goal-got ball, was the object we originally pursued."

In other words, the real pleasure of all these may be called the realization of the will, and consists in that harmony of the internal with the external, of the will with the deed, the idea with the reality, that is a part and corollary of the great truth that unity of the particular will with the Universal will is the highest happiness, the *summum bonum* of all happiness, which man is capable of.

It is this great moving principle that impels a

* "Psychology," Vol. II, page 557.

man to translate his thought, his idea, his will, into deed that he may enjoy that unity of individual will with Universal will which this in part affords and upon which, in the last analysis, all its pleasure depends.

The great motive power, therefore, of all men is not the seeking of food, clothes, bodily satisfactions, but the seeking of that unity of will with the Universal will which is only partially attainable by these slight and imperfect harmonies of will with will which occur in the achievement of sportsmen, philosophers, scientists, inventors, reformers, in the pursuit of their various undertakings. Or to come down to the smaller matters that fill our life every day, we may say that the carrying out of our plans, the fulfillment of our little expectations of life — the building a house, the making a bargain, the accomplishing of some small task — constitute the real happiness of our life; not the eating of food, drinking of delicious liquids, nor any of the keen physical sensations to which we are so apt to refer when we think of pleasure. All these are so truly transitory that the man who has the most of them could probably not claim an hour a day as the sum total of their duration. All the rest of the day, if not filled with so keen a consciousness of pleasure, will be found to consist of more enduring satisfactions, dependent upon that unity of will with will — the agreement of friends; the result, agreeable and consonant with our will, of some external happening; the weather; the

actions of our fellows: these are what make up our continuous happiness or misery day after day, year after year.

William James in his "Psychology" expresses in a concise way this notion of the pleasure or displeasure that grows simply and solely from the correspondence or want of correspondence of will with will when he says: "We are chagrined if prevented from doing some quite unimportant act which would have given us no noticeable pleasure if done, merely because *the prevention itself is disagreeable*." * The italics are mine. That is to say, the prevention is a defeat of the will, a turning back of the will upon itself without the satisfaction of the will received from expression in act whereby a harmony of internal will and external act is attained. There is a want of harmony thus between internal will and external act. The will finds no corresponding act echoing back itself. Here we are on the very edge of the true reason why the prevention of a willed act is disagreeable; it is because the harmony of will with will is missed; the echoing back of internal individual will by external acts and objects which make up the Universal will, is that harmony of will with will which makes the *summum bonum* of this life and of the next. Any prevention of the doing of an act planned out by the will destroys that harmony, causes want of harmony that is painful,— painful, of course, in various degrees, from the slight miss-

* James' "Psychology," Vol. II, page 556.

ing of harmony that comes from a miscalculation of a boat or train to be caught, to the defeat and missing of some great reform to be accomplished. For it is not only in the great acts of life, the mighty plans of mice and men, but in the smaller as well, in their place and degree, that this harmony of will with will plays its part. In the daily and hourly contacts with the external world, in innumerable and often trifling individual instances, this harmony is found or missed, for it is in these, too, that we are made to know the Universal will.

What this joy of the unity of the particular will with the Universal will is, therefore, we may know in part and fragmentarily, for so only are we able to know the Universal will — by snatches, by bits and glimpses, from which we may infer its entirety imperfectly and conjecturally. The knowledge of the entirety of the Universal will is never vouchsafed; perhaps we have not the capacity, under our limitations, of knowing it as it really is in all its vast comprehensiveness of Universe upon Universe, the infinitely little and the infinitely great. We know it in our relations with each item of our immediate environment, we know it and experience it pulsing in the heart of our friend, our neighbor, or in the manifestations of nature, in the beating of the sea on the shore, the flying of the clouds before the wind; and we know the joy of unity and harmony with all these concrete expressions of it, calling such joys the joys of friendship, enjoyment of and communion with nature.

And the great and final punishment of an evil will,— that is to say, a will not in harmony with the Universal will,— consists in this, that the realization of that will is defeated, prohibited by the Universal will; and the evil will never attains the full realization of itself, but suffers the unhappiness of failure of realization which is the deepest unhappiness of the wicked if it does not mean the destruction of that will,— i. e. death itself, for the will as we interpret it is the individual; its death, or the cancellation of its acting ideas, is equivalent to the striking out of all the contents of its particularity, making its individuality a mere blank, a nothing. In this sense are to be understood the pregnant words of Scripture, “The wages of sin is death.”

SIN AND DEATH

And so we see how sin and death come to be identical at the last, for sin is the disagreement of the particular will with the Universal will, and, as we have seen, in the wide and all comprehending sense the particular will cannot exist except in harmony with the Universal will. We have seen that the all-powerful Universal will in all the physical Universe rules all things and suppresses all contradictions of itself; and so we see that this same rule must apply to man himself; that his particular will,— although it has power of choos-

ing, of initiative, and may for the moment contradict and defy the Universal will,— yet finally must submit itself to the Universal; that is, it must, like all the physical Universe, be ruled by that will, must either reconcile itself or suffer extinction. So we perceive how it is that sin means death, because sin means the opposition of particular will to the Universal will, and that necessitates the destruction by the Universal of the particular will that is contradictory of itself and therefore sinful.

THE IDENTITY OF GOODNESS AND HAPPINESS

It may be interesting to remark some of the consequences that flow from this identity of virtue and its reward, happiness. That a good will must always be a happy will has already been asserted. For the particular will to will, to act, to govern itself, in harmony with the Universal will is both right conduct and that state of happiness which moralists tell us is only to be so obtained.

“Be happy and you will be good” is, therefore, as sound a saying as its reverse and more common maxim, “Be good and you will be happy.” For, properly interpreted, to be happy is in the last analysis to be in harmony with the Universal will, and this harmony with the Universal will is sure to produce conduct likewise in harmony with the Universal will, and so good.

This is not to declare that there can be no happiness of any sort apart from that harmony with the Universal will which is virtue. There is a false happiness, but even this will be found to consist in an apparent harmony with the Universal will; that is, a harmony with one or more of these particular items, these individual instances, by which alone we know the Universal will (for without harmony with some items of particular will, even this false happiness is impossible), but which particular wills are themselves out of harmony, contrary, to the true Universal will. Such happiness is that of wicked men who, agreeing in their contrariness to the Universal will, do gather a false happiness from this agreement, this harmony of wills contrary to the Universal will. Superficially it might seem their happiness exceeds that of the particular will which, while truly harmonious with the Universal will, is yet in conflict with other particular wills contrary to the Universal will.

These temporary harmonies or conflicts of particular will with other particular wills constitute all the moral difficulties of the world and lead to all those apparent contradictions in which we see the good will for a time unhappy, the evil will apparently happy. It is by these apparent harmonies, this false happiness, that the particular will, always seeking happiness, is led into conflict with the Universal will, and so to that misery which otherwise it would never of itself seek, for the identity of virtue and its reward is no ideal

theory: it gives us a practical solution of many problems of everyday life with all the ease of a true key. At the very outset it strikes down one of the most elusive and all-persuasive fallacies, a fallacy that lurks in unexpected nooks and crannies of our thinking and has to be dragged by main force into the light of day before it is recognized for what it really is. This is the popular fallacy which holds that goodness and happiness are external, that the one consists in doing and the other in possessing something. It is oft recurring, and continually crying out for the repetition of the threadbare truism that man's virtue and happiness consist in what he *is*, not in what he *does* or what he *has*. This strikes down the charitable gifts of an evil will as ethically worthless, makes nothing of the happiness gained by the possessing of things apart from that harmony of will with the Universal will which has just been declared the only and sole definition of true and real happiness. Doing good by a man of evil will is nothing, just as getting happiness by the getting of some external possession is nothing.

In like manner and with equal ease this identity of the good will with happiness explains that problem of the theologians — the existence of evil and the necessity therefor; for granted once that a good will is itself the reward of virtue as well as the cause of that reward, and we see that the existence of the particular will thus becomes an essential part of all happiness, and, further, that in this

existence of the particular will necessarily lies latent also the existence of evil, for a will whose essence is its self-determining nature, its power to be good or evil, to agree or disagree with the Universal will, would be no will if it lost that power and could not, if it pleased, be evil as well as good. That is to say, the possibility of evil is the necessary consequence of the possibility of good; both lie dormant in the nature of the will. Evil is thus nothing more nor less than the exercise by the particular will of its self-determining power in a way contrary to and against the Universal will. Evil is not something *sui generis*, something by itself, but simply a wrong relation, a wrong state of the particular will with regard to the Universal will.

Nor does the fact that the continuous contradiction of the Universal will by the particular will spells ultimate destruction for the particular invalidate this conclusion. The Universal will does not permit the particular will to oppose it except under the penalty of its final destruction, yet it does not deny to it the power to oppose and to so destroy itself. Its own destruction is thus as much the result of its free choice to oppose as its happiness is the result of its free choice to agree with the Universal will.

It follows that much of the difficulty of the theologians and the metaphysicians over the existence of evil disappears. It is plain now how it happens that an all-powerful Universal will permits the existence of evil, for its existence is but the conse-

quence of the existence of the particular will itself as a will, with its power of willing to agree or disagree with the Universal will. The possibility of good and of happiness is inextricably bound up with the possibility of evil and of misery. A particular will, to be a will, must have self-determining power,—i. e. the power to be harmonious or discordant with the Universal will, the power to be evil as well as good, to be miserable as well as happy; otherwise, it would not be a will. It must be suffered to be itself if it is to be a will in the true sense of the word; to compel it to be harmonious with the Universal will by the coercion of a superior power, would make it not a good will but no will at all, by robbing it of that self-determining power which alone makes it a will. In order to be a good will, it must have power to be an evil will; to be happy, it must have the power to be miserable: the self-determining power is an essential element of both states. A harmony of the particular will with the Universal which is not self-determined, the result of a free volition, is not virtue, nor is it productive of happiness, the reward of virtue, for such a harmony would be a coerced, forced harmony which is no harmony at all. Nothing short of hell itself could probably be more miserable than a particular will compelled against its own volition by a superior power to be harmonious with a Universal will. Such may be the condition of condemned devils, forever rebelling against a will they loathe, yet to which they are forced to yield them-

selves in a servile submission that in effect annihilates their wills as wills by taking away all power of self-determination. In short, such a condition is in effect the destruction of the particular will; it is death, for sin and death are essentially like goodness and happiness, different aspects of the same thing.

This identity also disposes of a class of moral problems which have given rise to numerous and endless ingenious arguments, but at whose root lies the same essential fallacy that something may be good or bad irrespective of the will; the contradiction of Kant's maxim that there is nothing good — or ill, he might have added — but a good or an evil will. No thing, no material substance, can have moral significance, or permanent pleasure or pain producing effects, apart from the will, for it is now apparent that there is no good end, no good thing, possible in all the world of action or of things but the perfect harmony of will with will, particular will with particular will and with Universal will. The idea of obtaining any such good in violation of that harmony is an intellectual delusion, another of the many nooks and crannies of thinking in which lurks the fallacy that happiness, the good, is an external something to be got or lost by getting or avoiding some external thing.

In truth, all goods or evils, save a good or evil will, are relative, mediate, depending always on something else, some other further thing for the reason, the justification of their moral significance,

their goodness or their badness. A good will alone is a good in itself, complete, having reference to no other, further good, an end in and for itself, asking nothing more, self-justifying, looking for nothing beyond itself; so we recognize and distinguish and know it for what it is, the final good.

To another somewhat different problem, growing, however, out of the same recurrent fallacy, this identity brings the only satisfactory solution. The difficulty regarding prayer and the answers to it is a very real and, if considered otherwise than in the light of this identity, an insuperable one. For how can the government of the Universe, the Universal will, be placed in subordination to any particular will that may see fit to pray for some material thing not in harmony with the Universal will? And if this cannot be, how, then, are prayers to be answered?

But now it is evident that prayer is one of the great instruments for bringing the particular will into harmony with the Universal will. The true good of all prayer is harmony of will. "Thy will be done" is the epitome of all prayer. It expresses the ego's desire for that good of all goods, a good will; i. e., unity of will with the Universal will. It is one of the methods of universalizing the particular will. How this is accomplished is of no importance; whether the particular will modifies the Universal by getting its particular desire, its asked-for material thing; or whether it gets it not,

but yields it up a willing sacrifice to the Universal will, matters not at all, only provided harmony is established between the two.

In the function of thus unifying the will of the individual with the Universal will we see the true office of prayer. It obtains for us, not what we ask in the way of external things; but its exercise, properly made, brings our will into that accord with the Universal will which constitutes for the ego the highest happiness. And this it attains, not by impressing the individual will on the external world, not even by a deliberate copying of the Universal will, but by a making of the Universal will its own in truth as though the Universal will were the spontaneous particular will, free and uncoerced. And it operates by virtue of that elemental psychological principle that the very attempt to formulate, to give expression in consciousness to some mental condition, tends to produce it. If I pray sincerely "Thy will be done" generally, or particularly that I may forgive my enemies, that I may feel love for others, that I may be content with my lot, for any state of mind harmonious with the Universal will, that very act tends to create, to bring about, the result I ask. And so the prayer fulfills itself wherever it concerns itself with its legitimate objects, internal conditions; except as related to these, material goods are not the proper objects of prayer. It may be lawful and proper for me to express my own particular will with regard to the want of material goods; "Give us this

day our daily bread " is certainly one of the clauses of the Lord's Prayer, but it is the only one relating to material good ; all the rest are concerned with spiritual conditions — forgiveness of trespasses, the prevalence of God's will on earth as in heaven, freedom from temptation — and this solitary petition for daily bread is one expressing not so much an arbitrary desire of the particular will for a material satisfaction, as for the answering of that demand for bodily sustenance without which it were impossible to exist on the earth, to be a will at all. It is only a petition for life, existence as a will under those material conditions in which it finds itself placed, and under which alone it can exist as it is. But the expression in prayer of the particular will in regard to material things, the getting or the not-getting — the escaping — of something, must always be allowable as in the clause just cited where the material thing is really part of the particular will and so necessary to its expression, making up its particularity, so to speak, as a will distinct from other particular wills, but always with the idea of such will coming to be universalized, made one with the Universal will, and its particularity, expressed in this desire for some material thing, completely eliminated and the material thing stricken out in the process of Universalization as of no consequence or significance. The getting or not getting the material thing must become a matter of utter indifference ; otherwise, the particular will, instead of becoming

universalized by prayer, would put itself in the position of particularizing the Universal will, attempting to coerce the Universal will into agreement with itself.

In so far, therefore, as individual will involves in its expression the desire or need of some material good, it is legitimate for such desire to be expressed in prayer, since that desire for that material good is an expression of the individuality of that particular will; but it must be an expression with no expectation that the desire, as respects that specified good, is to be gratified. Its expression must be much after the manner of a confidential outpouring of hopes, fears, desires, needs — in short of our self and our heart — to a sympathizing friend, with no idea that he will give things to us, but simply that he may know and become one with us, a sharer of our inner self and so of the wishes that make up that self.

THE RECONCILIATION OF WILLS

I. E., THE STRUGGLE FOR HAPPINESS

Happiness or misery is the internal condition of the will, of which conduct is its external expression; and here we find the same struggle, the same effort to reconcile particular will with Universal will, that we observed in the external world of conduct, only that now the struggle is one of internal feeling,— the endeavor of the particular will to ob-

tain the satisfaction that accompanies the assertion of its own appetites and desires, its identity, as against the appetites and desires, the identity, of all other wills, and restraining this and limiting it, that opposing tendency, that other feeling, that insists on harmony and unity with all other wills as a condition of its own internal state of happiness. This latter acts as a constant check upon the former, the unbridled satisfaction of egoistic appetites.

In short, every man is torn asunder by two opposing forces, two tendencies that contend for mastery in the external world; or rather, this internal contention is the forerunner of the latter. Each man is, to use the conventional expression, selfish,—that is, full of his own particularity, his desires, his wants; he is urged irresistibly on this side to do, to get, to assert for himself as against all the world — the Universe and all its individual parts. Yet at the selfsame moment an equally irresistible instinct or sense of unity compels him to strive for unity, harmony, with that very world which the first instinct of particularity urges him to oppose by an assertion of his own will. This latter seems wholly, hopelessly, contradictory of the former tendency. In the very selfishness of his particularity, the satisfying of his own desires, the assertion of his own particularity as against the Universe, lurk the seeds of pain and discomfort when such particularity carried out into conduct brings him into conflict with other particular wills,

other individualities, and so into violation of the law of unity, of harmony with the Universal.

The assertion of desires, thoughts, and feelings of the particular will — no matter how insistent and apparently in the interest of the happiness of the particular will — results at once in misery when they come into conflict with the desires, thoughts, and feelings of another particular will. I behold, for example, another man achieving some worthy deed, no matter what, and my feeling is not in harmony with his; I have no sympathy, no pride, in his deed, but a conflicting, inharmonious feeling of jealousy, envy, a desire to rob him of it, to grudge him the credit of it. I have no love or sympathy with him, and therefore I do not share his feeling of gratulation over it. Here is a true conflict of internal wills, a difference of wills, and with that conflict — following fast and inevitably upon it, part of it, indeed — is the penalty, its punishment. Unhappiness fills my consciousness at his success, an unhappiness which is caused by the want of harmony, the conflict of our wills, or rather that conflict is itself unhappiness. Instead of sharing his feeling of satisfaction at his accomplishment — a harmony of will with will — I have the opposite feeling of dissatisfaction, of grudging him it, depreciating it — a conflict of will with will; and in like manner, should he learn my feeling, there may also come to him conflicting feeling, which may make him unhappy in his turn. Ignorant of my feeling, uninformed of it, there

exists no conflicting feeling in his will until he becomes aware of my feeling; and then if his own will is truly harmonious with the Universal will, it does not harbor conflicting feeling with my will, but suppresses it, and so, leaving me miserable with conflicting will, it preserves happiness for itself by avoiding conflicting feeling.

If, on the other hand, I look with sympathy on the deed of the other man, rejoice in it as if it were my own, feel proud of it as he does, I shall then share his feelings, the content of his will is the content of my own; my will is not conflicting, but harmonious. My reward, happiness, follows apace, for that harmony of will with will is itself happiness, just as the conflict, popularly and variously styled jealousy, envy, depreciation, was misery. In other words, and adopting popular language, the pathway to true unity of will is love and sympathy. These are the keys by which I may unlock the treasures of the Universe, its true and lasting treasures; that is, its spiritual, eternal joys thus become mine. I make myself one with all; the world is mine in the highest and best sense, in its reality. All its achievements are my possession: I sing the songs of Mozart, think the thoughts of Bacon, write the hymns of Homer; I paint the Madonnas of Raphael; I shape the marble of Phidias or Praxiteles. The heroic triumph of Luther, the discoveries of Copernicus, the courage of Leonidas, are mine; I feel the devotion of the martyrs, the intrepidity of heroes, the love and joy

in beauty of artists. There is nothing good, or fine, or truly and really a joy, in all the world that I may not lay hands on, appropriate to myself; they are all mine through love and sympathy, for these are the paths to unity of will; these bring the joy of the world to those who will accept.

And in the lesser ways of life, the affairs of every day and hour, among my neighbors and friends, my family, my city, my country, every joy of these is in like manner my joy. Not a man does a noble act or generous deed but it is mine; not one bears affliction manfully, suffers patiently, but I have my part in it. The world is mine indeed when I have this unity of will; not that in point of ability or of power I have what these great folks possess, but that in point of feeling, according to my power and capacity, as far as I can I share their emotions and have their enjoyment of their achievements.

On the other hand, lacking this unity of will, every one of these fine and glorious works of art, deeds of heroism, achievements of skill, becomes a misery. I suffer when I should enjoy; for envy, jealousy,—in short, disunity of will,—robs me of my lawful share, my property in these world joys. There is no truer exclamation of a full heart than the splendidly philosophical words, “I love and the world is mine!”—no truer saying than the Buddhistic expression of the opposite truth: “Hate is hell.” For this is part of the Universalizing of the particular will, the beginning on earth

of what is to be completed in heaven. It is thus that the most selfish is forced, in the interests of his very selfishness, to set bounds to his selfishness; for with a true instinct he learns that only so can his own joy attain its rightful proportions; and so he stretches forth his hand to the joys of others. For his own satisfaction every man is compelled to seek reconciliation of his own particular will with that will of the whole making itself known to him in these various concrete expressions of pictures, statues, melodies, poems, deeds, achievements of scientist, philosopher, or investigator, to the smallest act of everyday life. Even in that fierce competition of will with will which we call business, the most flagrant assertor of his own particularity seeks to justify himself by showing that his self-assertion is for the good of the whole; to argue that the crushing out of the few, the weak, the unfit, is for the benefit of the many. So every selfish fellow defends his selfishness by reference to that law of unity, of harmony of will with the Universal, which he violates, but by virtue of his own internal constitution finds it impossible to ignore. He strives to bring himself and his particularity into relation with the whole, to feel himself one with it, part of it and possessing proper definite relations with it.

Forced at one and the same time into particularity by these wants, desires, that constitute his particular will, make him what he is, a human unit, an individual by and for himself,— he instinctively

rebels at the isolation, separation, and division from the great whole that the assertion of these wants and desires compels in him. He desires to assert his particular will, to be himself, but he also desires to be in harmony with the Universal will. He refuses to be shut in upon his own narrow self; he insists, while still himself, upon being something more, a self with universal ties and relations adjusted to the great whole. He must share with and be shared by others, all his fellows, everywhere; and in proportion to the completeness of this sharing will be his happiness.

The very assertion of his own particularity in so far as it separates and opposes the Universal will, the whole, makes for unhappiness, and he instinctively puts forth his hand for a remedy, a cure, for something that shall restore him to his place as part of the whole. Two great instruments of reconciliation present themselves, two avenues of escape — art and religion; art as the great human bond of expression, of sympathy and communion with all other men, that shall bridge for him the gulf between his particular and the Universal, that shall convey his feelings to others and bring back their sympathy to him, that shall unite all in feelings common to each and every particular one. Art is the less conscious, the instinctive escape which the individual seizes naturally and without deliberation; it is the cry of the child in the dark with no language but a cry; it is the suffering or enjoying individual calling for

sympathy from his fellows; it is the search for communion of feeling with others, the striving for some common channel for the expression of feeling, and so, by and through such channel, for harmony with all men and — so far as humanity goes to constitute the Universe — for harmony with the Universe and its Universal will. But humanity in its totality is only a part of the whole, of the Universal, and the particular will cannot rest satisfied, therefore, with art. Religion of some kind is required to wholly reconcile the individual, not only with other individuals, but with the whole. Having come into some sort of harmony, of unity of feeling, with the Universal under this instinctive, impulsive, tendency to foregather with his fellows by means of artistic expression, much as sheep huddle together in a storm for the comfort of fellowship, there still remains for him the further desire to be in harmony with all, with the whole. The escape from his particularity is still but partial; he is now, by means of art, one in the great community of the whole human race,— their feelings are more or less his; but he is still left with his fellows as only a part of the real whole. He must, to truly reach the Universal will, find something that will include these, unite and give them end, purpose, meaning; that will co-ordinate them into an organized, reasoned unity. Men, no matter how harmonious and united among themselves, are still not the whole; they still are only a union of many particulars which can never be a true Uni-

versal. There must be something else necessarily superior to them, beyond and above them, for it must unite and give true reconciliation to the particular with the Universal. The satisfaction of human intercourse, sympathy, community of feeling with others, is still only a partial satisfaction of the desire of harmony with the Universal. It is a satisfaction that takes a man out of his particularity, and so partially relieves that burden of separation that pesters the particular and individual, but it falls short of a complete satisfaction of his longing for unity with the Universal, for it puts him in relation with the Universal only partially; it fails to give final purpose and meaning to that relation. To feel himself one with others, his fellowmen, is a deep pleasure and a long step onward toward the Universal; but his intellectual and spiritual craving remains unsatisfied in this, that his fellowmen, like himself, are all themselves particulars and have no more sanction for themselves in their particularity than he has. To be in harmonious relation, community of feeling, with them, while evidently right and part of his reconciliation with the Universal, fails to afford any final answer to his reason, which asks: "How and why, to what end, are we all here; whither do we go; whence have we come; what are we in relation to the whole of which we, all of us, are plainly but a part? What is the final purpose, the real meaning, of ourselves, which purpose and meaning must be in connection with that whole?" This, perhaps,

is an intellectual difficulty primarily, but it carries with it secondarily a feeling of dissatisfaction, a divine discontent, until it is satisfied. There is connected with it a strong desire for its answer that causes unhappiness until satisfied by some explanation of the relation of the particular to the whole, the Universal.

Here we have the fundamental basis of religion in the wide sense, for it is religion that seeks to tie the particular, the part, into the whole, the Universal. In the history of man the two have ever been closely allied. Religion usually precedes, historically, conscious art. We know that the first great works of Greek art were all the handmaids of religion — the temples, and their statues and bas-reliefs, its outward symbol; the choruses (the beginnings of the drama), the expression of the internal feelings of thanks and joy to the gods for victory in battle.

By these two methods, art and religion, therefore, man seeks to retain his particularity, assert and preserve his individuality, and yet avoid and escape that separation, that opposition, which revolts his instinct and impulse toward harmony and unity with all, but which separation and opposition are yet the legitimate effects of his particularity if carried to its logical extreme. Thus he reconciles the particular and the Universal will, and gains that unity of feeling which is essential to the internal condition we call happiness.

ART

To the casual passerby in our streets there can be no more suggestive spectacle than on some rainy evening to behold, in the early dusk, that dull, inert line of humanity stretching its bedraggled length at the theater door. There they stand, poor wretches, patiently, dumbly, waiting. "For what?" you ask. "What awaits them behind those somber portals that they should thus stand in the rain, their last coppers, perhaps, in their hands to pay the meager price of admission?" One would think a cup of coffee, a piece of bread, a patch on those ragged clothes, would be a more pressing need. But no; so strong is their spiritual longing for what the theater affords in more or less degree that they choose it in preference to physical comfort.

What, then, is it the theater, however degraded, gives these hungry souls? Is it not a lifting of them out of their particularity, a granting them the sharing of the life of feeling beyond themselves and so into closer touch with the Universal? What matters if it be but the poorest melodrama, filled with false sentiment, unnatural characterization, absurd dramatic action; be it never so poor a transition into the life of others, it yet is a transition, a passing out of one self into others, and by virtue of that alone possessing something of the Universal; for how else is the Universal to be

gained in feeling? How am I to go out of myself, cast out my own particularity — made up of my own selfish appetites, passions, wants, thoughts — save by bringing into my soul the appetites, passions, wants, feelings, of others? For so alone can sympathy with them be born. And this the theater gives these poor restricted lives. It says to them: “Come here. Be a king, a noble, a hero; feel the devotion of the mother, the heroism of the soldier; know the unhappiness of the evil; rejoice in the goodness of the good. In short, come into your inheritance, your birthright of the Universal; be part of it by sharing all these feelings of others.”

It is not a conscious seeking of an escape from particularity, from the narrow selfishness that shuts each man into the prison house of his own desires and feelings; it is rather the instinctive seeking of the pleasure and the freedom that comes with the sharing of the lives and the sympathy with the feeling of others. Thus the man gets released from his own particularity, gets a dim foretaste of the great Universal feelings, and loses himself in his sense of the Universal. This is the human side of the Universal, the unity of man with man in feeling, in understanding of each other.

A great philosopher,* quoting Guyon, has well said: “Art lifts man from his personal life into the Universal life by means not only of participation in the same ideas and beliefs, but also by means of similarity in feeling.” It remained for

* Tolstoi's “What is Art?”

this same philosopher to expound the true theory of art, to give it its true philosophical definition, for he saw and announced, with fine discrimination, that art is no more than the means adopted for conveying feeling from one man to another. It is the great channel for communicating feeling between all men. It is that activity which, by external expression of one sort or another,—by sound, color, line, written word or acted thought, by music, painting, sculpture, poetry, prose, theatrical representations,— seeks to make the feelings of one man the property or gift of another. It is thus a great bond between men, making for a common brotherhood of all by making all sharers of the same feelings, making a thousand hearts beat as one. So intimate is the communion of feeling thus brought about that, as Tolstoi has eloquently said, “the receiver of a true artistic impression is so united to the artist that he feels as if the work were his own and not some one else’s — as if what it expresses were just what he had long been wishing to express. A real work of art destroys in the consciousness of the receiver the separation between himself and the artist; nor that alone, but also between himself and all whose minds receive this work of art. In this freeing of our personality from its separation and isolation in this uniting of it with others, lies the chief characteristic and the great attractive force of art.” *

Tolstoi goes on to explain that where one soul

* Tolstoi’s “What is Art?” 1899, page 133.

catches from another a condition of soul, an emotion — he means just what he have called harmony of will with will — then the work of art is complete. The degree of completeness with which this transfer of feeling is effected measures the excellence of the work of art. “The stronger the infection (so he styles it) the better the art,” putting aside for the moment the question of the kind of feeling transmitted.*

But now we are made aware of another and remarkable characteristic of art and its work, namely, that these individual, particular appetites, passions, feelings, of the particular will play a two-fold part. On the one hand they link all men together by reason of the invariableness of their presence in all. Our individual character in these common characteristics links us all together; my love, my hate, my hunger and thirst, enable me to understand and share your love, your hate, your hunger and thirst. These parts of the Universal will, as we have seen, help to unite all men by giving them a common ground of understanding and sympathy for each other. But again, and on the other hand, these loves and hates, hungers and thirsts, coming face to face with each other in the external physical world, lead men to conflict of will. My love opposes yours; my hunger asks satisfaction as against, in despite, if you please, of yours. Art, therefore, only uses such feelings so far as they tend to make all hearts beat as one. The con-

* Paraphrased from “What is Art?”

flicting of appetites, the opposing of will to will, is not art's work.

"And all art has this characteristic, that it unites people. Every art causes those to whom the artist's feeling is transmitted to unite in soul with the artist, and also with all who receive the same impression." *

With this view of art comes a greater clearness of vision; many of the absurd — and because without any clear understanding, necessarily endless — discussions disappear, and with them go the foolish attempts to establish useless and irrelevant definitions, such as standards of beauty, and the equally absurd idea that the object of art is to minister to beauty, the accidental, rather than to feeling, the essential.

It is easy to perceive how — lacking this fundamental view of art as the vehicle of feeling — the idea of beauty, and of the office of art to serve beauty, arose, for to a narrow and strictly technical view of art work, regarding it as something which concerns itself chiefly with the copying or reproducing of outward objects, it was very natural to fix attention on the character of that copy, its outward aspect of beauty, to the neglect of the vital function of conveying feeling. That a beautiful object did more effectively convey joyous feeling was instinctively understood, and then it was easy to assume that the only end of the work of art was to embody beauty and to announce that

* "What is Art?" page 142.

all art has to do is to mirror forth beauty, forgetting that its purpose in mirroring beauty is simply the better to convey feeling; forgetting, too, especially, how often art has mirrored suffering, ugliness, even hideousness, with the end of conveying feeling.

From the strictly representative arts of painting and sculpture, this idea of beauty and the duty of art to serve beauty suffered a sort of metaphorical translation to the more abstract arts, and poems and music came to be spoken of as beautiful. What was worse, an idea arose of a standard of beauty which was to have universal application, and such standard was sought for in learned discussions, as if beauty were the all-in-all of art instead of only an important instrument of that all-in-all,—namely, feeling. For certain it is that scarcely anything possesses such power to inspire feeling as beauty, and it is only in this sense that it has importance in art. Beautiful objects excite powerfully the feelings of all, and prompt the artist to represent them; but to enter into a discussion (such as the learned have done) to elucidate the principles of beauty, fix its standards, dwell on its peculiar properties, etc., while ignoring the only purpose of its existence — the conveyance of feeling — would be like an engineer who should devote all his attention to polishing the brasswork of his engine to the neglect of the steam that gave it efficiency.

A standard of beauty is, of course, an impossi-

bility, as these learned discussions (if they can be said to have succeeded in proving anything) have established. We cannot measure art, therefore, in this way. But a standard of feeling may not be beyond our powers, for if art is simply concerned with feeling, using, if you please, beauty — varying as it will and must with every age and nation — as one of its most powerful agents in the exciting of feeling, then if we can fix some standard of feeling, we may have a true measure of works of art. If all art is what has just been stated, the handmaid of the Universal, if its purpose is the uniting of men in common feelings, and the forwarding of that unity of will with the Universal will by this means, then surely it is not too bold a conclusion to declare that all feelings conveyed by works of art are to be measured by this standard, that this question is the only test of works of art: “How and to what degree of perfection does this work of art serve its purpose of uniting men in common feelings? Does it conduce to love and sympathy of all with all?” For then we may further add that the work of art whose feelings, when conveyed to others by it, tend in the highest degree to this end, is the greatest and highest as compared with all others. In other words, harmony of will with will is the great end of all art. As it best and most effectively accomplishes this, the work of art is to be measured.

That work of art is the highest in value which expresses most truly in the concrete and particular

the Universal, for art must, as a vehicle for feeling, deal with the concrete, the particular. We shall see presently that we can have no feeling save as it is concerned with the concrete, with something particular, something individual. Abstractions, Universals, convey no feelings.

And so we may define art as the expression of the Universal in the concrete. A few words upon this definition: First, it must express the Universal in some way; that is what makes it a work of art as distinguished from a mere copy or reproduction of some natural object. A photograph will give us a far better reproduction of the human figure than Giotto's awkward painting, but Giotto has put something more into his work than the photograph can have — his feeling, himself. By expressing this, it is taken out of the merely representative function of the photograph and gets that touch of the Universal that makes it a work of art. This turns the facsimile of some outward object, a Madonna, a child, a saint, what you will of the external world, into a conduit for feelings common to all, that link all men together in a common bond of fellowship and brotherhood by reason of their Universality, by reason of the fact that these feelings are the common property of all; so the picture gets its touch of the Universal. And by the scope and breadth of its Universality we have to judge of its excellence as a work of art. The more perfectly and completely it appeals to all men, the more perfect and complete is it as a work

of art. Now, as we all know, it is the simple, elemental feelings that appeal to all men and that make them all one. Love of God, love of country, of home; pity for the downtrodden, sympathy for the suffering, resentment against wrongdoing; all these are of the simple, fundamental feelings of men, and works of art that convey these and like feelings are, therefore, the great art of the world. As we descend the scale of feeling to less universal feelings, to the peculiar, the artificial, the acquired, we go away from the Universal toward the feelings that are common to only a few, and so such works of art tend less to make all men one, to unite men together in a common humanity; they may unite cultivated coteries, educated and trained scholars, but leave out the great masses of men, and so in a measure lose their Universality. Then when we go a step farther to the abnormal, the sophisticated and highly artificial feelings to which appeal the problem play, some of the impressionist paintings, the obscure and scarcely intelligible words of some poetry of modern times, we reach art which, so far from expressing universal feeling, seems rather to express particular, singular, eccentric feeling that repels the great masses of men; and so far from uniting and binding all men together in a common brotherhood, seems to repel and repulse the men of average feelings, and so tend to separate and particularize instead of Universalizing them. I am united with all men by a great work of art which makes me a sharer in some mighty

elemental feeling like love, or pity, or indignation at wrongdoing. I am shut in upon myself, shut out from other men, by a work of art which gives me some peculiar abnormal feeling such as only I or a few specially instructed people can feel.

So much for the Universality which enters into a work of art and gives us at the same time its measure. By its Universality you shall know it.

Secondly, there is the element of concrete particularity which is the other essential of a true work of art. It is by this element that the work of art is able to excite or convey feeling. Feeling can only be called forth by some particular object presented to and impressed on the consciousness in as vivid a way as possible. It is the presentation of this concrete thing in pigment, stone, or word,—in picture, statue, novel, play, or poem,—that is the task of art; in this its technique is displayed,—that is, the skillfulness with which the object is treated; in this its success or failure in a technical sense is seen, for it is the first requirement of art of any sort, high or low, that some feeling of some sort should be produced by it. And this can only be done by this presentation of the particular object. I cannot be made to feel love, pity, indignation, by the mere pronouncing of those words; I must be shown a vivid representation of an object of love, or pity or indignation: then the feeling will occur naturally in connection with the object. I cannot love or pity or be indignant over nothing, or over an abstraction, a

universal. All feeling is concrete, particular; I must love a particular person or thing,—and so of all the rest. Such is the natural law of feeling.

These two elements of Universality and of concreteness seem so utterly, fundamentally, opposed to each other that it may seem as if a work of art were taxed with an impossible task to blend or unite the two as it must. It is here, however, that the skill of the great artist displays itself in the manner in which he takes up the ordinary, the particular, the average, and idealizes, eliminates, takes out something here and adds something there, so that you have the individual thing — man, woman, landscape, event, what you will — of the particular, taken up and put into touch with the whole in such a way that the spectator or reader may be moved and feel, and yet realize that relation of the object presented with the Universal. Sometimes this realization may be very slight, as in some trifling work; sometimes it may be overwhelming and subduing in some masterpiece of the world.

Tolstoi tells us upon this point that the artist must have the feeling himself if he is to transmit it to us truly and well; the mere passing over of somebody else's feelings transmitted to him will not be "infectious," as he phrases it.*

* Paraphrased and condensed from "What is Art?" page 93.

RELIGION

But there is a further work to be done before satisfactory unity with the Universal will can be attained. The mutual relations and the interchange of common feelings between man and man which we rejoice in and crave, and which are helped and fostered by true art, while they do indeed form an important and necessary step toward unity with the Universal will, form yet only a partial step, just as our fellowmen are only a part of that whole to whose will we seek to be reconciled.

There is still the craving for reconciliation, not merely with man, but with the all of which men are but a part. We still ask: "How came we to find ourselves in these relations? What are we all doing here? What is the purpose of our life together as a community and as individuals in this great whole of which we know ourselves parts?" This is a different want from the craving for human fellowship and harmonious intercourse with our fellows. It is a deeper craving and demands a more profound satisfaction. It has two sides: the intellectual desire to know, to understand; and the emotional contentment which is only to be gained by understanding the general object and purpose of our life, contemplated in relation to the whole. So only can all wills be rendered truly harmonious, by ascertaining their purpose and relation to the whole.

And all religions find in this craving their common basis; they are the result of the struggle, the effort, to find reconciliation with the whole; in short, they present to man more or less perfectly that scheme or plan of reconciliation which he craves, and must in some shape possess. Whether polytheistic, monotheistic, or what you will, they all spring from the feeling that in some way the individual is to be placed in relation with the whole and out of a discontent until this is accomplished. Very often this takes the shape of an endeavor to sacrifice the individual to the whole, either partially by self-torture, punishment, penance; or wholly by immolation, the casting away of life under some idea of obligation. In the earlier religions there is usually an effort to visualize the whole in some impressive way for the eye. By setting up an image, or idol, as it is called; or by selecting some natural object as embodying it, such as the sun — sun worship; or by some less gross, more intellectual mode, the mind tries to make for itself some symbol, some visualization, of that something which it feels must govern the relation of the individual to the whole. All religions have this elemental want at their base,— *i.e.*, the emotional and the intellectual craving to be in relation with the whole. Religion is the set and purposeful attempt to satisfy this want; its development, like that of law in the domain of conduct, is from a very slight recognition of the particular to a very careful and especial regard for it as a

part of that whole with which it is to be put in relation. From pagan cruelty and disregard of the individual, we trace a progress to the religion of humanity, as it is called, where the sense of obligation to the Universal, the whole, is almost lost in the endeavor to preserve the particular in all its particularity; and the healing the sick, helping the fallen, aiding the poor, are the duties chiefly dwelt upon, as if this care for the part were all that were required by the obligation all feel to serve the whole which is composed of the parts.

For this reason, therefore, in their early stages, their first endeavors to reconcile and put in relation the particular and the Universal, law and religion were simple, easy of application and of apprehension. Those nice distinctions, careful limitations, which were to preserve the particular in all its particularity so far as was compatible with its relations with the whole, were not invented. It was not then perceived so acutely as at present that the right of the particular to its particularity, in so far as it made up the total or whole, was in truth the right of the whole itself, which was made up of the sum of the particulars.

While a more intellectual craving than that for mere human sympathy, community of feeling, fellowship with other men, which finds satisfaction by art, this craving, of which religion is the satisfying instrument, is not devoid of a feeling of its own, variously described and differing much in intensity with different individuals. Until this crav-

ing is satisfied, there is a feeling to which the general name of spiritual discomfort or dissatisfaction might be given. In sensitive, highly susceptible individuals it includes and reaches to a positive agony of feeling until in some way the sufferer is put in right relations with the whole, or fancies that he is so put. Remorse, which is one of the names for the extreme phases of this feeling, we are told has sometimes forced men to walk barefoot in the snow that by physical pain they might palliate their spiritual suffering.

Remorse is, of course, the extreme, the intense, phase of that craving for harmony with the Universal, a phase of it rendered unusually keen by some immediate or particular transgression of that harmony by a wrongful act which emphasizes the out-of-placeness of the individual with the whole, the Universal, and renders more urgent the consequent necessity of getting back into harmony with it.

In the very opposite extreme of the craving, the milder type of the transgression of that harmony, we find that men lacking this proper relation with the Universal, lacking that end or purpose in their lives, are afflicted with that feeling to which the word *ennui* is sometimes applied, as expressing the milder type of unhappiness which results from lack of purpose in life. For lack of purpose is but another name for want of true harmony, proper relations with the Universal, the whole. It is this

that breeds that deadly monotony⁶ from which *ennui* springs.

The constant repetition of even the keenest pleasures fatigues and wearies if continued endlessly, for the root of the evil, monotony, lies just here; it has no future, no prospect, no vista, no purpose or end; it never reaches a climax or a crisis. It is its purposelessness that is the essence of its curse. It is at this point that religion steps in; its part it is to give purpose to the particular will, end to the individual life. It gives vista to the narrowest lot, horizon to the most restricted surroundings. It unites man, the particular, to the whole; knits his life and purposes, his petty acts, into the great Universal purposes, the mighty Universal acts. It gives to his intellect a scheme, a purpose, which includes his particularity, rationalizes it into complete harmony with the whole. But a merely intellectual comprehension is far from sufficient to satisfy the human craving for harmony with the Universal. Religion must appeal to and satisfy feeling, and this it does with its forms and ceremonials, its churches, its music, its services more or less elaborate; in other words, by its worship it calls to feeling. These are but its machinery, and they may vary as the individual feeling varies; some men must have, for their feeling of reverence, of worship, to enable them to realize in feeling their dependence and their subordination to the Universal, elaborate ceremonials, splendid

glass, imposing architecture, inspiring music; others shrink from this, and to them a white walled room devoid of all ornament, an assembly with no appointed head, a ceremonial which is a negation of every form, are the only congenial methods of worship. These are unessential means to arriving at that state of feeling which is as much necessary to true religion as the intellectual knowledge of the scheme and place of the particular, the individual, in the whole. For a mere knowledge, however correct, that I am part of a great whole, that I owe service and loyalty to that whole, that I must subordinate myself to it, moves no responsive feeling, although it may answer my intellectual craving to learn where and what I am in the whole. Feeling can never be awakened to such abstractions. Tell me that this whole, this Universal, is a great Almighty being, like, and yet far beyond, all human beings; paint his love to me, his care for me, his giving himself for me; and then feeling is aroused, and worship, which is the expression of feeling, is born. I long to bow before this Almighty power; I seek to express my devotion to it by gifts laid on its altar, by hymns and music voicing my emotions of reverence, fear, and love; I try to represent in picture or in marble my conceptions of that power; I rejoice in all the pomp and ritual with which I can surround that service, for so I vivify and stimulate my imagination to realize in feeling what I owe and ought to render in homage.

Again, worship brings us back from the par-

ticularity of our everyday world of feeling. All week long we are exerting and asserting our particularity, struggling with the world, getting all we can; and all the feeling that belongs to this struggle,—the selfishness of the particular, the eagerness to take, to win and keep for ourselves,—has filled us. To correct this over-emphasis of the particular, restore the balance to our feelings, we have worship that puts us in touch with the Universal; makes us feel as well as know our relation to the whole, rejoice in our subordination to the whole, long to give ourselves to it and for it, not coldly and intellectually, but with the fervor of the missionary, the martyr. We are made to feel our oneness with the whole and to know the joy of being a part, forgetting our particularity in this Universality.

Thus religion has its two sides, feeling and knowledge; in truth, the two are so involved that we cannot really separate them. No man can feel without knowing, nor can he know without feeling. Even a proposition in geometry carries some feeling with the cognizing of it; and the purest feeling of love to God must have some mental idea, some knowledge of the God toward which that feeling goes out.

Religion, therefore, is to be understood as the method by which, in these two domains of feeling and thought, man, the particular, the individual, comes into harmony with the whole, the Universal. By it he reconciles himself with the Universal, not

merely in avoiding all conflict of his will with its will, but by assimilating his will to its will, by adopting its ends and purposes as his so far as his capacity permits.

For religion means this and this only: true and correct relations of the particular, the individual, to the whole, the Universal; and, as a consequence of these relations, a recognition of the necessity of acting in proper harmony with it.

Whether the spiritual discomfort that results from a want of these true relations be the acute suffering called remorse or only the milder one of mere *ennui*, the cause is the same essentially. Life without purpose makes monotony, and out of monotony springs *ennui*. Even the most pleasurable experiences, if repeated endlessly, have upon them this curse of monotony, so that it is not infrequently the case that those who have nothing but pleasure after pleasure, repeated endlessly in their lives, are the most wearied and sick of it; sometimes kill themselves because of it.

Man knows he is but a part of the whole; he knows his petty purposes and objects. The various acts of his living cannot have any significance by themselves; they must be unified, brought into touch with the Universal will, or be cast aside as nought.

The struggle men make to attain a true relation with the Universal, or what they esteem a true relation, is constant; and the distress they suffer for

want of it, the satisfaction they find in its attainment, is the history of all religions.

Perhaps there can be found no better concise account of this struggle than is presented in Mr. William James' interesting work, "Varieties of Religious Experience." In it for the first time, so far as the writer is aware, are grouped together accounts of the innumerable individuals who in so many different fashions have felt the need of setting themselves in right relations to the world above and around them, urged thereto by a sense that it was necessary for them, as part of the Universal whole, to be in definite known relations to it, and to ascertain and perform all the obligations, ties, and duties that follow such relations. The degree of sensitiveness to this varies greatly in different men; with some the sense of the necessity of this orientation of themselves with the Universe is so overwhelming that they cannot rest day or night until it is accomplished; with others it is a mere matter of course that they should ascertain and accept relations with the whole, and perform the duties growing thereout with cheerful alacrity but without notable enthusiasm. To the former the joy of finding this true relation sometimes surpasses all words, while to the latter it is only a mild and gentle satisfaction. In this, as in other matters, men differ according to their character, but it is probably safe to say that with all, until this relation is established in some way, there is

at least a sense of uneasiness, of a something to be done before the man can feel himself right with the world.

This involves, as has been already remarked, both an intellectual satisfaction — an understanding of where and how he, the particular, stands with regard to the Universal — and an emotional satisfaction which is the prompting motive, the satisfaction of a desire for harmony with the Universal as expressed in all that surrounds and environs. If a man is to be in harmony with the Universal, he must understand, or think he understands, it. The intellect and the feelings, ideas and emotions, are inseparable: there is no feeling, however faint, without some idea; no idea without some feeling. No man can feel in harmony with a Universal of which he can form no idea — I do not say a necessarily correct idea, but an idea upon which his feelings may center and with which he can make his feelings and his ideas coincide with more or less completeness. It is thus each man finds his place and recognizes his obligations to the Universal, and by so doing reaches that state of harmony with the Universal which he feels compelled to seek. This feeling of compulsion is an elemental necessity, without possibility of explanation or further analysis; we can only say, so it is — an appetite, so to speak, as elemental as hunger or thirst. Different men describe this condition differently, but it all comes to this.

Professor Leuba, as quoted by Mr. James, thus expresses this reconciliation of the individual with the Universal, the whole: "When the sense of estrangement fencing men about in a narrowly limited ego breaks down, the individual finds himself at one with all creation. He lives in the Universal life; he and man, he and nature, he and God, are one." * And, as Mr. James adds: "A passion of willingness, of acquiescence, of admiration, is the glowing center of this state of mind." ** That is, there follows this harmony of will with Universal will which brings content out of discontent; peace out of turbulent, unrestful questionings.

At the root of all varieties of experience of this sort will always be found, as the vital point, the common characteristic that marks them all, one and the same thing in different dress — this struggle to place the individual in true relations with the Universal. Sometimes it is almost mystical in its manifestation, as when the poet Tennyson writes that "individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being; and this not a confused state, but the clearest, the surest of the surest, utterly beyond words; where death was an almost laughable impossibility, the loss of personality (if so it were) seeming no extinction, but the only true life." *

Perhaps a sudden transition from this to the ex-

* Quoted page 384, "Varieties of Religious Experience."

** Quoted page 306, "Varieties of Religious Experience."

pression of another, utterly different individual, Saint John of the Cross," * may illuminate the point further by the violence of the contrast of its mysticism and the bearing of it on that primeval craving for the whole, the Universal. Here are a few admonitions for the conduct of a religious: "When you stop at one thing, you cease to open yourself to the All." "For to come to the All, you must give up the All." "And if you should attain to owning the All, you must own it desiring nothing." It is interesting to remark the intellectual aspect of the struggle proceeding side by side with the emotional and illustrating forcibly what has been said as to the necessity for some intellectual insight to accompany the emotional impulse toward the Universal and unity with it. Very often this results in mysticism; the effort to understand the Universal, to state it in terms, goes on by a process of abstraction, a taking away of the particular and individual as if the Universal, the whole, was to be reached by taking away its parts. All sorts of contradictory statements are thus made; for, very naturally, statements that exclude the individual, the concrete, by which alone the human mind can know or have knowledge, become unintelligible.

Observe this intellectual attempt of that mystic of mystics, Jacob Behmen, to express his thinking in cognizable terms. "Primal love," he tells us, "may fitly be compared to nothing; for it is

* Quoted page 306, "Varieties of Religious Experience."

deeper than anything and is as nothing compared with respect to all things, forasmuch as it is not comprehensible by any of them. . . . And because it is nothing respectively, it is therefore free from all things and is that only good which a man cannot express or utter what it is, there being nothing to which it may be compared to express it by." * And again, "When thou art gone forth wholly from the creature and from that which is visible, and art become nothing to all that is Nature and creature, then thou art in that eternal one which is God Himself." **

This is only a mystical attempt to express the relation of the individual, the particular, to the Universal, the whole. In it is very palpable the difficulty of the task which lies just here, to preserve the individuality of the individual while merging it — as the instinct of man is always insistent on doing — in the whole. "We must put the individual," they seem to say, "into the Universal; yet we must preserve it there, save its individuality." From this theoretical position, this intellectual perception of the relation of the particular to the Universal and the subordination of the former to the latter, there results a transition in life and practice, feeling and action, to the asceticism of the hermit and the monks. The suppression of all egoistic desires seems a short and obvious road to a true relation with the whole.

* Quoted page 417, "Varieties of Religious Experience."

** Quoted page 418, "Varieties of Religious Experience."

The individual is thus lost, blotted out in the whole.

Christian and Buddhist agree in this essential, however much they may vary their expression of it. St. Paul's "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me" is translated by the Indian Vedentists into "Not a part, not a mode of that, but identically that, that Absolute Spirit of the world," * meaning, I take it, that thus the individual becomes part of the Universal. The reality is the same for each, but conceived differently according to their varying capacity. The man of the lowest intelligence, the savage to whom the above expressions would be as Greek, yet in his own way feels, thinks, and acts this essential reality of his relation to the whole, for every act that is not directed to self, that takes one step beyond the self, must find its reason and cause just there, in that sense of a relation to the whole, no matter how undeveloped or faint that sense may be.

As Mr. James sums it up, all religions have a uniformity of deliverance in this; they all have their origin in our uneasiness of feeling, which in the simplest terms means that there is (1) something wrong about us as we naturally stand; (2) that this uneasiness is to be relieved, the wrongness cured, by making connection with a higher power.**

* Page 508, "Varieties of Religious Expression," somewhat paraphrased.

** Page 419, "Varieties of Religious Expression," somewhat paraphrased.

To reach the Universal, to put himself in true relations with the whole, it is thus made plain, the individual must yield up something of his particularity; all attempt at religion, that is, at the right relation of the particular and the whole, go more or less directly toward this goal. How much is to be given up, how much preserved of that particularity? Here is the crucial question answered in a thousand different ways by different religions.

Perhaps we shall learn more of this by taking a wide sweep and going into an entirely different world from that we have just been observing. If we could study a man of an entirely different type, with different environment, in the throes of this struggle, we might gather valuable knowledge as to the essentials of the struggle. Fortunately, apart from Christian tradition (which we are so prone to regard as the sole and only source of knowledge when there is question of religion) we have an account, with much minuteness of detail, of just such a struggle by a man of great original force of character and entirely independent of all Christian or its preceding Jewish tradition. Whether we consider the story of Buddha, as handed down to us, entirely true or merely a legend invented by a deeply philosophical people to set forth their spiritual struggles toward the Universal, the story itself is equally instructive, for it is an account of the studied, deliberate attempt of a man to escape from the particularity of the individual to the Universality of the whole by way

of religion,—that is, by finding some relation, some proper placing, of the individual in the whole. It is the finding of a reconciliation of his particularity with its Universality; or, if we would be more concrete, the prescribing to his desires, wishes (his will), the limits that are necessary to make them conform with the Universal will of the whole.

Buddha, or as he is more properly called, Gautama, we are told, was born to great wealth and high rank; that is to say, he was placed in circumstances that served to intensify and emphasize the particular by affording him unusual opportunity and full scope to indulge without restraint his wishes, desires,—his individual will. He was the son of a Rajah, and gave himself to pleasure.

The Sutra of the Great Renunciation tells us that he fled from all this, from his young and beautiful wife, his luxurious home, and newly-born child. In the full flood of his enjoyment a young girl sang the triumph of his particularity. “Happy the father, happy the wife, of such a son and husband” were her words. In the word “happy,” as used, lay a double meaning; it also signifies saved, freed, delivered from the chain of existence. It suggested to Gautama a train of thought long latent; he put its suggestion into immediate action, and left that night all these behind him to become a despised student and seeker after truth. Penniless and homeless he went forth, a

beggar for his daily sustenance; and at last he finds a solution of his struggle. And what, then, was the answer, the solution, which he found,—or first, perhaps, we should ask rather what was the exact problem, the difficulty, that troubled him in the midst of his happy condition of wealth and rank? What drove him away from them into the exile of poverty and of wandering over the earth's surface?

We may state it in his own words, used when he thought he had attained what he sought. He declares that now he has become free from all desires; in other words, he has escaped from his particularity, and the solution which he finds is Nirvana, rest, negation, the destruction of all desires. In short, his solution of the problem of particularity is its destruction. He does not reconcile it with the Universal, he destroys it. We may not like his answer; we cannot doubt, however, what his question was: it was the reconciliation of the particular in some way with the Universal. It was this burden of his own particularity, expressed in all his wealth of riches and earthly satisfactions, that drove him forth into the world. It was the eternal problem that has plagued man from his very beginning. His answer is aptly expressed in a passage of the Buddhist sacred writings thus: "I say that Tathagata is emancipated by reason of the destruction of, detachment from, cessation, resignation, forsaking, and relinquishment, of all

imaginings, all agitations, and proud inclinations toward everything that maketh I and me." * Philosophically speaking, Buddha may be said to have overlooked in his solution of the problem the obvious truth that this negation of the particular, "everything that maketh I and me," is to that extent a negation of the whole as well, for the particular is a part of the whole. His answer is thus inadequate, unsatisfactory, and becomes more apparently so when contrasted with the Christian answer to the same problem. Christianity preserves the particular at the same time that it reconciles it with the whole. It limits and confines, but does not destroy. Its solution of the question is not a negation of the particular, which, if carried to its logical conclusion, would be a negation of the Universal itself; for the content of the Universal must be found in the particular; deprive the particular of content, and you deprive the Universal.

It is an error to which all religions are open — the tendency toward a negation of the particular. In Christianity itself we find again and again the revival more or less clearly of the Buddhist doctrine; for asceticism, the eliminating from the particular of all its content (its desires and wants despised and destroyed instead of ruled into accord with the Universal), is one of the commonest forms of religious teaching, both as a system and as the

* "Buddhism in Translations," Henry Clark Warren, Harvard University, 1896.

individual expression of a longing for a better and higher rule of life, i. e. as an escape from the particular and its limitations.*

But again we see emerging on this internal side of our subject — happiness — the same rule or canon as upon the external side — conduct. That law or rule of life which shall allow the utmost of particularity consistent with harmony with the Universal is the true rule of the highest happiness precisely as in conduct we found that the most perfect rule or law of conduct was that which gave the freest play to the particular consistent with harmony with the Universal.

True religion does not destroy or despise the particular; it cherishes and helps it to greater and fuller particularity so long as that is consistent with the Universal will of the whole.

Religion and art are thus both revealed as the efforts of the individual to escape from his particularity in so far as that separates and divides and

* It is highly probable that asceticism had its first and earliest beginnings in India, to the character of whose people it was peculiarly suited, for according to the latest investigations (Flinders-Petrie's "Personal Religion in Egypt before Christianity") there was no trace of the ascetic ideal in Egyptian, Jewish or Greek life before 600 B. C. The first trace of it is found in an ascetic community in Egypt of about the middle of the fourth century B. C. Its passage over from India into Egypt may reasonably be conjectured to have been by means of the almost universal dominion of Persia about 500 B. C., when Indians were serving in her armies and her rule extended from India to Cyrene. By the middle of the first Christian century the ascetic life was practiced by Egyptian, Jew, and Greek.

isolates him; for such separation and isolation are distressing to him. For his own satisfaction he must place himself in harmonious relation with all the world about him, both animate and inanimate, — i. e. with the great whole of the Universe. But it is evident that it is only the separating and isolating qualities of the particular that must be eliminated.

And the true measure of all religion as well as art must be the degree of perfection with which they accomplish the end of their existence,— that is to say, the end of putting the particular in its true relation with the whole. That religion must be the highest which, while allowing free and untrammelled development of each individual, brings that individual into the closest harmony with the Universal will. Religion is the attempt to hitch the wagon of the individual and particular will to the star of the Universal will. It finds a reason for the apparently unreasoning, senseless struggles of the work-a-day man for bare existence by exhibiting them in their true relation to the Universal will; that is to say, it exhibits the connection and relation of every particular and individual part to the whole.

And the same rule applies to art: that work of art is the highest in value which expresses most truly in the concrete and particular the Universal. The greatest art, therefore, is simple, dealing with great fundamental feelings common to all men, for such we know, as already pointed out, are more

nearly related to the Universal. As art descends to an expression of the lesser feelings,—the more peculiar, or particular, or morbid even,—it leaves the Universal and grows more and more particular, and so of less value.

Tolstoi, in his “What is Art?”* has well expressed this by declaring that all art is bad which, instead of inspiring a common feeling of union and brotherhood among men, tends, by the feelings which it transmits, to separate and divide, to create conflict rather than harmony of will with will, which is the only true happiness for this world and the next. Such art, too, as deals with exclusive feelings, feelings peculiar to a class or a nation, is bad, since thus it tends to divide men instead of performing its true and noble office of uniting them. Even the most trifling and simple feelings which are common to all men may thus form the subject of a true art which by portraying and transmitting them may thus tend to unite all men in these lesser feelings as well as in the greater and more fundamental.**

And so in religion; it is the separating, the dividing, feelings that make sin. Evil is the denial in any way by the part of its relation and subordination to the whole, the undue emphasis of particularity as against the Universal. This was the sin of the Pharisee condemned by the Master when

* Page 142, and passim.

** Paraphrased and condensed from “What is Art?” page 144.

he said, "Lord, I thank thee that I am not as other men are — extortioners, thieves." It was not evil for him to rejoice in his own virtue — that was a legitimate feeling enough; but that he made his virtues a wall of separation from others, that was a deep and fundamental sin. It was the same thought which led the Master to exclaim on another occasion: "Woe unto you, scribes and pharisees; you make clean the outside," etc. "I tell you the publicans and harlots go into the Kingdom of God before you." * For these latter have not that spiritual pride of virtue which is one of the most conspicuous marks of particularity and that cuts it off from the whole, separates and divides, instead of uniting and harmonizing all. A goodness that separates a man from others is not true goodness, for all goodness finds its essence in this, that it is the harmonizing of the particular with the Universal, the part with the whole, the giving the particular its place in the whole which it can never have if it harbour separating, dividing ideas. We have seen that it is only the separating, the dividing, elements of the particular that must be eliminated.

That religion or art that stirs up strife and conflict, that separates, therefore, man from man by expressing the particular so as to put it into opposition with the whole, is always false, unfaithful to its office; while that which brings them together by inspiring feelings of sympathy, kinship,

* St. Matthew's gospel, XXI: 31.

kindness to others, is true religion and true art.

For example, and to make the test of practical application: a religion which divides men into castes, fosters class feeling, fails of its purpose, for this tends to exaggerate the particular, to intensify particularity, and so separate man from man. So that ascetical religion which, going to the opposite extreme, would rob the particular of all its particularity, tends in a different manner, but to like effect, to separate. It deprives the individual of those common characteristics which serve as a basis to unite all men. It separates the particular even from the Universal, for that Universal will has for part of its content some of those very items thus taken away. To shut up men in monasteries and women in convents, and so eliminate those passions, appetites, desires, which are part of the content of all particulars, is to separate them from close sympathy and community with all their fellow particulars and so erect a dividing wall which, it is true, is new and different from that of their natural individuality, but nevertheless constitutes as effective a means of keeping them apart, out of their true relation with the Universal, as an unrestrained particularity. For if my passions, my desires and needs, force me into conflict with my fellow particular on the one side, where the satisfactions due to each may be mutually exclusive so that either my hunger or his must go unappeased; on the other side those very passions and desires are part of a particularity that is common to us

both, and so a bond of union and mutual sympathy and understanding; to destroy or ignore them is to destroy and ignore our common humanity expressed in them.

And again, that art is the greatest which expresses best the commonest and most universal characteristics of our particularity. Great art is, therefore, simple, seeking its motives in the simple and fundamental contents of our particularity that are common to all men. Abstruse, morbid, eccentric manifestations of our particularity, just in proportion as they are such, are unfit for expression in great art, for they are not common to all and so tend to separate and divide rather than unite men by calling forth sympathetic feelings.

Studies of morbid development of character, problem novels and plays, fall within the condemnation of this rule, and of course so do all other works of art which like these unduly emphasize the particular and its contents as against the Universal will and its supreme control, or which ignore that control by exhibiting some item of particularity, passion, or desire, exercised beyond bounds and uncontrolled. Such art as is briefly styled vice triumphant, virtue unrequited, is of this sort; in short, any artistic work which fails in its expression of particularity to bring it into reconciliation with the Universal. For art may be concisely defined as the expression of the particular in harmony with and under its true relation with the Universal. It is the expression of this Universality

in the particular and concrete that makes it art, as distinct from the mere copy or reproduction of the particular. Concisely put, it may be said: All art is the expression of the Universal in the concrete.

EDUCATION OF THE WILL

It is evident that a will, one of whose definitions is that it "is a method of reaction of the self to the stimuli presented by the external world," must get its content, the matter of its willing, from that world. Of if we prefer to consider the will in its other, broader aspect, as the sum total of the desires, ideas, wants, of the self, it is equally evident that until some objects of desire, means of satisfaction of wants are given, no exercise of will can take place.

Without these the will is in a sort of vacuum; it is blank of all significance. Nothing calling upon it for choice, it cannot choose. In other words, the will has to be furnished with objects, to be educated by experience. This first, we might call the necessary, automatic, education of the will. It gives it material, fills it with objects of choice, furnishes it with relations to other wills, and varies greatly with the state of society in which each will finds itself. The will of a highly civilized man encompassed with a vast mesh of relations, connections, occupations, objects of desire, inviting forth

his will, is a very different will from that of a man in a barbarous or semi-civilized society, whose relationships are few, almost none, whose objects of desire are scanty and simple. The questions of right and wrong in the one will be much simpler; no complicated conflicts or harmonies of will with will are likely to arise. The will of the latter will be so empty of content, of objects, of relations, compared with that of the former, that there will be a corresponding poverty of harmony or conflict by reason of the lack of content. The will of the savage man, of the ignorant, the child, the infant, is a very different will in its scope, content, variety, from that of the highly cultivated, the civilized, the educated, the mature man, not only in this — the primitive — sort of education, but still more in that store of conjunctions of substantive and acting ideas which form the artificial or secondary education of the will and which, crystallized into habits, we style character.

Thus it appears that the will is the subject of education; that it not only is built up, as already described, by series after series of experiences, and so by the addition of many conjunctions of substantive and acting ideas, as I have styled them, grows into a complicated and richly endowed faculty, but above all it is the subject of education by teaching, by the intentional presentation to it of substantive and acting ideas in such a manner that conjunctions of the two may be so impressed that they become inseparable. It is by this proc-

ess of education that character — developed will, if you choose to call it so — is made, and by such process all changes of character, moral reformations, must be wrought out.

This moral change, miracle though it seems, mysterious in its ultimate analysis, is yet governed by laws, and is subject to conditions which we may trace, at least in part.

We have seen the process by which naturally will is educated — built up step by step by additions made by experience — and change of will, moral reformation, is effected.

It is to be noted likewise that the richer the content of a will, the more subjects of desire, the greater its stock of ideas, the greater must be its capacity for happiness or misery; for the *summum bonum*, the harmony or unity of will with the Universal will, will be the greater in exact ratio with the number and variety of contents which thus afford opportunity for unity. How vast and suggestive a field for speculation this opens up to the imaginative soul who can thus see in every new object of sympathy or love, of knowledge or of feeling, an added happiness which will go on increasing from year to year, from æon to æon of eternity itself! For the soul grows larger and deeper with every added harmony of will. Its capacity for harmony of will with the Universal will grows richer, opening up an endless vista of increasing happiness for ever and ever.

Perhaps it is thus we are to interpret that saying

of the Scriptures, "In my Father's house are many mansions,"—that is, in the next world all men of harmonious wills will not be of the same capacity for harmony, and to each the harmony of will with the Universal will can only be of the quality, and kind, and possess the diversity and richness, which each individual will possesses. Each man will have the highest happiness he is capable of,—that is, the perfect harmony of his will with the Universal will; but that harmony and its corresponding happiness will be measured by the capacity of that particular will. Its happiness, while the greatest possible for that particular will, may be much less or much more in comparison with another particular will, according as such other will is greater or less in content and variety.

The greater the content of the individual will, that is, the wider its sympathies, the more numerous the objects of its love, its desires, interests, thoughts, ideas, the greater the harmony and its concomitant happiness, for so the particular will possesses that many more points of contact, objects about which it may be harmonious. It comes in touch with other wills in many more points, and thus its relations with all are multiplied. Its harmony grows richer and more pleasurable because of this increase of relations with other wills, for the harmony, as already declared, is not a negative but a positive thing; a will cannot be in harmony with another will save by having the contents of one will correspond with the contents of the other. And

so we may say — speaking, as it were, in metaphor adapted to the minds of the hearer — in the next world there will be many mansions, many kinds and degrees of that harmony of will with will out of which must spring the happiness in which each soul will find its abiding place, its habitation, its mansion, wherein to dwell.

COMPLICATED NATURE OF RIGHT AND WRONG

From this it of course follows that as these relations multiply and grow complicated, the corresponding occasions for conflict increase in exact ratio with the occasions for harmony. In highly civilized society, with many wills, with many objects of will, many relations of each will to the other, rights and wrongs, harmonies or conflicts, of a most complex description spring up. What is right or wrong,— i. e. truly harmonious or otherwise,— is not easy of ascertainment when these relations of will with will out of which all questions of right or wrong arise become numerous and complicated.

The contents of the will introduced thus by experience, impressed in the various ways already indicated (by sensations agreeable or disagreeable; by example, environment; by deliberate coupling of one substantive idea with some particular acting idea,— that is, by teaching) constitute character,

individual and particular; and this character is the will, and this will is the man in his very essence as good or evil. It is only by changing this content, these ideas, that any change of character or will can be wrought.

The manner of working this change of character is always something of a mystery, but it must consist in changing the character by changing these ideas which make it up, constitute it; these conjunctions of substantive and acting ideas must be altered. One of our difficulties in understanding the process grows out of our habit of thinking of character, of goodness or badness, of moral qualities, in the abstract, when in fact all the reality of these is found in the concrete, in the connection fixed and settled of certain substantive ideas with certain acting ideas so that the occurrence of the one always automatically calls up the other and demands its execution in deed.

It is because of this that we are so often surprised at what appear to the superficial view to be strange anomalies of character. We behold, for example, a man who would not for a moment hesitate about returning another's pocketbook, but who hesitates just as little about selling worthless or watered stock for more than he considers it worth, or accepting some personal benefit as a consideration for acting in some particular way in a fiduciary or representative capacity. Moralists exclaim that they cannot see how an honest man can do such an act. But the explanation is obvious. Honesty is

not an abstract element of character that acts alike in all circumstances: it is rather a congeries of specific conjunctions of certain substantive with certain acting ideas, and when some new circumstance occurs, some hitherto unknown substantive idea arises with which no fixed acting-idea is conjoined, there is nothing surprising in finding an acting idea annexing itself to the new substantive idea which does not agree in principle, as we say, with the acting ideas which by their fixed conjunction with familiar substantive ideas have given a character of honesty to the individual. He, coming into contact with new, unfamiliar substantive ideas, appears delinquent for want of the conjunction of like fixed acting ideas with such new substantive ideas.

In such a case it is the popular fashion to say that the man's conscience is not educated to meet the particular new situation; he requires teaching, instruction.

But this teaching and the establishment of character or the change of character wrought out by it must be by individual, concrete instances, just as the character itself is made up of this conjunction of countless concrete acting ideas, not of some one generalized abstract idea. The latter is the mere product of thought, and as such has no direct coercive influence on the will or on the translation of idea into deed. The abstract idea of honesty, for example, is but a label for a great class of concrete acting-ideas; it has no feeling or emotion con-

nected with it which would lead any one to perform some specific act. For the reason that all idea of a specific act is abstracted from it, I cannot convert the abstract idea of honesty into an act or have any desire to do so, for no particular act is set forth in the idea. It is a mere abstraction to which no desire to act attaches. It is not such a substantive idea that any acting idea can attach itself to it.

But the moment some concrete substantive idea capable of conversion into a deed occurs, then there occurs with it the desire to perform some act with reference to it. The perception of another man's pocketbook brings with it at once the acting idea of returning it, which compels my conversion of the idea into the act.

Individual character or will (for the two are identical) is the sum of all these acting ideas; or, more abstractly, it is the habit of acting under given conditions in the same way, a way marked out by the acting ideas.

To change character, to elevate or debase it, we must work upon this stock of acting ideas that constitute it and since they are all definite, concrete, act-defining ideas, we must pursue the same method in our teaching. By concrete instances we must impress new acting ideas upon the will. These alone have the power to excite emotion, feeling, and so again they are the essential of all attempts to educate the will, for so alone can the feelings be moved. This is made plain in all those

daily appeals to the will with which we are familiar.

The orator, the preacher, seek to persuade their audience, to move them to the performance of certain acts, by presenting to their mind's eye vivid pictures, instances of the acts toward which they would urge them. When it is sought to make men charitable, distressing accounts of individual cases of suffering, illness, poverty are recounted, suggesting to each mind the acting-idea of relieving the same. If generosity is urged, we are moved by the tale of some child who gave her few pennies to the cause presented. How often has the widow's mite been made to do duty in this way! Example is indeed a powerful teacher of these ideas and so a maker of character. Show a child the constant example of a parent who always bows his knees at the name of Christ in the creed, and that will be a very strange child indeed who will not bend his own childish knees when that particular part of the creed is recited. The acting-idea is surely fixed for it by the vivid act of the parent.

It has been noted that mere abstractions are incapable of exercising coercive power on the will for the simple reason that acting-ideas can never be joined to them,—it is only the definite, concrete idea that can be so joined; and it was also noted that the vividness of this idea or its contrary had important bearing on the degree of coercive power possessed by it over the will.

SYMBOLS, CEREMONIES, THE CONCRETE
PICTURE OR CONCEPTION

This brings us to a very important doctrine of the teaching, the influencing, of the will. It is the part played by symbols, by pictures, by ceremonies, by concrete individual objects in dealing with the will. These tend in their several ways to the production of a vivid concrete idea to which acting-ideas are easily joined, and which, indeed, themselves often suggest acting ideas; and with them they carry that all important essential, feeling, emotion, which prompts the conversion of acting-idea into deed. Mere abstractions have no such attribute of feeling attached to them, or when they have, it is always by means of some concrete picture which has transferred its feeling to them. Thus the mere abstract ideas of country, nation, God, have no feeling naturally arising with their presence in the mind. Whatever patriotic or religious feeling these abstractions command is feeling originally created by far different, less abstract ideas, by concrete objects which embody vividly the things of whose reality they are but the pale shadow.

For example, the king in many governments plays no more than the part of a symbol, a concrete picture of the state actualized with great magnificence to appeal to the senses and so through them to influence the feelings and the will with an eye

to conduct, to loyal obedience, patriotism. An acute critic, Walter Bagehot, in discussing the royal functions in the English Constitution, remarks that the king is only a theatrical property who fixes the attention of his subjects and attracts their obedience in order that the efficient parts of the government may utilize the same for the real purposes of government for which the king as such has no efficiency or value.

So in a less degree the national flag, with its bright colors flaunting the sky, the broad landscape with the sun and cloud shadows lying on its green sward and shining waters,—these bring to the abstract idea of country its due measure of feeling just as the human picture of God as a loving father brings to that idea a feeling that gives the idea of God power and influence over the will. It may be a very small and insignificant part of God's reality, his fatherhood toward men; his other relations to the rest of the Universe may totally overshadow that small part of him; but that is the important part for man and his will, and that translation of God into the concrete is the vitalizing for man of the abstract idea. Indeed, we have already seen how slowly man grasped the abstract idea of God, rising to it through infinite concrete ideas, the many gods of heathen mythology. This was the natural genesis of the notion of God, carrying with it as it grew the feelings which all concrete individual ideas do, and by a subtle transition endowing the abstract and highly ideal-

ized God with the feelings originally generated by the concrete ideas of the sea, the storm, the thunder, the fire, and so on, out of which the early gods were made.

This same process takes place in a very like way with every child as it comes to grasp the idea. To the child of tender years the idea of God must be translated back from its high abstraction to its concrete beginnings, the process must be reversed for it; and so God as a father, as being humanized and made man, is the only way in which the child's will can be educated to reverence, obedience, love, of him.

The science of government and the administration of the law, however, give us daily practical examples of the method of educating the will by emphasizing with symbols, ceremonies, appeals to the eye, the ear, the mind; with objects that shall rouse feeling and present concrete ideas with the purpose of so influencing and shaping the will.

The more vivid an idea is made, the stronger usually will be its influence on the will and its power to create an impulse to act it out in deed. What a moving symbol, for instance, is the national flag, waving with its bright colors from the staff, symbolizing for the dullest in a definite picture the abstraction of his country! For this man will lay down life when the very abstract idea of the nation might have so little of the definite that it would be hard to join it with any acting idea that would persuade a man to die for it. In like manner the

pageantry, magnificence, and state surrounding the head of the nation, the king, the emperor, the president, tend to vivify and impress that idea, and so serve to increase its effective power on the will. So of all the ceremonials of our daily life; the church wedding, with its robed clergyman, nuptial ring, wide pealing organ, emphasize, make real, the idea of marriage. So the forms and state of a court impress a definite idea on the criminal of the abstraction, justice, giving him a concrete idea as its symbol.

Religion especially finds in symbols and vivid concrete embodiments of its mysteries an essential part of its education and control of the will and character, for the mere abstract idea of the Universal all-powerful will with which the particular will must harmonize has little power to move the feelings. It is scarcely comprehensible.

To tell man of countless worlds beyond worlds governed by some utterly unimaginable power would not satisfy his needs, nor would it be intelligible to him. But chief of all defects, it would have no hold upon his feelings; it would not move his will. The craving of his heart is for human love, human intelligence, human care over all,—in a word, for that concrete something to which acting ideas may attach. The truth may far exceed this narrow construction of the Universal, but for man this is the only satisfying construction; it is his truth of the Universal. Abstractions have no comfort for his soul, and what is even more

to the point, abstractions have no power over his will, for his will can only be moved through his feelings or emotions, and abstract ideas have no appeal to these. He cannot love an unknown, abstract something which is called the Universal will, the immortal intelligent power; he must know it in some human, concrete shape that he can see or imagine like himself; otherwise it has no power to move his feelings, has no comfort for his emotional sufferings, his fears and apprehensions. He cannot feel in sympathy, cannot love, an impersonal power; he must, for his purposes, and that he may fulfil his duties as a particular to the Universal will, feel that Universal will to be to him a man divine, all-powerful, all-wise. That he may love and pay devotion to it, that power must be interpreted to him in human guise; so alone can he escape the awful despair of a particular who sees itself a microscopic unit in a Universal whole that rolls on regardless of his individual welfare, impersonal in its relations to him, relentless in its treatment of him, without human feeling or human regard.

He must have symbols, if you choose to call them so, of these realities. Without symbols, his emotional life, his feelings (which alone move his will), go unfed, unsatisfied, and finally die for lack of their proper nourishment. It is easy to mistake these symbols for the reality behind them, since it is the human instinct to more and more regard the symbols and disregard their meaning, to

substitute them for what they symbolizé. All history teaches us this. And so of God himself; the struggle of men to visualize him, give him some visible corporeal symbol such as their heart and feelings craved, was ever leading them into by-paths of error. Moses on Mt. Sinai, communing with the Lord in clouds and darkness, and the Israelites — hungry for less abstract, more symbolic, realization of his reality — making the golden calf below, is an oft-repeated episode in man's religious history.

It does not follow, of course, that the mere vivifying of some idea, the mere impressing on the mind some definite picture, some symbol, instead of an abstraction, such as the nation, marriage, justice, God, will of itself coerce the will into any particular act. All that the process does is to lay the foundation for joining to such vivid idea the acting idea, such as the dying for one's country, the observance of the marriage vows, the submission to the decrees of justice, reverence and service to God. What kind and sort of acting idea is to be joined to those substantive ideas thus vivified by translation into symbols, is another matter. This is moral education, that changing of character or building up of character which we study and which is, especially in its more complicated, higher development, not easy of explication.

In all the higher stages of this process there is an important intellectual element that does not appear in the less sophisticated. It requires no

intellectual effort, or at least one of a very simple sort, to join with the idea of food the acting idea of eating. But when we approach the highly involved, complicated ideas, we find the intellectual process assuming an ever larger and more important place.

The joining of proper acting ideas to substantive ideas may be said, indeed, to be the chief process of civilization so far as conduct is concerned, for the degree of civilization of a nation or of a man may be said to consist largely in the number and quality of these conjunctions of substantive and acting ideas which have been acquired. The greater the civilization, the more extensive, elaborate, and finely discriminated is this stock of ideas so conjoined.

The amplifying, refining, and perfecting of these ideas and their proper conjoining may be very well observed in the growth of the science of the law as it develops and perfects itself. The entire intellectual process exhibits itself in the trial of causes in the court as they arise and are decided. Such trials are always — as a matter of law apart from facts — the trying of this single question: was the proper acting idea conjoined with this particular definite substantive idea as exhibited by the facts? And the decision always involves a passing from some uncertain or doubtful conjunction of acting idea to a more certain and fixed conjunction.

The progress of a people or of a man in moral

education, in civilization as regards conduct, must always be measured by the degree of certainty with which its or his acts may be predicted under all circumstances. In other words, it is measured by the fixity and the number suited for each particular case of the conjunctions of his substantive and acting ideas. Often the conjunctions of these are not fixed, vary with different men or different nations; or they may vary with the same man, and we pronounce such a man of a vacillating character, signifying thereby that his acts cannot be calculated or counted upon.

But always in civilized society true progress is ever toward a greater number and a greater certainty in these conjoinings of acting ideas with substantive ideas,—with given concrete circumstances requiring action, that is to say. Owing to the new circumstances or new substantive ideas constantly arising in civilized life, there will always and necessarily be a large number of uncertain conjoinings of acting ideas with the new substantive ideas. It is the work of great leaders, teachers, reformers, to make these conjoinings of proper and right acting ideas with substantive ideas fixed and certain. Wilberforce in his dealing with the slave-trade, Sir Robert Peel and the corn laws, John Bright and free-trade, are familiar examples of how new acting ideas are introduced and of the process of changing character in a nation or a community of men.

New conjunctions of substantive and acting ideas are thus made, the stock of these has thus been

increased, and civilization has made a step forward. Once established, the reasoning, the appeals to feeling and to precedent, are lost sight of, and the conjunctions thus established become automatic, are habits of that society, are its character, its will.

Character, individuality, therefore, consists in this stock of what we call habits, fashions of acting, but which at the last are seen to be this stock of conjunctions of substantive with acting ideas. Appetites we all have very much the same, furnishing us the common substance of our human nature; but these other conjunctions of acting ideas we have superimposed on these, and they constitute our individual character, our will, in other words, or in reality ourself, for our will — thus understood as the peculiar and characteristic way in which we respond to all our environment, to the Universal will — is pre-eminently our essence or entity.

CONCLUSION

Let us see now whether we can gather the separate straggling threads of our discussion into anything substantial and valuable.

Briefly summarizing, we have seen that the only good thing in this world or the next is a good will; that a good will is its own reward,— that is, happiness is not a result or consequence, but a part of a good will. Happiness is simply one aspect, the

emotional side, of the good will. Virtue (the good will) and happiness (the result of the good will) are simply different views of the one identical condition of the soul; and that condition of the soul is the harmonious tuning of the soul into unison with all that touches or affects it,—i. e., with the Universe,—for a good will is a will that is harmonious with the Universal will manifested to us in all the manifold ways in which the Universe affects us, from man and his acts, the material world and its buffetings, to the remotest stars and their appearance.

Some unfolding of the true notion of will, of what it consisted and how its harmony with the Universal will was constituted, was then attempted, and in this connection it was pointed out that since the will thus explicated consisted of innumerable separate items, states of consciousness, conjunctions of substantive and acting ideas, of desires, wants, feelings and so on, the harmony and happiness of each will varied in exact ratio with the possibilities of separate harmonies presented by these; that the more there were of these, the greater, more intense, would be the happiness because of the greater harmony, for harmony was not an abstract thing, but a real something whose entirety was made up of parts, of individual, separate harmonies, each item of particular will with each item of Universal will.

It was then pointed out that this desire for harmony of will with the Universal will was as ele-

mental as hunger or thirst, and as little capable of any further analysis or explanation. It is simply the desire for happiness: for no man is happy with a conflicting will; all men find their highest happiness in harmony of will with will. In this connection, and illustrating one phase of will harmony, allusion was made to the great passion of men for conquest, money, power, discovery, achievements, great and small; the striking of a cricket ball, the abolition of the slave trade, the discovery of the Pacific Ocean, were all examples in their way and place of the satisfaction derived from harmony of will with will. The realization of the will might fitly describe this special class of harmonies where will and act are made one by accomplishment, internal will made harmonious with external act.

This, indeed, is the only adequate philosophical explanation of the joy gained by achievements that bear within themselves no pleasure of the senses to reward the doer of them. If we ask why should the discoverer, the scientist, the statesman, the scholar, struggle for years amid difficulties, dangers, tiresome details, to accomplish some object which they have fixed upon, one may be told for glory, honor, fame. But these are mere names; what are they in reality, and how do they give satisfaction to the toilers? Surely these are nothing more than the approval and recognition by others of the worthiness of the work done, the agreement of other wills with the wills of the doers.

So whether we consider the satisfaction of the man himself in his achievement, or the appreciation of others of that achievement, that is sometimes called reputation, applause, glory, fame,— it is plain that it is in its last analysis nothing more than harmony of will with will. For my pleasure in your applause or approval of any deed of mine is due solely and only to the agreement of your will with mine, the similarity of content between them, your will echoing back to me my own in your words of approval, of praise; and that is fame, glory, just as my own internal satisfaction in the realization of my will grows out of a harmony of my internal will (the idea to be executed) with the deed executed and accomplished and so echoing back to me from the external world of deeds my internal world of ideas, making a complete harmony.

It was then shown how, in this struggle of men for harmony of will, two great instrumentalities were employed: First, art, which is the great bridge of communication for feeling between men. It is evident that if harmony of will is to exist between man and man, there must be a sharing of feelings each with the other. No man is happy shut in upon his own feelings with no man to whom he can communicate; the first impulse of every man possessed of feeling is to express it in some external way; to cry out that feeling to another; to share it; to gain harmony of will with will by that means, and so attain the joy which that harmony yields. And so again there is a pleasure, in the reverse

order, of receiving the feeling of another so that the recipient may have and share the feeling conveyed to him. This is art and art's service to man. It unites all in common feelings. But there is in man a further desire, occasioned and growing out of his environment, out of the situation in which he finds himself. He comes into a world full of things — of men, animals, natural objects; he is exposed to all sorts of impressions of the senses to which he finds it necessary to respond in some way; he finds himself in countless relations with external things. He is like a mariner on a vast ocean; he looks for some beacon, some point of land or star, that shall show him where he is and whither he is going. He must orientate himself with his surroundings; this means he must have a vision of what his place is, what his purpose and part in the chaotic sea of men and things about him.

Until this finding of himself he can have no satisfaction, no rest; a feeling of uneasiness afflicts him, a painful confusion of thought. Like a wanderer from another planet, he is separate, alone; he has no connection with his surroundings, and his surroundings have no relation to him. In other words, his will and the Universal will known to him in these have no point of union or connection; the world and its affairs roll on regardless, cruelly regardless, of him and his affairs. The two wills — his, the particular, and theirs, the Universal — have no harmony.

It is the part of religion to formulate this rela-

tion between man and the Universe into a harmony. According to Ira W. Howarth's definition, religion is "the effective desire to be in right relations to the power manifesting itself in the Universe." That is, religion is the desire and the means by which, in various ways according to their several needs and capacities, men are brought into reconciliation with the Universal will,—i. e., "the power manifesting itself in the Universe." This requires a more or less elaborate formulization of the purpose and end of the Universe, and of the relations not only of men, but of all its parts to each other. Out of this again springs the duties of man to the Universe and all its parts. Morality is and must be founded, therefore, in religion, for it is only out of the relations of man thus formulated by religion that any moral obligation can find its sanction. This may be described as the intellectual side of religion, the plan and scheme by which man is placed in true relations with the Universe. But now feelings become involved, there is a satisfaction in a harmony of will with Universal will thus brought about, and whenever he violates the duties growing out of his relations to the Universal will, he feels discomfort by reason of the want of harmony which then results between his will and the will of the Universe as he understands it, as it is set forth by his religion.

To put the matter more specifically, this primary elemental craving of man for harmony of will compels him to ask: "What is the meaning of all I

see about me; what must I do with regard to it; what is its purpose with me? In short, how do we stand towards each other?" These questions are forced upon every man the moment he turns from himself and looks upon his surroundings; for he cannot think with any comfort that he and they are merely in a common chaos, that there is no relation in which they stand to each other, no common higher ground upon which and by which their apparent disparateness is united.

It is religion's part to answer all these questions, and all religions worthy of the name do so in more or less complete fashion; it is for this they exist, to orientate the individual with the Universe. What part the intellect of each man plays in this was hinted at; for it is a mixed matter of intellect which perceives and understands and comprehends the purpose of all and of feelings which crave the satisfaction that a knowledge of purpose and meaning bestows, instead of the bewilderment springing from a want of such knowledge. Until he formulates his religion, all the transactions going on about him, all the natural objects by which he is surrounded, are a species of chaos; they seem separate, independent of each other and of himself. This is distressing to him; it constitutes a will within him conflicting or rather not harmonious with the will without. He must have some understanding of this turmoil, perceive in it some plan or purpose and fit himself into that plan, before his will and the external Universal will can har-

monize. He cannot think but that there is such a plan or scheme which should reconcile him and all the rest with the harmonious whole. Such a reconciliation he craves as an essential to a harmonious will,—i. e., happiness in his own inner state.

Once let a man conceive in some shape what the purpose of it all is; let there form itself the picture of that great processional of men and things, events, happenings, and the whither and why of its stately impersonal march; and there follows not only a feeling of satisfaction that he knows his place, but also a feeling that he must keep that place, follow that march, be part of that processional. Any failure to do so causes unhappiness because it makes his will inharmonious.

The question of the education of the will and the importance of symbols, of example, was dwelt on, and again in this connection the nature of the will was discussed and it was shown that the freedom of the will had been unnecessarily doubted from a lack of a proper understanding of what the particular will was as a part of the whole; that my will was not less mine because it was a creature of the past as well as of the present. I am part of that past just as the past is part of me, not mechanically, but vitally connected, not separate and different from me, but permeating me, living in me, and finding its own fruition in me as its continuation.

From all this, therefore, may we not get a something valuable and worth our searching out in this

single truth which is the very soul of the whole matter, the legitimate gathering together of all the apparently scattered, disconnected threads of discussion,—namely, that the self for its own sake, to preserve itself and its individuality, must be part of the whole? Separate from the whole, by itself, it is not significant, is not really itself. It is the lonely cipher without its digits and so devoid of meaning. To realize its selfness it must realize itself as a part of the whole. Particular and Universal are not separate and distinct, but identical, different aspects of the one individual whole, the Universal made manifest and known to us by the particulars gathered together and united to form a single purpose, a common end of all. In their union they become much more than the mere adding together of particulars, for the particular wills thus united are like the bits of some fine mosaic; by themselves, tiny and without meaning, but when united, showing forth with shining truth the picture of the Master in all its fullness and splendor of significance. The picture was there all the time, a part of it in each particular bit of apparently insignificant stone, but only to be revealed when, all united, these, each in its place, put their otherwise unmeaning particularity into the great, complete whole. They, in their isolation and separateness, were the Universal divided and perceived in detail,—to our intellect a mystery, for, notwithstanding our metaphors, it is not easy to think

how the particular can be part of the Universal and yet still remain itself; still harder is it to understand how that particularity is more truly realized, intensified, by the losing of the particular in the whole, that it is there, not lost, but emphasized and given its true particularity.

There are, however, partial, imperfect illustrations of this truth to be found in all the various phenomena of our life. In the laws and the growth of society we see how throughout all social relations of men together there has arisen in each community of men a common will what might be called *pro hac vice*, a Universal will superior to and compelling all particular wills, yet a growth of them, a product of the particular wills working and modifying each the other, not, as Rousseau well pointed out, a mere adding together of particular wills, a *Volunte de tous*, but a *Volunte Generale*, a Universal will, that rises above all particular wills and yet at the same time realizes them in a way that by themselves, each for itself, they never could do. The individual will, by losing itself in the Universal and only by so losing itself, finds itself a higher and greater individual will. It is a loss which is no real loss, but a gain. It is vividly portrayed by the inspiring words of Scripture: "He that loseth his life for my sake shall find it."

This realizing of the individual will in the Universal, by which it touches a higher plane and, by going out of its particularity, attains an intenser

and truer particularity, may be seen in many and very various domains of will activity.

Lord Haldane, in a recent address * on law as applied to society, remarked that in society, apart and beside the express statute law, the various individuals composing it have established a common will — part of that Universal will, I should call it — “and in so willing are more than isolated men and women. It is not, indeed, as unrelated atoms that they have lived. . . . They cannot mark off or define their own individualities without reference to the individualities of others. . . . They are real only because they are social.”

And so we find the patriotism, the zeal of a vast crowd or of a nation, wherein the individual unit, rising above itself into the Universal will, suffers an apotheosis in a Leonidas, a Tell, a Luther. Were it not so, these never would have had the power to accomplish the deeds they did, for it was because they represented, even anticipated, in expression the latent will of all that they became the representatives and leaders of the individuals who beheld in them the intensified realization of their individual wills.

In a lesser and different degree, yet in a specially marked way, we may recognize this process of realizing the individual will by participating in the Universal will in the domain of our feelings. Thus a man caught up into the vortex of enthusiasm of

* Address delivered before American Bar Association at Montreal, 1913.

a great assemblage, for example, finds himself filled with an ardor and intensity of emotion of which by himself and isolated he is incapable. He is carried away, out of, beyond, and above himself. Our feelings touch reality as nothing else does, and so make us to know the truth and the joy of this losing of the particular in the Universal.

Simple examples of this are common enough for us not to recognize them as either strange or very peculiar, and so we fail to mark their underlying meaning. It is no uncommon experience of us all, I take it, to have felt the passion of enthusiasm, the intensity of feeling that has filled our souls on some great occasion when, in common with a vast multitude of our fellows we have shared some great emotion with them,—I care not whether it be of joy or sorrow; whether it be the triumph of the victory at Yorktown or the sorrow of Lincoln's death. Our petty self had lost nothing of its selfness when it thus lost itself with a vast multitude of others; its selfness was intensified a thousand times by its complete absorption in the common exultation or the common woe. It is the touch of the Universal; wherever it appears there comes with it that tremendous and overwhelming feeling which tells us of the mighty whole of which we are part. Our souls respond as to a master key that unlocks latent treasures of feelings until then unknown.

Who is there that has not felt that tingling of the nerves at the announcement: "The President of the United States!" "The Emperor!" "The

King!" It is not a feeling of personal subservience, of abject submission, that the pronouncing of these words inspires, but the consciousness, brought home in this vivid, visible image, of the state, the nation, and of the dignity and the worth that come to the individual when it is thus related to this partial Universal by this realized sense of the particular's place and rights in the whole, its ownership of the whole. Here we have a dim foreshadowing of the great truth and the possibility of the reconciliation of the particular with the Universal.

On this high plane there comes into view, like the snow peak of some shadowy Alpine summit, another and final truth, a truth of conduct. We now understand what the supreme law of all moral conduct, the law of sacrifice of self, signifies. In the clear light of our present position it appears not really a sacrifice of self at all; it is rather a truer realization, an intensification, of the self in the Universal to which it gives itself up. For thus the self, in yielding all to the Universal, receives back a far richer content than it gave up, just as I, with my feeble enthusiasm of patriotism or of grief, coming to the great multitude, get back as one of them a thousandfold more intense feeling than I brought with me. Self-sacrifice so understood is not a blotting out of self — a striking down of the self's feelings and will — but a filling the self with the Universal feelings and will. Only

am I truly myself when I become part of the whole and forget myself in it.

But all these are abstractions hard of comprehension; let us vivify our thinking with the contemplation of an example of how this great law of self-sacrifice has worked itself out in a concrete instance, the greatest instance known to history, for our reality is ever to be found in the concrete, the specific.

We have already seen that all character making must be by what we may call symbols, something that appeals to the feelings and so influences the will. Symbols are concrete, individual; make their appeal not through the intellect, but to the emotions. They must be understood as including everything that addresses the feelings with the intent of rousing them and so teaching them. Of all symbols the most powerful is that of personal example; act as you would teach your child or your pupil to act. And with the appearance of Jesus Christ on earth there came the teaching of self-sacrifice by personal example. The great lesson of the losing of one's self to gain a richer, grander self was taught, as best it could be, by the most amazing example, the crucifixion of an innocent man for the guilt of others; so that from that day the cross has been the mighty symbol of the law of self-sacrifice.

It has been the symbol of the reconciliation of the particular will with the Universal. In the ter-

rible light of that sacrifice the conflict and war and self-assertion of the particular against the Universal was forever condemned and set aside. It is in this light that we are to read the wonderful words that revolutionized ethical ideals. "Ye have heard that it hath been said, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth: but *I* say unto you" (mark the splendor of assured authority that spoke in that "*I*," setting at nought with a single stroke the teachings of the thousands of years of the past) "*I* say unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also." And again, "You have heard that it hath been said: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself and hate thine enemy. But *I* say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you." *

Here in this law of self-sacrifice we have the solution of the great practical problem of our earthly life, the reconciliation of the particular with the Universal will, the rule of all action, of conduct. Properly understood, this does not blot out the particular; it is rather its highest realization. And it furnishes the intellect with the solution of its problem, the relation of the particular to the Universal.

* St. Matthew's Gospel, V: 38 et seq.

RECONCILIATION OF THE PARTICULAR
AND THE UNIVERSAL WILL

Some of the attempts at this reconciliation have brought about merely negative results, have reduced the particular will to nothing and called that harmony with the Universal. Buddhistic teaching of Nirvana eliminates every element of individual will — its desires, ideas, cravings — and presents an empty emasculated shell as the reconciled particular will. Suppress your particular desires, destroy your natural appetites and passions, make the particular will a blank in these elements of its particularity; and again, blot out in like manner your hatred as your love, hate not your enemy any more than you love your friend. Observe how different is the Christian reconciliation of the particular will with the Universal. It does truly suppress the hatred of one's enemy, and so far it is as negative as Buddhism itself; but it does not stop with negation,—it supplies positive content for what it takes away. "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you." It leaves the Universalized will not a mere negative, a blank; it gives it positive content. On the other hand, it must be remembered that too great a content, too excessive a particularity, is in effect as evil as too little. The voluptuary who gives free rein to his particularity and the ascetic who gives none are both out of proper relations with the Universal, and the

results, curiously enough, are much the same in both cases. One destroys the individuality of the particular by excessive expression; the other by excessive suppression. For particularity, carried too far by the unregulated indulgence of every item of its content, every appetite and passion going its full length without let or hindrance, at last turns that particularity into a blank and destroys it. The body, the instrument of its expression, is rent asunder by unbridled appetites until it is incapable of further expression of particularity; and how much more the soul, the source and seat of all the particularity of the individual, that delicate, sensitive intangible reality that lies behind all the physical realities! It suffers by this excess a far worse fate, for its true particularity, which consists of and depends upon proper relations to the Universal of which it is part, is blotted out and annihilated by this disregard of the Universal, of the whole. A denial of its relation to the whole by the particular, which this excess of particularity amounts to, is a denial of itself. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die," is not a threat, but a statement of an inevitable result, for the particular can only be itself, realize its particularity, when in relation with and in subordination to the whole, reconciled and harmonious with the Universal.

Of what the true reconciliation of the particular will with the Universal will must consist, we may get a definite notion by beginning, not at the top, but at the bottom of the process. The natural,

instinctive reaching out of every man for a share in Universal common feelings of the family, the race, the nation, point us on our way, for the longing of men for the theater, the novel, the poem, for music, painting, all art, grows out of this desire to reconcile their particular with that partial Universal. They thus in art, in all its manifold representations, Universalize their individual feelings, their particular affections, by entering into the feelings and affections common to all men. This is the first step. Here we have not a blank, empty particularity as our result, but a richer, fuller, particularity, a raising of the particular to greater intensity, richer content, by the taking in and sharing of these feelings of others.

This is, however, but a short and feeble step in our path to the full reconciliation which we seek. So far we have preserved the particular will and enriched it with the content of other wills, and so approached the Universal will. We are still, however, very far short of our final goal; the road is long and difficult, full of pitfalls, false leads, and snares. It is by gradual stages only that this last and highest stage of perfect reconciliation with the Universal will is to be reached by the particular. First the particular will has to begin by making the feelings, the hopes, fears, desires, of others its own by entering into them and sharing them: this it does on the lowest plane by the enjoyment of works of art in all their variety; this gives rise to sympathy of feeling with others, and thus follows

a very natural wish to help and satisfy those desires of others by active work for them. The particular, the individual, will manifests itself in benevolent and charitable work; this entails a greater or less amount of sacrifice of individual, particular desire and wants to the desires and wants of others; so step by step the particular becomes more and more filled with the desires, wishes, wants of others, which, becoming its own in this way, are substituted for its particularity,—or perhaps we should say, become a part of that particularity; and at the final stage of all, when the particular will has at last of its own accord acquired for its own particular content the Universal will, we reach the ultimate, the highest stage of all, the perfect union of particular and Universal which is perhaps but a possibility to us, but which is exemplified by that last, agonizing yet joyful cry of the particular will as it yields itself to the Universal: “Abba, Father: all is possible unto thee; take away this cup from me. Nevertheless, not what I will, but what thou wilt.” *

For so must we interpret that cry. It is agonizing — else where the sacrifice? It is joyful, full of the happiness of perfect unity with the Universal will — else where that free submission of will essential to the act? Here lies the mystery of the reconciliation of the will: it is at once a giving up of all individual desire as witnessed in the request that prefaces it, “Take away this cup,”

* St. Mark's Gospel, XIV: 36.

and a receiving back of more than was given up, "What thou wilt." On this side of its manifold character it is summed up in that magnificent declaration of Hebrew inspiration so mysterious to our understanding: "He that findeth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." *

Well may we meditate this, the great and final truth of the particular and Universal will. It is the law of willing sacrifice of the particular to the Universal that we have arrived at. Its elements are easily discerned; it is a sacrifice,—that is, it must cost the particular will an effort; it must be willing,—that is, the particular will must of itself, without external coercion, make the Universal will part of itself; it must be for the sake of, because of, the Universal,—that is, it is not a mere negation, a sacrifice for nothing: it must be for "my sake," for the Universal,—that is, the emptiness of what is lost is filled with the fullness of what is gained, the Universal will, for whose sake it was lost. In mere loss lies no virtue; the suppressing of the particular, of passion, appetite, life, is of itself a vain thing if nothing is given in its stead. Loss "for my sake" does not take away alone; it gives something back in place of what is taken. There lies the very essence and soul of the transaction. It is the loss of a small thing, of the particular life and will, for the greater, the Universal life and will, that makes the

* St. Matthew's Gospel, X: 39.

truth of the mysterious saying. To truly understand we must obey it; in no other way will the deep truth of it become ours. Its joy and its agony are for the initiated,—that is, the obedient,—alone.

It is evident now that for the particular will to yield itself to the Universal is not to blot it out, extinguish it in *Nirvana*, but to give it its highest particularity. This sacrifice constitutes its highest particularity. Properly understood, this saying means the identity of the particular with the Universal will; it requires that the particular should take to itself all the content of the Universal, for so it must do when of its own accord it sacrifices itself for its sake. The particular adopts for itself the Universal will, and its particularity now consists, not of these individual, separating traits that formerly were the content of its will, but consists of the Universal purposes, designs, that it has, by its sacrifice of itself, made its own. Thus is to be understood that humanly contradictory saying, “Whosoever loseth his life shall save it”: he loses it in its individual particularity; he gains it in its universality, its identification with the Universal will. But it is a willing sacrifice; it is a voluntary identification of the particular with the Universal. In this lies the very essence of the reconciliation.

Or again and finally, we have arrived at the last law of the two wills, the law of sacrifice. This law we may trace back in smaller matters color-

ing all the conduct of life. It is the law that declares that the truest particularity of the individual is only realized when that particular is subordinated to the Universal. All particulars are only able to truly realize their particularity as part of the Universal, and so we behold from the highest to the lowest the law of sacrifice to be the true law of all the relations of life, of every particular to other particulars and to the whole. This is the solution of the problem of all our life together; all the relations of life are governed by this supreme law,—master and servant, mother and child, husband and wife.

The law which deals more particularly than any other science with these problems of the relations of the particular and the Universal affords many interesting views of them in the course of its discussions of how and to what extent the particular, the individual, is to yield up part of its individuality to the state, representing society as the whole as over against the part. In his "Law as a Means to an End," Von Ihering, the well known philosophical German jurist, remarks on this point: "It is the right as well as the duty of society to set its own interests against those of individual egoism. . . . The individual exists not only for himself, but also for the world; therefore, freedom, that which is expedient for the individual, must be subordinated to justice, which is for the advantage of all."

It is only as each particular serves some other,

and through that other the Universal, that its relation is a true one. Even in the most sordid relations of business life, where the object of each particular apparently is to get simply for itself, a slight examination will reveal the truth that no man is ever rewarded on this lowest plane except in so far as he has been useful, has performed some service to another. His worth and value as a particular — be it servant, parent, citizen, what you will of the various relations of life — is measured not by what he does for himself, but by what he does for others; and we have again a different vision of the law of sacrifice, for we see that the worth of the particularity of any will is measured by the extent to which it is Universalized by becoming of worth to the whole. To put it very grossly and in the lowest terms, we do not pay a man for his labor except so far as that labor is useful, serves not himself but others.

So the magnificent saying of Hebrew inspiration that has echoed down the ages, unapproachable in its sublimity and daring, sheds a light never before known on the relation of the particular to the Universal will, not only in its fundamental and final, but in its minute and, so to speak, less important relations of everyday life.

The whole practical wisdom of life might be summed up, not only for the next world but for this world, in that pregnant declaration: "Whoso loseth his life for my sake shall find it." The law of sacrifice is the universal law.

One word remains yet to be said on the internal side of this great law of willing sacrifice. Here stands revealed in a new light the identity of virtue and its reward as well as the identity of vice and its punishment. Heaven and hell are names for the harmonious and the conflicting will. If the reality of heaven be the harmony of will with will, so of hell we may say its reality is nothing more than the content of a will that goes on forever contradicting the Universal will; thus may we understand that terrible metaphor of the Scriptures: "Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." Could there be a more vivid picture of the vain, yet unceasing, striving of an evil will for its own ends and purposes against the ends and purposes of the Universal will. Baffled, turned back upon itself by the Universal, it ever strives and conflicts without end, without success, hopeless. It is the drunkard ever seeking to satisfy a thirst that is forbidden satisfaction; the perpetual craving of desires and appetites to which the Universal will forbids all satisfaction. It is a state of conflicting wills that makes hell. All men are now speaking of the horrors of Belgium, of desolate homes, famishing children, beautiful cities turned to ashes, of the dead lying uncared for in its fields, of the starving and the mutilated that are the only living creatures left. But these are but the faint external expressions of the internal conflicting wills that have brought them about.

And the final happiness of the particular con-

sists in this — the harmony, the unity of feeling, which now results with that Universal to whom it has offered itself a willing sacrifice. What a splendid and noble picture of the final happiness is here afforded! It is the apotheosis of what has been called in earthly phrase the communion of soul with soul. It is the interchange of feeling and soul of the particular with the feeling and soul of the Universal. We cannot quite understand this stated in abstract terms, and we prefigure it to ourselves in the only way by which it is possible to even imagine it, under the guise of human friendship. We think of the spiritual communion with the man Jesus Christ for ever and ever as the nearest possible imaging of it. Of this we cannot speak in intelligible terms under the restricted conditions of earthly life and feeling.

Here we have the definition of heaven, the spiritual communion of the individual who has, by the sacrifice of his particular will, come into perfect accord with the Universal will. What the intensity of this joy must be, what a reward of virtue, we can only faintly picture to ourselves, but of one thing we may be reasonably sure — that in this way, and in this way alone, may we grasp some notion of heaven and its joys. We have left behind us those vague imaginings about it, those stupid attempts to picture it as something utterly different from all that gives us pleasure here, on the one hand, as if the difference from everything we had ever known before were the main point;

and, on the other hand, we have put aside that Mahomet's paradise built up by simply translating the grossly material pleasures of our earthly environment to an utterly unknown realm.

To an earthly imagination filled with all this material furniture of sensual enjoyment, heaven — deprived of them and reduced to the mere sitting still like an Indian Brahmin losing oneself in contemplation — must seem a dull place, hopelessly stupid and uninteresting. There seems no active employment, no progress, no life. But the truth properly understood presents no such picture; it sets forth a far different story. We now behold ourselves in the stream of a deep and active spiritual life and growth in which the struggle of the particular is to gather in more and more of the Universal will and the gaining of an ever deeper and richer harmony of its own will with the Universal.

Here we have a notion of heaven that will bear the strictest philosophical scrutiny. For if we set ourselves to examine the various causes and sources of pleasure here and now, and recall which of them all might be reasonably expected to survive that great change of death, we must concede that all pleasure of the senses must perish with them. The seeing eye, the hearing ear, the tasting tongue, perish, and from these no pleasures of heaven can be drawn. And yet if we believe, as of necessity we must, that our own identity is unaltered, it must follow that the roots and sources of the pleasures

of our heaven must be such as to some extent at least are contained in our present identity.

We therefore require a pleasure independent of our bodily senses, which presumably perish with our bodies, and yet a pleasure for which we have a capacity in some degree now if we are to preserve in heaven our present identity of character and of soul. And again it must be a pleasure that depends on no external means, no material things, for producing it; we must bear its germs within our own spiritual nature; it must be something which we can carry with us from this world into the next.

Let us see, then, if we can discover some such pleasure which will even partially answer these requirements. I think there is only one to which we would be willing to attribute these characteristics; not that we know it in all its fullness, but that we have glimpses of it — short, imperfect experiences, a dim shadow of its immortal reality. We have various names for it — friendship, sympathy, love, fellowship of man with man; communion with God is the highest phase known to us. But to describe it in the most general terms, it is that harmony of will with will which we only know in these particular phases of it when we share with others some common feeling of sorrow, joy, indignation, any one of the thousand shades of emotion which from time to time fill our consciousness. It is not the kind of feeling, but the fact of its being held in common with others, the community of the feeling,

that makes it pleasurable, so that even sorrow and suffering experienced with others has its own peculiar pleasure.

Here we have the highest and most intense pleasure we are capable of, without exception. It depends on no material objects, is influenced by no external environment; even the particular feeling makes little matter provided it is a feeling capable of being held in common. This proviso is, however, significant; it excludes the feeling of ill will, hatred, envy, malice, and the like as not properly community feelings, as separative, dividing feelings.

This, then, gives us the real joys of heaven, the harmony of will with will and with the Universal will that is the perfect communing of all souls together in common feelings; which is, in short, the final reward of virtue, that communion of saints of which so much has been said.

This is no faint, uncertain destiny or state, this unity of particular will with Universal will, but something surpassing all we can understand or imagine. Nor will it be the same for all, a sort of general impersonal state of harmony; but it will be for each his own individual, particular harmony, his note harmonizing with all other notes of that great will orchestra, yet still preserving his particularity. That is, every feeling of mind, every thought and generous emotion, will find there its echo, its accompanying chorus; and these will be just so numerous and rich a chorus as I have made

numerous and rich the content of my will by garnering noble ideas, generous feelings, pure and elevating emotions. So that we may imagine every good deed on earth, every charitable thought, going to swell the richness of the harmony that my will is to have hereafter with that Universal will. This is to be the heaven of our dreams, but yet the heaven of our own creating; for it will be the content of our will harmonizing with the content of the Universal will that makes that heaven. Each man will have his own heaven, will receive to himself just so much of the Universal will as he can contain, and no more. His heaven will be an echo of himself. We build our own heaven with our acts:

“ Our acts our angels are, or good or ill;
Our fatal shadows that go with us still.”

Every kind word to another, every act of self-sacrifice, every gift of time, goods — above all, of yourself — to the suffering, the sick, the needy, are stones in the structure of that heavenly house of your abiding that will some day be yours.

Our heaven must begin here if we expect to enjoy one hereafter; with our own hands must we fashion it. We leave philosophy as such behind us as we approach the tremendous reality of this world as well as of the next, and enter this high but less sure region of mystery and imagination. Perhaps we may go a step beyond, get visions outside our prison house of flesh, those stone walls of mat-

ter, of the external world, apparently so real, yet in the light of this upward vision so slight, so little accounting. Now we catch a glimpse of the meaning of those inspiring words of St. Paul, "When this mortal shall put on immortality"; for this refers to no mechanical outward change, but to that great spiritual change in the soul by which, beginning in this life, we put away selfish thoughts and put in their place the thought of others, lose the individual and the particular in the Universal and the eternal. "The eternal thoughts of creatures brief" replace our earthly thoughts, and so we truly exchange our mortality for immortality. And thus it is that this mortal puts on immortality by no miracle, no sudden transition from one to the other, but by the slow and often painful passage of our souls from selfish thoughts to generous and sympathetic thoughts, from the particular will to the Universal will.

And here again are infinite possibilities, heaven opening above heaven. As we gather richness and power into the particular will that it may thus more completely mirror the Universal will, we shall attain to ever greater and deeper harmony of will. This we cannot think save in symbols, pictures of the soul faintly hinting the tremendous reality.

The Universal will in its abstract, unimagined truth we cannot think; but under the image given to us, the man Christ Jesus, the incarnation for our human needs of that will, we may somehow grasp the otherwise unthinkable reality of all this.

We can imagine the perpetual and eternal community of feeling with him as shadowing forth in anthropomorphic terms the great Universal will that governs and directs all, embraces and is all particular wills, for which our own will has yielded itself a willing sacrifice and, so yielding, has come into perfect harmony, boundless wealth of feeling; for it is that final realization of the particular will in the Universal which makes them one and indistinguishable.





